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School choice is becoming increasingly popular around the globe. Broadly the term 
‘school choice’ is used to describe the options available for families to send children to 
school(s) other than the one they are residentially assigned to. Private school choice 
interventions known as ‘school vouchers,’ offer public or private funding to enable families to 
send their children to private school. 
Research in 1970s and 80s by James Coleman and his colleagues showed a private 
school advantage in student achievement and graduation rates, in comparison to traditional 
public schools. Competing evidence was presented by Christopher Lubienski and Sarah 
Lubienski in 2013, claiming a public school advantage in student achievement. The debates 
surrounding a particular school sector advantage can be better addressed using causal evidence 
and using large datasets to understand possible mechanisms that differentiate the school sectors. 
This dissertation reports on four analyses of the possibility of a private school 
advantage, using a variety of data. The first study looks at overall evidence on student 
achievement in math and reading scores from causal studies on private school vouchers around 
the globe. The second study offers a supplemental cost-effectiveness evaluation of the same set 
of voucher programs. 
In the third study, nationally representative data on public and private school principals 
is analyzed to study principal autonomy over seven school-level activities across school sectors.  
Using the same dataset, the fourth study examines the determinants of principal attrition across 
school sectors. Principals’ stated responses to stay in the profession in the baseline year are 
compared to their revealed status a year later.  
 
Some contributions of this dissertation are evidence of vouchers increasing reading test 
scores more in comparison to math test scores and a larger test score impact in developing 
countries than in the U.S. The dissertation finds more autonomy over school-level activities and 
more likelihood to remain in the profession for the private school principal in comparison to the 
traditional public school principal. Hence, future studies may test the role of principal autonomy 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
My research in Kenya suggested that these poor families had always been able to afford 
private schools. Before free primary education, they were already in private schools. The 
real conundrum for me was why the development experts hadn’t already figured this out. 
James Tooley, 2009, p. 125. 
In the U.S., the status quo in traditional public education is to assign students to schools 
based on where they reside. School choice is the practice of letting parents choose schools rather 
than residentially assign them. School voucher programs are scholarship initiatives – frequently 
government funded or incentivized – that pay for students to attend private schools of their 
choice. America’s first private school voucher initiative was launched in Milwaukee in 1991 
(Witte, 2000). Private school choice programs provide public or private funds for families within 
the jurisdiction of the program to send their children to private schools. In 2018, 54 private 
school choice programs exist in the United States. Such programs extend beyond vouchers and 
also comprise education savings accounts (ESAs), tax-credit scholarships and town-tuition 
options for families living in rural areas (EdChoice, 2018). Inside the U.S., disadvantaged 
families are the main participant and beneficiary of voucher programs (Wolf, 2018).  
Outside the U.S., private schooling is on the rise in developing countries despite 
increased spending on public education and near-universal access to free of cost public primary 
schools (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016). Indeed, the private school share accounts for a fifth of 
primary school enrollment in the developing world (Baum et al., 2014). Research attributes this 
demand for fee charging low-cost private schools among poor families to the low academic 
quality of public education and high rate of teacher absenteeism in government operated schools 




It is argued that school choice can improve education systems through academic 
competition among schools and also by providing families a better match between their needs 
and schools’ quality (DeAngelis & Erickson, 2018). Studying school choice is becoming 
increasingly common and more data about choice programs are available (EdChoice, 2018). In 
the 1970s and 80s, sociologists James Coleman and Thomas Hoffer (1987) reported a private 
school advantage in student achievement and graduation rates relative to traditional public 
schools. Competing evidence claims a public school achievement advantage relative to private 
schools (Lubienski & Lubienski, 2013). Several studies argue for advantages in student success 
(over a variety of outcomes such as achievement, attainment, civic values and non-cognitive 
skills) for one form of schooling over the other. Arguments for advantages of private over public 
schools are purely philosophical (Mill, 1962[1869]; Paine, 1791), rely on qualitative evidence 
(Stewart & Wolf, 2016), rely on quantitative evidence (Coleman & Hoffer, 1987), are based on 
literature reviews (Ashley & Wales, 2015; Coulson, 2009; Morgan, Petrosino, & Fronius, 2015), 
are based on field work (Dixon, 2013; Tooley, 2009) and are meta-analytic (Anderson, Guzman, 
& Ringquist, 2013; Fryer, 2017). Other arguments for advantages of private over public schools 
are based on economics (Friedman, 1955), a theory of bureaucracy and autonomy of private 
institutions (Chubb & Moe, 1988, 1990), degree of family involvement in schools (Hiatt-
Michael, 2017), civic values (Wolf, 2007) and religion (Bryk, Lee, & Holland, 1993). Competing 
arguments exist for advantages of public schools over private schools (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; 
Gutmann, 1987; Lubienski & Lubienski, 2013). Some commentators argue for accommodating 
private interests publicly through pluralism in public institutions (Berner, 2017) while other 





 This dissertation reports four analyses to determine if private schooling enjoys an 
advantage over public schools in student success. Chapter 2 presents a first analysis that relies on 
causal evidence around the globe of the effect of using a school voucher on student achievement 
in math and reading. Chapter 3 presents a cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate the program 
impacts beyond the perspective of student achievement. However, merely looking at limited 
evidence from student achievement may understate the impact of private schools. Therefore, 
Chapter 4 looks at the issue of a private school advantage in student success over public schools 
from the perspective of educational leadership. Using a nationally representative dataset, chapter 
4 examines in which sector principals enjoy relatively more autonomy – i.e. if school principals 
can run schools without taking orders from higher-level authorities. Increased autonomy for 
school principals may incentivize them to be more innovative, adapt to changing needs of 
students and staff within schools and influence school-level activities that matter for student 
success (Hess, 2013; Ouchi, 2009). Private school principals may have an advantage over public 
school principals, due to the former’s more autonomy in influencing school-level activities such 
as hiring and firing teachers, shaping the schools’ curriculum and setting their schools’ discipline 
policies. Finally, chapter 5 examines the determinants of principals staying in or leaving their 
profession in both school sectors. The analysis tests if principals are more likely to stay in the 
profession in either school sector. Private school principals do not have tenure, have lower 
salaries on average and less opportunities for professional development in comparison to public 
school principals. Yet, the existence of an increased likelihood of principals in private schools 
remaining in the profession in comparison to principals in public schools may indicate principal 




The first study is a meta-analytic consolidation of the evidence from all Randomized 
Control Trials (RCTs) on school vouchers evaluating the student-level achievement test score 
effects in math and reading. Reading and math test scores are available and known with 
acceptable reliability in the analyzed voucher programs. English test score impacts are analyzed 
as a subcomponent of reading results for developing countries due to the importance parents in 
developing countries assign to English as a medium of instruction (Azam, Aimee, & Prakash, 
2010; Mitra et al., 2003; Sen and Blatchford, 2001; Tooley & Dixon, 2002). The results of this 
meta-analysis indicate that voucher programs globally tend to increase test scores over time, 
particularly in developing countries like Colombia and India with a large private-public school 
quality gap. Generally, the achievement impacts are positive and small but larger for reading 
than for math and for programs outside the US relative to those within the US. 
Inside the US, a major proportion of increase in the public school expenditures comprise 
the cost of staffing and infrastructure (Scaffidi, 2017). In developing nations, often the private 
schools operate with limited infrastructure and lower teacher salaries than comparison public 
schools (Dixon, 2013; Tooley, 2009). The participating private schools in the voucher programs 
generally have lower per-student expenses in comparison to public schools within the 
jurisdiction of the same voucher interventions. A global assessment of the cost-effectiveness of 
private school choice has never been done. Chapter 3 uses a variety of data from state, national 
and international-level sources to analyze the cost-effectiveness of the causal evidence on private 
school vouchers internationally. Results from the cost-effectiveness analysis of the experimental 
evidence on school vouchers around the globe establish that vouchers are generally cost-effective 




school setting, may have a net benefit for society. More research is needed to study the 
scalability of private school choice programs. 
While substantial school choice research focuses on student achievement outcomes, little 
has explored the mechanisms involved in producing such outcomes. The roles of school 
principals, for example, may vary between public and private schools. This could be important 
because principals should have an effect on school environment/quality. School principals 
possess superior knowledge of and an ability to influence school culture and learning practices 
(Hess, 2013; Ouchi, 2009). Chubb and Moe (1988) theorize the existence of greater autonomy in 
private schools related to structure, goals and school operations. Increased autonomy over school 
level activities such as curriculum, budget and personnel may allow principals to be more 
innovative and influence student learning positively. Highly effective principals increase student 
learning by two to seven months within a single school year (Branch, Hanushek, & Rivkin, 
2013).  
The third study presents a comparative analysis of the autonomy of private and public 
school principals using data from the School and Staffing Survey (SASS) 2011–2012. Chapter 4 
adds to the literature on educational leadership and school choice by examining the differences in 
private and public school principals’ abilities to influence important decisions at their schools 
from a nationally representative sample of 9,230 school principals. The self-reported influence of 
principals on seven school-related activities are analyzed: setting performance for students, 
establishing curriculum, determining the content of in-service professional development 
programs for teachers, evaluating teachers, hiring new full time teachers, setting discipline 




Results from logistic regressions indicate that private school principals exhibit more 
autonomy in influencing school level policies, perhaps explaining private school advantages. In 
particular, private school principals have a higher likelihood of reporting major influence over 
performance standards, curriculum, professional development, hiring teachers, discipline policy, 
and budget decisions. Conversely, private school principals have a lower likelihood of reporting 
having a major influence on the evaluation of teachers. Principals are those administrators most 
aware of the daily issues at the school level: more autonomy may help them address the issues 
faster. Perhaps, due to the heavy bureaucratization and centralized functioning of the public 
school system, principal autonomy is more robust in private schools. 
The final study in my dissertation compares principal attrition rates between the public 
and private sectors. School principals play a key role in determining school quality and a 
school’s academic outcomes. Principal attrition poses a challenge in maintaining a school’s 
academic environment. Principal turnover likely generates short-term shocks into the school 
system which may affect the school environment and student learning negatively (Branch, 
Hanushek, & Rivkin, 2013; Burkhauser et al., 2012; Mascall & Leithwood, 2010; Miller, 2013). 
Earlier research has explored the determinants of principal turnover in traditional public 
schools using nationally representative samples (Boyce, & Bowers, 2016; Mitani, 2017; Sun & 
Ni, 2016; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010). A comparative analysis of the attrition patterns of 
public and private school principals using nationally representative samples does not exist 
(Rangel, 2018). A comparative analysis of attrition patterns of school principals may be 
informative of the underlying school-level mechanisms that differentiate public schools from 





Using data from the School and Staffing Survey 2011-2012 and the Principal Follow-up 
Survey 2012, the final study in the dissertation compares principal attrition between public and 
private schools. Principals’ stated preferences on a prior year baseline survey are compared to 
their revealed status a year later on a follow-up survey. The research presented in chapter 5 
reports significant differences in principal attrition between public and private schools. Results 
show that private school principals are significantly more likely than their public school peers to 
intend to stay in the principal profession. The chapter reports that principals stated preferences a 
year before stand in contrast to their revealed status a year later. Although privately school 
principals are significantly more likely to intend to stay in the profession in comparison to their 
public counterparts at the baseline year survey, at the follow-up year, the results do not reveal a 
statistically significant difference. As most private school principals teach at their schools, they 
may be utilizing principalship to gain teaching experience and later return to teaching in the 
same schools (Chubb & Moe, 1988). Such a change from principalship to teaching is less likely 
for principals in public schools, probably because of bureaucratic rules and specialization (Gerth 
& Mills, 1946), and a greater social distance between teachers and principals in public schools in 
comparison to private schools (Ingersoll, 2003).  
The contributions of this dissertation are: a) establishing that private school vouchers tend 
to increase reading score more in comparison to math test scores, b) establishing modest 
advantages of private schooling on student achievement, particularly outside the US, c) 
establishing that vouchers are generally cost-effective and even null impacts, if obtained at a 
lower per-student cost in comparison to public school settings, may yield a net benefit for 
society, d) presence of more autonomy for private school principals over school-level activities 




profession for the private school principal in comparison to their public counterparts, with 
evidence of a disconnect between principals’ stated preferences versus their revealed status.  
These findings should be taken with caution, however, as merely 11 voucher programs have been 
analyzed causally around the globe, and data from studies on school principals are not connected 
to student outcomes.  
The next chapter investigates the experimental evidence on the use of private school 
vouchers around the globe. Chapter 3 explores the cost-effectiveness of the aforementioned 
experimental evidence on vouchers. Thereafter, comparative principal autonomy in the public 
and private school sectors is studied in chapter 4 using a nationally representative dataset. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the same nationally representative dataset to study comparative principal 
attrition from the principal profession in public and private schools. Lastly, chapter 6 concludes 
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1. Introduction  
In the United States, families are typically residentially assigned to schools. School 
choice is the practice to let parents choose schools for their children rather than residentially 
assign them. School choice is a salient market-based school reform globally. School vouchers are 
a mechanism by which resources are provided to families that enable them to attend a private 
school of their choosing (Wolf, 2008a). Strictly speaking, a private school choice initiative is 
only a “voucher program” if the government funds the program directly out of an appropriation 
and the “voucher” only purchases educational services from a single provider. Other private 
school choice initiatives are funded indirectly, through tax credits provided to businesses or 
individuals who contribute to nonprofit scholarship-granting organizations. Such arrangements 
are commonly called tax-credit or opportunity scholarship programs. This study is the first meta-
analytic consolidation of the evidence from all Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) evaluating the 
student-level achievement test score effects of school vouchers internationally. Our search 
process turned up 9,443 potential studies, 20 of which ultimately were included. These 20 studies 
represent 11 different voucher programs, eight in the U.S. and three in non-U.S. countries. We 
present math and reading outcomes when available, and present English results as a 
subcomponent of the reading effects in the international context to account for differences 
between English and the local language.  
The funding structure of a voucher program in Colombia involved the use of student 
performance incentives, and the voucher program in Louisiana contained test-based 
accountability provisions not found in any of the other programs included in our study. We 




Economist Milton Friedman (1955) put forth the first concrete school voucher proposal. 
He argued that government should provide funds in support of compulsory education but need 
not deliver the schooling itself. Vouchers are a form of government outsourcing wherein the 
government provides funds to socioeconomically disadvantaged families to select private schools 
for educating their children. Supporters of vouchers claim that participating students will learn 
more, either by accessing higher-quality schools, or because the chosen private school will be a 
better match for the student’s particular needs. It is expected that parents of these children are 
motivated to figure out their child’s needs. 
Whether or not students benefit from school vouchers is a fiercely contested empirical 
question (Doolittle & Connors, 2001). For example, education historian Diane Ravitch describes 
school vouchers as a “hoax” that has failed to benefit participants (Ravitch, 2014). Richard 
Murnane (2005, p. 181), in contrast, argues: “Providing families who lack resources with 
educational choices makes sense. The consequences of attempting to do this through a large-
scale voucher…system are unknown. Carefully designed experiments could provide critical 
knowledge.” 
Experimental design is critical to evaluating school voucher programs because of 
concerns about selection bias. Some families may be more educationally motivated to find a 
better match between their child’s needs and the chosen private school. Additionally, some 
families may seek quality education in accord with a religious nature and mission orientation of 
the chosen private school. Generally, we expect that more motivated and able families self-sort 
into private schools and/or voucher programs, though some within-study comparisons indicate 
this is not always the case (e.g. Anderson & Wolf, 2017). Fortunately, much of the research on 




assignment experiments that control for self-selection in expectation. Random assignment 
assumes that assignment of a private school to a family is no longer due to selection by a family 
but rather due to chance. Thus, any effect of private schooling is causal in theory. However, the 
caveat is that families who apply to such voucher programs may be motivated differently than 
families that do not apply for the voucher programs. Similarly private schools that participate in 
voucher programs may be different than private schools that choose not to participate in voucher 
programs. Both of these factors limit the external validity of experimental voucher findings. 
In this meta-analysis we consolidate the evidence from 20 experimental evaluations of 
the achievement impacts of private school choice programs in the U.S., India, and Colombia. We 
primarily focus on estimates of the effect of using a voucher to attend a private school, referred 
to as the Treatment on the Treated (TOT) program effect, for several reasons. First, expanding 
access to private schools of choice is the key purpose of school voucher programs. The effects of 
private schooling specifically on the kinds of students who will access it with the support of 
vouchers is the most policy-relevant piece of information regarding school choice programs. 
Thus, the TOT effect of private school voucher use is considered by some analysts to be the 
policy-relevant effect parameter for school-choice interventions (Bifulco, 2012; Cowen, 2008; 
Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson, 2002). Second, the TOT effect is less sensitive to the rate 
at which voucher recipients use a voucher when offered and the rate at which control group 
students “crossover” to private schooling in the experiment. As such, the TOT estimate of the 
effect of private schooling is more consistent across programs. We also report in the appendices 
the experimental results for the mere offer of a voucher through winning a lottery, referred to as 
the Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effect, which is the pure experimental impact from the evaluations but 




We focus on reading and mathematics achievement for three reasons. First, they are 
measures of academic achievement. Schools are charged with enhancing student learning, so 
test-score outcomes are a proper measure of the effect of an intervention like school choice that 
expands the schooling options of students. Second, measures of reading and math achievement 
with known and acceptable reliability1 are available around the globe. Third, the reading and 
math effects of private school choice programs are the only types of program effects that are 
sufficiently common to provide the foundation for a meta-analysis.  
Very few voucher RCTs have systematically evaluated non-math and non-reading test 
score or even non-achievement outcomes. The evaluation of the PACES program in Colombia 
showed that lottery winners were ten percentage points more likely to finish 8th grade after three 
years. Lottery winners were also less likely to marry or cohabit as teenagers (Angrist, Bettinger, 
Bloom, King, & Kremer, 2002). Wolf et al. (2013) reported a positive impact on high school 
graduation in the evaluation of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP). The Louisiana 
Scholarship Program (LSP) showed statistically significant negative impacts of voucher usage on 
student achievement in science and social studies in its first (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak & Walters, 
2015) and second (Mills & Wolf, 2016) years. By its third year, the LSP negative effect was 
statistically significant only for social studies (Mills & Wolf, 2017). Bettinger and Slonim (2006) 
reported positive and statistically significant effects of a voucher intervention on students’ 
altruism towards charitable organizations but not towards their peers. The Andhra Pradesh 
school choice experiment showed no difference between test scores of lottery winners and losers 
on science and social studies after two and four years of the program (Muralidharan & 
Sundararaman, 2015). Although these non-reading and non-math experimental outcomes from 
                                                     





voucher studies are interesting, there are too few of them to consolidate into our formal meta-
analysis without introducing a substantial amount of statistical noise due to the diversity in 
distinctive outcomes and their associated measurement issues. Thus, we focus on reading and 
math test scores here. 
Additionally, we examine English impacts as a subcomponent of reading results for 
developing countries. We do so because parents in developing countries assign high importance 
to English during the school selection process due to its likely association with increased 
academic opportunities and a higher economic return from the job market (Azam, Aimee, & 
Prakash, 2013; Mitra, Tooley, Inamdar, & Dixon, 2003; Sen and Blatchford, 2001; Tooley & 
Dixon, 2002). 
2. Private school choice programs around the world 
Government or philanthropic efforts providing greater access to private schools of choice 
are common around the world (e.g. Glenn, De Groof, & Candal, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 2012d; 
Wolf & Macedo, 2004). Voucher programs are either universal or targeted. Universal programs 
offer funding to all school-age children in a jurisdiction. 
Universal private school choice programs operate in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, 
Sweden, France, and other European and Commonwealth countries, mainly based on a 
constitutional right for parents to educate their children within a particular religious, 
philosophical, or pedagogical tradition (Glenn, 1989). A universal school voucher program has 
operated in Chile since the 1980s (Mizala & Romaguera, 2000). Of the 54 private school choice 
programs in 28 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia, nine are universal or nearly universal in 




in the U.S. are in the states of Arizona (2 programs), Georgia, Montana, and Nevada; the rural 
areas of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont; and the urban area of Cleveland, Ohio. 
 Targeted programs have eligibility requirements that limit private school choice to certain 
disadvantaged populations of students, typically those with low family incomes or disabilities. 
Private school choice programs targeted to low-income students operate in Colombia, regions of 
India and Pakistan, and several developing countries in Africa. Many of these initiatives provide 
the equivalent of around $200/year to fund schooling at very low-cost private schools operated 
by education entrepreneurs (Dixon, 2013; Tooley, 2009). The U.S. is home to 45 targeted private 
school choice programs, of which 23 are means-tested, 17 are limited to students with 
disabilities, one is restricted to students attending failing public schools in Ohio, and four are 
doubly-targeted to low-income students in low-performing schools (EdChoice, 2017). The 
means-tested private school choice programs in the U.S. provide scholarships that range widely 
in size from around $1,000 to $13,000, with the lower-cost scholarship programs typically 
requiring families to contribute to the cost of private schooling. Vouchers for students with 
disabilities are typically larger, cover the full cost of educating the child, and in some cases are 
priced on a sliding scale based on the severity of the child’s disability.     
 Private school choice is increasingly common throughout the U.S.2 and the world. The 
research base on the effectiveness of voucher programs has been reviewed by multiple scholars 
over the past nine years, but those reviews do not render a clear judgment regarding whether 
students are helped or harmed academically by access to private school choice. In the next 
                                                     
2 The newest form of private school choice in the U.S., education savings accounts (ESAs), permit parents to secure 
educational services from multiple private providers (Butcher & Burke, 2016). Other programs, in the U.S. and 
globally, use scholarships funded through private donations and philanthropy, with no extra government tax 
incentive involved. This study does not cover ESAs, because no experimental evaluations of their effects on student 
outcomes yet exist. Since privately-funded scholarships, tax-credit scholarships and school vouchers accomplish the 
same general purpose of expanding access to private schooling, we generally treat all three types of programs as 




section, we review the systematic reviews of voucher effectiveness to evaluate if they reveal a 
clear, consistent and indisputable judgement on the achievement effect of vouchers. 
3. A review of the systematic reviews of voucher effectiveness 
From 2008 through 2017, 15 reviews of the achievement effects of private school choice 
in the U.S. have been published as reports, working papers, or journal articles. This plethora of 
school voucher research reviews underscores the salience of the topic. A meta-analysis is a 
statistical method to combine evidence from several studies on a chosen topic to develop an 
overall conclusion on the effectiveness of the evidence on the selected topic. Often, a meta-
analysis combines the effect sizes on a selected outcome across several studies based on a similar 
methodology to evaluate if the overall evidence on the topic is statistically significant. Without 
methodological coherence, one cannot tell if the findings from different studies vary because the 
intervention truly had heterogeneous effects or simply because some of the research designs 
were biased in estimating the effect. The ideal meta-analysis is up-to-date, includes only studies 
with similar methodologies, is comprehensive, and provides a specific and verifiable 
determination of the average effect of an intervention on an important outcome (Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004, pp. 324-328). Private 
schools account for at least a fifth of the share of total primary school enrollment in developing 
countries (Baum et al., 2014). The private school sector has witnessed continuous growth in the 
last two decades in the developing world, despite near-universal access to free public primary 
schools and increases in government spending on public education (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 
2016). Thus, an ideal meta-analysis on the effectiveness of private school vouchers should 
incorporate studies from around the globe. We add to the standard set of four desirable meta-




None of the 15 existing reviews, however, satisfies even three of the five criteria for an ideal 
meta-analysis, and seven satisfy none of them (Table 1).  
Although some of these reviews are nearly current (Egalite & Wolf, 2016; Forster, 2016; 
Fryer, 2017; Lubienski & Brewer, 2016), none of them include the two most recent experimental 
studies of school vouchers (Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017; Mills & Wolf, 
2017). Only seven of the reviews are methodologically coherent, restricting their scope to 
evaluations with experimental designs (Egalite & Wolf, 2016; Forster, 2011; 2013; 2016; Fryer, 
2017; Morgan, Petrosino & Fronius, 2015; Wolf, 2008b). Only two reviews (Egalite & Wolf, 
2016; Forster, 2016) include all studies available at the time of publication that fit the inclusion 
category of the authors of these reviews, described in Section 4 and Appendix A. Only two 
reviews (Anderson, Guzman & Ringquist, 2013; Fryer, 2017) are formal meta-analyses that 
include overall effect point estimates and confidence levels, with the other 13 studies being only 
literature reviews. The Anderson, Guzman, and Ringquist (2015) meta-analysis includes 17 U.S. 
school voucher studies of widely varying methodological designs. The Fryer (2017) meta-
analysis is limited to school choice experiments but mixes RCTs of public school choice in with 
those of private school choice. 
 A final limitation of 13 of the existing reviews of voucher studies is their geographic 
focus. Eleven of them limit their consideration to the U.S. while Morgan, Petrosino and Fronius 
(2015) restrict their scope to developing countries and Fryer (2017) restricts its scope to 
developed countries. Epple, Romano, & Urquiola (2015) and Coulson (2009) are the only 






Table 1. Extent to Which Previous Voucher Reviews Satisfy the Conditions for an Ideal Meta-
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 X X   Null to positive, 
encouraging 
Fryer (2017)  X  X  Null to positive, 
encouraging 
Previous selective reviews vary greatly in their conclusions regarding the effectiveness of 
vouchers. Based on these reviews, school vouchers have no effect on student achievement 




Petrosino & Fronius, 2015) or produce some mix of null to positive effects that are either 
encouraging to the authors (Egalite & Wolf, 2016; Epple, Romano, & Urquiola, 2015; Coulson, 
2009; Fryer, 2017; Rouse & Barrow, 2009; Miron, Evergreen, & Urschel, 2008; Wolf, 2008b) or 
discouraging to them (Anderson, Guzman, & Ringquist, 2013; Lubienski & Brewer, 2016; 
Lubienski & Weitzel, 2008). Most of the individual studies covered in the reviews are only 
modestly powered to detect voucher effects, having analytic samples of less than 1,000 students 
in the final evaluation year. The many findings of “no significant effects” could be due to either 
limited power of studies to detect a significant effect, noisy data or the absence of a true school 
voucher effect. None of the reviews includes recent studies from 2017 that have generated 
extensive policy and media interest. Given the lack of any contemporary, complete, statistical 
meta-analysis of the effect of private school vouchers on student achievement around the world, 
this study offers a clear contribution to the literature on private school choice. 
4. Method  
4-A. Search strategy  
For this meta-analysis, we identified publications from systematic computer and 
networked searches primarily through the EBSCO, JSTOR, and ProQuest databases, with 
Google Scholar used for additional checks. Lastly, we utilized subject matter experts in the field 
and snowballing techniques to find additional relevant studies missed by the systematic search. 
We identified 9,443 articles which ultimately produced 20 qualified RCTs meeting our key 
inclusion criteria. Specifically, to be included, a study had to be an experimental evaluation 
based on random assignment, include as an outcome individual student-level test scores in either 
math, reading, or both, and be available in English (see Section 4-B and Appendix A for details). 




not include studies of the competitive effects of vouchers on traditional public school students or 
papers focusing on fiscal outcomes. Similarly, studies on participant effects of other private 
school choice programs like Tax Credit Scholarship programs were excluded, as those programs 
are not relevant to this review. Studies were not limited by publication date or publication status. 
The initial search process began in mid-2015 and yielded 16 qualified RCTs, after which we 
relied on network searches that identified four additional studies (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & 
Walters, 2015; Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017; Mills & Wolf, 2017; Wolf, 
Egalite, & Dixon, 2015). The network searches involved contacting scholars who had produced 
experimental voucher studies previously and asking them if we were missing any unpublished or 
contemporary studies. We also monitored a daily Google alert list generated by the keywords 
“school choice.”  
 We focused on identifying RCT (a.k.a. experimental) studies for several reasons. First, 
RCTs are the “gold standard” of program evaluation in terms of assessing causal relationships 
(e.g. Mosteller & Boruch, 2002; Pirog, Buffardi, Chrisinger, Singh, & Briney, 2009; Rossi, 
Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004). The random assignment of subjects in RCTs creates a treatment 
group (in this case, those receiving the offer of a voucher) and a control group (those who did not 
receive the offer of a voucher) that are similar to each other in expectation regarding all 
measurable and unmeasurable characteristics. This similarity is important when evaluating 
private school choice programs, since families who self-select into private schools likely differ 
from other families in unmeasurable ways that affect subsequent student achievement. In RCTs, 




expectation. Thus, random assignment of a voucher generates strong internal validity, which is 
the confidence that any observed differences actually are due to the program.   
Other voucher studies have been conducted using quasi-experimental methods such as 
Regression Discontinuity Design, propensity score matching, or use of control variables to try to 
minimize selection bias. The results from these non-experimental studies range from positive in 
some subject areas and years (Witte, Wolf, Cowen, Carlson, & Fleming, 2014) to consistently 
null (Witte, 2000) to negative in some subject areas (Figlio & Karbownik, 2016). While well-
designed quasi-experimental school choice studies can approximate the results of experimental 
evaluations under certain conditions (Bifulco, 2012; Fortson, Verbitsky-Savitz, Kopa, & 
Gleason, 2012), at least sometimes they fail to reveal the true causal effects of attending private 
school (Anderson & Wolf, 2017; Betts, Tang, & Zau, 2010; Cowen, 2008). Moreover, it is often 
difficult to measure how much bias is present when relying on quasi-experimental approaches 
instead of experimental ones (Pirog, Buffardi, Chrisinger, Singh, & Briney, 2009). On the other 
hand, some quasi-experimental approaches tend to have greater external validity and 
generalizability than experimental ones. However, since the quasi-experimental approaches do 
not rely on distinctive randomly-assigned samples of students in a single location, our study 
compensates at least partially for the limited external validity of individual voucher experiments 
by systematically compiling the experimental results across varied student populations. The RCT 
approach generates the internal validity or causality of our study while the meta-analytic 
approach provides some external validity as the contexts vary across studies. 
Compliance in RCTs refers to program participants who continue to remain in their 
originally assigned treatment or control groups. Control crossover refers to program participants 




The evidence from RCTs is more reliable under conditions with strong compliance, as control 
crossover or treatment non-compliance reintroduces selection bias if analysts merely compare 
the outcomes from voucher users with those from the subgroup of control group students who 
remained in public schools. Explicit TOT estimation methods eschew that simple but 
problematic approach and are designed to recover unbiased estimates of the effect of actually 
experiencing the intended school voucher treatment when some students randomly assigned to 
the treatment group fail to use their voucher and some students randomly assigned to the control 
group attend private school without a voucher. The three TOT strategies used in the studies that 
inform this meta-analysis were calculation of the Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) 
(Cowen, 2008), Instrumental Variables (IV) analysis (Heckman, 1996), and the Bloom 
adjustment (Bloom, 1984). All three of these approaches seek to construct comparisons of the 
average outcomes for program participants compared to the outcomes those same students would 
have experienced if not for participation in the program. The RCT studies recover unbiased 
estimates by utilizing the underlying random assignment of access to the voucher. Original 
voucher RCT studies that did not provide the information required for us to judge the 
appropriateness of the use of the specific TOT method in that case (e.g. Greene, Peterson, & Du, 
1999; Rouse, 1998) were excluded from the TOT calculations for the meta-analysis. Whenever 
the original voucher RCT report did not include TOT estimates (probably due to their emphasis 
on ITT impacts over TOT impacts of the voucher programs) but did include sufficient 
information for us to calculate the TOT, we did so using a Bloom adjustment because it requires 
fewer assumptions than CACE or IV approaches.3          
                                                     
3 For example, CACE estimates of the TOT are only unbiased if the characteristics of treatment decliners are 
accurate predictors of which members of the control group similarly would have declined a voucher if they had won 
the lottery (Cowen, 2008). Instrumental variables estimates of the TOT are only unbiased if the effects of winning or 




Our second reason to focus on RCTs is because Anderson, Guzman, & Ringquist (2013) 
established that the conclusion one draws about the efficacy of vouchers is heavily influenced by 
which studies are selected for review. Quasi-experimental voucher studies have produced smaller 
voucher effect sizes and fewer statistically significant results, arguably because weaknesses in 
the research design and comparison groups biased the impact estimates towards zero. If one has 
to believe either the results from RCTs or the results from non-RCTs regarding the effects of a 
given intervention, then one should believe the results from RCTs because they have much 
stronger internal validity. 
Third, we expected there would be a sufficient number of voucher effect estimates from 
RCTs to produce a reliable estimate of voucher impacts. Since the geographical scope of our 
search was global, and the temporal scope of our search was unrestricted, we assumed that we 
would identify many voucher achievement studies, even restricting our sample to gold standard 
experiments. Despite setting up a broad search, we only recovered 20 studies with 260 effect 
estimates. RCTs of private school choice outside of the U.S. are still relatively rare.  
4-B. Selection Process 
Each of the 9,443 collected sources was reviewed by two separate team members based 
on its title and abstract in order to determine whether it justified a full review. To be included in 
the meta-analysis, studies had to include student-level test score achievement effects of a private 
school voucher program in at least math or reading. Studies dealing with other impacts of 
vouchers such as competitive effects or fiscal impacts were excluded. We did not include 
                                                     
through an emotional response to the lottery outcome (e.g. Rhinesmith, 2017). Bloom adjustments generate their 
TOT simply by dividing the average difference in outcomes between all treatment and all control group members by 
the proportion of treatment students who ever used their private school voucher. This approach relies upon the 
simple assumption that any differences between the average outcomes of the treatment and control group students 
must have been produced solely by treatment uses, since non-users could have not been affected by the treatment 




graduation rate, college attainment, or civic values outcomes in the current study as the focus of 
this study is only on achievement impacts in math and reading scores. Most of the articles 
excluded were theoretical discussions or opinion pieces without quantitative evidence, were 
focused on other issues such as competitive or fiscal rather than student achievement effects, or 
were merely quasi-experimental.4 We only included studies published in English or with English 
translations.  
A total of 6,549 sources were excluded based on title and/or abstract reviews. In some 
cases, the two coders initially disagreed over whether or not to include a particular study. When 
that happened, the two coders came to a consensual conclusion. Unless there was a clear reason 
to exclude a study, it was included in the full article review round, when more information would 
be available to judge its merits. Our full-article review process resulted in 16 studies remaining 
in the sample. 
Our supplemental network search resulted in four additional articles added to the sample 
– two of the recently implemented Louisiana voucher program (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & 
Walters, 2015; Mills & Wolf, 2017),5 one of a philanthropic voucher program in Delhi, India 
(Wolf, Egalite, & Dixon, 2015), and one of a recent evaluation of the federal voucher program in 
Washington, D.C. (Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017). The four studies 
found in the network search did not show up in our computerized search as the four studies were 
either not in wide circulation on internet search engines or were not publicly available during the 
initial phase of our computerized search. In total, 20 RCT studies met the qualifications for 
                                                     
4 A surprising number of education evaluations are described as “experimental” via keywords or in their abstracts 
but, upon a closer reading, actually do not create their comparison groups via random assignment and therefore are 
merely quasi-experimental. 
5 A third study of the LSP, Mills and Wolf (2016), is not reported separately, as Mills and Wolf (2017) includes the 




inclusion. Appendix A contains the details regarding the studies that were identified and 
eliminated at each stage. In Table 2 we summarize the studies, presenting attrition rates in terms 
of both sample attrition (the percent of study participants who are not observed in the final year) 
and program attrition (the percent of students offered a voucher who were not using the voucher 
in the final year). The program attrition rate is the additive inverse of the voucher take-up rate, 
which is also reported for other years, when available. The level of randomization of each study 
was at the child/family level.6 Table 2 also indicates how the TOT effects were estimated or 
calculated, if applicable.
                                                     
6 One study (Muralidharan, & Sundararaman, 2015) involved randomization at two stages (randomly assigned 
students within randomly assigned villages); the two-stage randomization allows for higher external validity of the 
findings to the larger sample. As the randomization in the studies occurred at the child/family level, the studies can 














































Not provided 61% (initial) or 
51% (final year) 
Original research 






Greene (2000) 1 1999-2000 
(1 year) 
2 to 8 357 51.60% 60% Not provided 48.40% N/A  
Cowen (2008) 1 1999-2000 
(1 year) 
2 to 8 347 25.50% 70% Not provided 74.50% Complier average 
causal effect 











K to 8 186 43% 92% 21% (at time of 
survey) but 
39% of control 
units attended 
private school 
at some point 
post-lottery 
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& Dixon (2015) 
2 2011-2013 
(2 years) 
K to 2 1,306 11% N/A 25% in total (or 


















































3 to 8 N/A 27% N/A 5% 73% Instrumental 
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3 to 8 1,184 46% 10% 6% (Year 1), 
15% (Year 2),  
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64% (Year 2), 
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Penner, & 
Hoynes  (2015) 
3 1997-2000 
(4 years) 
K to 4 2,080 41.3% 34.6% Reading; 
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K to 8 930 71% 40% 11% (first year), 










Notes: The sample size and attrition rates are based on the estimates from ITT Reading with the exception of Bettinger & Slonim (2006) which had only math impacts. The actual 
sample sizes for calculating the ITT and TOT Reading and Math impacts may differ slightly. 
* Voucher eligibility was conditional on admission to a participating school) 
** The 57% not using the voucher is based on 15% not in school, 16% in public school, and 12% that lost the voucher for other reasons. 




 Table 2 also includes the control cross-over rate, generally defined as the percent of 
voucher applicants randomly assigned to the control group that still attended a private school. In 
the U.S. voucher programs in our meta-analysis, students who lost the voucher lotteries often 
found other ways to access school choices. In the experimental evaluation in Dayton, Ohio, 18% 
of the control group students enrolled in a private school even without the assistance of a 
voucher (Howell & Peterson, 2006, p. 44). In the first evaluation of the D.C. OSP, 12% of the 
students that lost the lottery subsequently enrolled in a private school and 35% attended an 
independent public charter school, leaving just 53% of the control group students in traditional 
public schools (Wolf et al., 2013, p. 257). In the more recent D.C. OSP study, after one year, 
10% and 42% of control group students attended private schools or charter schools, respectively 
(Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017). The New York City program achieved 
the clearest treatment-control contrast in type of school attended, as only 4% of the students that 
lost the lottery attended a private school and public charter schools were uncommon in NYC at 
the time; thus, almost all of the control group attended traditional public schools (Howell & 
Peterson, 2006, p. 44). In the experimental studies included in this meta-analysis, students 
remained in the control group and their outcomes counted towards the control group average for 
the ITT impact estimates even if they attended a private school. The rates at which control-group 
students crossed over to private schooling factored into the TOT effect calculations. Appendix D 
provides assumptions and calculations by study.     
Our search recovered several studies unexamined by prior systematic reviews and meta-
analyses. The global scope of our search added important data to our meta-analysis. Two studies 
of a large voucher program in Bogota, Colombia (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer, 




regions of India (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015; Wolf, Egalite, & Dixon, 2015) were 
included. Our combined computerized and networked search also identified an RCT of a small 
privately-funded voucher program in Toledo (Bettinger & Slonim, 2006) that had been missed 
by all previous systematic reviews. Finally, we included four recent experimental evaluations of 
voucher programs (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015; Bitler, Domina, Penner, & 
Hoynes, 2015; Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017; Mills & Wolf, 2017). This 
meta-analysis represents a new look at a more comprehensive body of rigorous research on 
private school vouchers than ever before.   
Many of the published reports of experimental evaluations of school voucher programs 
were nested in ways that affected how much independent information they contributed to the 
meta-analysis. In particular, at least six different research teams have published more than two 
dozen reports or articles analyzing the experimental data from the New York City Children’s 
Scholarship Fund evaluation, 1998-2002. Including all 24 of those reports would generate 
substantial spatial auto-correlation due to repeated counting of the same finding. To ensure that 
the meta-analysis accounts for this nesting, we treated as a single study any group of publications 
of the same results, using the same methodology, by essentially the same research team. Any 
variation on that, such as publication of different results, using the same methodology, by a 
different research team (e.g. a failed replication), represented a different study even though it 
drew upon the same data. That determination reduced the number of New York City studies to 
five (Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, & Rubin, 2003; Bitler, Domina, Penner, & Hoynes, 2015; Jin, 
Barnard, & Rubin, 2010; Krueger, & Zhu, 2004; Peterson, Howell, Wolf, & Campbell, 2003). 
We then extracted data primarily from the final publication, unless an earlier publication 




from other studies in the “nest” as needed. A study in our meta-analysis is the final and most 
complete presentation of a specific set of findings from a specific research team using a 
particular analytic method. 
4-C. Programs included in the meta-analysis 
The 20 RCTs identified by our search represent 11 separate school voucher programs 
(Table 3). Five programs – in Andhra Pradesh and Delhi, India; Toledo and Dayton, Ohio; and 
the D.C. Washington Scholarship Fund7 – were each subject to a single experimental evaluation. 
Four programs – in Charlotte, NC; Louisiana; Milwaukee, WI; and Bogota, Colombia – were 
each the focus of both an original experimental study and one replication study. The New York 
City program was the subject of five different experimental analyses. The D.C. OSP was the 
subject of two different evaluations involving different samples of students. 
In Table 3 each program is categorized as either privately or publicly funded, with either 
fully or partially funded vouchers. Fully funded vouchers must be accepted by participating 
private schools as the full cost of educating the student while partially funded vouchers require 
an additional payment from the student’s family. In general, the fully funded vouchers were 
publicly funded, and the partially funded vouchers were privately funded. Funding for the 
programs in India and Colombia, whether “full” or “partial,” was extremely low in nominal U.S. 
Dollars, ranging from about $117 in India to $190 in Colombia (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, 
King, & Kremer, 2002; Wolf, Egalite & Dixon, 2015). These low voucher amounts in India and 
Colombia are also reflective of lower educational costs in these areas. Comparable average costs 
of education in the public schools is $350 for Colombia (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & 
                                                     
7 The Washington Scholarship Fund (WSF) was a privately-funded scholarship program that preceded the 
government-funded Opportunity Scholarship (voucher) Program (OSP). The WSF was phased out in 2009, five 




Kremer, 2002, pp. 1537-1538) and $1,963 for Delhi, India.8 For Andhra Pradesh, Muralidharan 
and Sundararaman (2015, pp. 1031, 1058) report that the voucher amount was 40 percent of the 
average public school expenditure per child. The fully funded programs in the U.S. provided 
vouchers with maximum values that ranged from around $5,000 in Louisiana to over $13,000 for 
high school students in D.C. (Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017; Mills & 
Wolf, 2016). Fully funded programs provide all or nearly all of the state government funding that 
normally would go to the child’s public school but do not include any of the federal or local 
education formula funding for the child. Partially funded programs in the U.S. provided about 
$2,000 in tuition support to families (Peterson, Howell, Wolf, & Campbell, 2003). Regardless of 
jurisdiction and full or partial funding, the maximum voucher amount allotted for all the 
programs in this meta-analysis generally represented less than half of the amount being spent 
per-pupil on students in area public schools.  
 All programs were targeted to low-income students through either income limits or 
program location, but usually both. The voucher initiatives in India and Colombia served 
students living in abject poverty either in cities (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer, 
2002; Wolf, Egalite, & Dixon, 2015) or villages (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015). The 
U.S. programs were limited to students with family incomes near or below the cut-off for the 
federal lunch program,9 almost entirely in cities. Almost all U.S. voucher participants were either 
African American or Hispanic. As a result, this meta-analysis is a study of the achievement 
effects of low-cost private school vouchers on low-income, primarily urban minority children. 
                                                     
8 Per-pupil expenditure in public schools for Delhi, India was obtained from an Economic Survey of Delhi, 2016-
2017. Source: http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/15375/publisher/government-of-nct-of-delhi/. We 
converted the per-pupil expenditure for public schools (rupees 29,641) to U.S. dollars for the year 2013 for 
comparison with the voucher amount (rupees 7,300). The comparable inflation adjusted voucher amount is $483. 
9 The federal lunch program provides low-cost or free lunches to children from low-income families in public and 




The private schools participating in some of these voucher programs (D.C. and 
Louisiana) were found to charge modest tuition and have experience serving disadvantaged 
student populations (Sude, DeAngelis & Wolf, 2017). Religious schools in general, and Catholic 
schools in particular, were the main participants in voucher programs in the U.S. In the first 
evaluation of the D.C. OSP, 80% of the participating students attended a religious school with 
their voucher, and 53% of them specifically enrolled in a Catholic school (Wolf et al. 2013, p. 
257). Across programs, the private schools serving students with vouchers tended to have modest 
school facilities and few special programs for differentiating instruction to students (e.g. Dixon, 
2013; Wolf et al., 2013). School-level quality measures based on test scores generally are not 
available for private schools participating in voucher programs because private schools are 
seldom required to report school-wide test scores publicly.  
The counterfactual condition for control group students varied across the programs. In 
India and Colombia, almost all the students who lost the voucher lotteries attended local 
government-run schools. In India especially, public schools have many more resources than low-
cost private schools but are plagued by teacher daily absenteeism rates of around 30% (Probe 
Team, 1999). When public school teachers in developing countries fail to show up for work, 
typically the children are on their own and are not supervised by substitute teachers. The 
counterfactual condition for students participating in voucher programs in the U.S. are traditional 
public schools that are free to attend and residentially assigned. Unlike their counterparts in 
developing countries, the public schools in the U.S. do not face the problems of teacher 







Table 3: Description of 11 Voucher Programs included in Meta-Analysis 
 
4-D. Data extraction 
The 20 included studies were coded in Microsoft (MS) Excel for details on author, 
publication year, location, funding type (public/private), years of evaluation, duration of study, 
grades analyzed, outcome (math and reading in English or local language), size of treatment and 
control group and overall sample size. Some studies had multiple evaluation years. Each 
evaluation year, type of impact estimate (TOT or ITT), and subject was treated as a separate 
observation in the database. A study that reported results in each of three years, in both reading 
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(3 x 2 x 2). The 12 observations that a given study might produce were only analyzed within a 
specific meta-analytic estimate of effect, such as the TOT estimate of the voucher effect in math 
in Year 2 after random assignment. When the authors provided results from multiple estimation 
models or from robustness checks, we only extracted the estimates from the final or most 
preferred model as signaled by the authors.  
The extracted data filled 260 rows of an MS Excel spreadsheet, meaning 260 distinct 
effect estimates informed our meta-analysis (67 reading TOT estimates, 59 math TOT estimates, 
71 reading ITT estimates, and 63 math ITT estimates). The extraction process was performed by 
two team members to minimize human error.10 When necessary, we made assumptions to derive 
accurate sample sizes for the treatment and control groups. Appendix D provides assumptions 
and calculations by study. 
4-E. Data synthesis  
Meta-analysis combines results from several studies which individually have relatively 
small sample sizes and low precision. The fixed effects meta-analysis of the RCTs created an 
overall effect size by combining the effect sizes extracted from each study in standard deviation 
(SD) units. Effect sizes were analyzed separately for math and reading/English outcomes. All 
reading impacts were measured in the native language of the students and also some additional 
languages. The non-English languages specified in the reading results are presented in the figure 
notes. Both TOT and ITT effects were calculated, when possible. We focus on reporting the TOT 
impacts of voucher programs as the kinds of students who will actually use the vouchers to 
attend private schools may provide the most policy relevant information regarding these 
                                                     
10 Inter-rater reliability is the extent to which researchers agree on the aspects of ratings and decisions. For the 




programs. The ITT effects are reported in the Appendix C. The overall effect size was a 
weighted average of the individual effect sizes extracted from the studies. Each observation’s 
weight was the inverse of the variance around the effect size, so more precise effects were 
weighted more heavily in the meta-analysis (Borenstein, Hedges, & Rothstein, 2007). 
The effect size and standard errors were extracted directly from the source if available. If 
necessary, they were calculated by the team using available data and the formulas in Appendix 
B. We calculated11 the effect size and pooled standard deviation using Hedges’ g (Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985). Lastly, the grand effect size and lower and upper bound of the overall 95% 
confidence interval were determined. Bettinger & Slonim (2006) had only math test outcomes 
while the other 20 studies included both math and reading/English. 
The entire analysis was performed in two meta-analytic steps using a fixed effects meta-
analysis. In the first step, we estimated an overall TOT and ITT effect for each year of the 
outcomes available for reading/English and math for each program by combining estimates 
reported across different studies for the same program in the same year. The program/year 
estimates vary slightly across the programs studied by multiple research teams due to 
methodological differences such as which baseline control variables are included in the 
estimation model, how missing data challenges are addressed, and even how students are 
classified by race. In the cases of the New York City studies, what might seem to be minor 
methodological variations produced substantively different interpretations of the results of 
hypothesis tests (Krueger & Zhu, 2004; Peterson & Howell, 2004), thereby underscoring the 
                                                     
11 The calculated Hedges’ g effect sizes and associated standard errors may differ from the effect sizes and standard 
errors reported in the studies. For comparability across studies, we estimate Hedges’ g, relying on all available 




importance of our meta-analytic approach to move beyond the peculiarities of individual voucher 
studies.   
This mini “meta-analysis” of findings by site-year reduced the total number of effect size 
estimates to 96: 23 reading and English TOT estimates, 24 math TOT estimates, 24 reading and 
English ITT estimates, and 25 math ITT estimates. These 96 estimates represent the independent 
observations that inform our meta-analysis, as the actual set of student data used for each of the 
96 estimates was unique in terms of the set of students involved, the year of evaluation, or the 
outcomes estimated (reading or math, ITT or TOT). We report all 96 effect sizes and their 
standard errors in Appendix E. 
In the second step, we estimated overall voucher effects for 11 programs using a fixed 
effects meta-analysis. Use of random effects would not result in precise estimates12 as the 
between-studies variance cannot be estimated with precision with our limited number of studies 
(in this case 11 programs) (Borenstein, Hedges, & Rothstein, 2007). The voucher effects in 
reading/English and math were estimated overall and separately based on geography (U.S. vs. 
non-U.S.), funding type (publicly vs. privately funded programs) and years of treatment (one, 
two, three, and four or more). The analysis for years of treatment used all 96 effect size estimates 
(which themselves represent a consolidation of the 260 extracted estimates) and all other 
analyses used the 46 effect size estimates for the last year covered by each study (12 estimates 
for reading/English TOT and 11 estimates for math TOT). We highlight the effects from the last 
study year because they represent the cumulative effects of the school voucher intervention 
across all years of the evaluations. We also report the overall variation in impacts across studies 
as well as the impacts across the subgroups analyzed. In addition to describing the statistical 
                                                     
12 A caveat with the use of fixed effects meta-analysis is that it assumes that the estimates for all voucher programs 




significance of the findings from each individual study, we present the p-value of the 𝐼2 statistic, 
which measures whether there is sufficient study heterogeneity to eliminate sampling error as a 
likely cause of the observed results. All analyses have been carried out using a pre-coded 
worksheet in MS-Excel that implements the meta-analysis effect formula in Appendix B. The 
forest plots were generated using STATA. 
5. Results  
First, we present the global results for reading and math with English results as a 
subcomponent of the reading effects where English was taught in schools and tested. For each 
effect, we compare U.S. and non-U.S. programs. Next, we split the findings into effects from 
publicly funded versus privately funded programs. For those comparisons, the results are 
restricted to the final year of the evaluations. Finally, we present the results by years of 
treatment, which relaxes that condition. 
To present our results we use forest plots which show the effect size and confidence 
interval for each study, for the U.S. and non-U.S. components, and overall. Individual studies are 
represented by box and whisker plots where the size of the gray square represents the relative 
weighting for the study and the whiskers represent the 95% confidence interval around a point 
estimate. The diamonds represent composite effects across all observations. Any confidence 
interval that includes zero indicates that an effect is not statistically significant. In the discussion 
that follows, we only present the forest plots for the TOT analysis. The forest plots for the ITT 




that the TOT effects, whether positive or negative, tend to be larger in magnitude because they 
adjust for noncompliance with random assignment.13 
5-A. Overall impacts 
Figures 1 and 2 present forest plots for the effects for reading and English globally. In 
addition, composites of the U.S. and non-U.S. effects are provided. The overall effects of the 
voucher programs are gains of 0.28 SD in reading and 0.08 SD in English, when English was not 
the language of the reading test and was assessed separately. The effect in reading is dominated 
by a large positive effect in the PACES program in Bogota, Colombia (1.4 SD). Comparing the 
seven U.S. and three non-U.S. programs with reading impacts, we see that the U.S. programs had 
an overall effect in reading (all of which was in English) of 0.03 SD that is small in size and 
barely missed statistical significance [95% CI: -0.00, 0.07]. The programs outside of the U.S. had 
a more definitive positive impact on reading scores of 0.51 SD (0.25 SD excluding Bogota, 









                                                     
13 Milwaukee, WI does not contribute to TOT effects as Greene’s (1999) TOT in paper was non-experimental and 
Rouse’s (1998) paper does not provide sufficient details to compute TOT effects. Louisiana was a placement lottery 




Figure 1: Overall Global impacts – TOT Reading. 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study. 
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red 
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. 
Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading 
estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. 
Reading estimate for Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Overall effect size for US studies 
excluding Louisiana is 0.03 (-0.01, 0.07). Overall effect size for non-U.S. studies excluding 
Bogota, Colombia is 0.25 (0.20, 0.29) and overall global average excluding Louisiana and 
Bogota, Colombia is 0.13 (0.10, 0.16). 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall  (I-squared = 99.2%, p = 0.000)
Andhra Pradesh, India
Washington, DC - OSP II
Dayton, OH
Location
Washington, DC - WSF
Bogota, Colombia
Charlotte, NC
Subtotal  (I-squared = 68.6%, p = 0.004)
Louisiana
Subtotal  (I-squared = 99.7%, p = 0.000)
International
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Figure 2: Overall Global impacts – TOT English. 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study. 
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red 
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. 
Bogota, Colombia did not have an English estimate as the tests were administered in Spanish. 
Overall effect size for U.S. studies excluding Louisiana is 0.03 (-0.01, 0.07) and overall global 
average excluding Louisiana is 0.08 (0.05, 0.12). 
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The global effects in math are in Figure 3. Using a voucher improves math scores by 0.15 
SD, on average [95% CI: 0.12, 0.18]. The U.S. programs, overall, have an insignificant effect of 
0.01 [95% CI: -0.03, 0.05]. The non-U.S. programs have a positive effect of about 0.35 SD [95% 
CI: 0.30, 0.39]. The large effects for the non-U.S. programs are driven by the Bogota, Colombia 
study. Excluding Bogota, the non-U.S. studies had an overall insignificant effect on math test 
scores. 























Figure 3: Overall Global impacts – TOT Math. 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study. 
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red 
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). Overall effect size for US studies excluding Louisiana is 0.03 (-0.02, 0.07). Overall 
effect size for non-U.S. studies excluding Bogota, Colombia is -0.01 (-0.08, 0.05) and overall 
global average excluding Louisiana and Bogota, Colombia is 0.01 (-0.02, 0.05). 
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So far we have presented the results globally, as well as specifically inside and outside of 
the U.S. School vouchers have positive effects in reading, but these impacts are largest outside of 
the U.S., while the U.S. programs, as a subgroup, had insignificant impacts on reading. Overall, 
there is a positive impact on math test scores, but this result is entirely driven by one program in 
Bogota, Colombia. Next, we separate the effects by funding type (private or public). 
5-B. Overall impacts by funding type 
Figure 4 presents the results in reading, by funding type. For the purposes of this 
distinction, we define publicly funded programs as those with any amount of public funding, and 
privately funded programs as those that are exclusively privately funded through development or 
philanthropic funds. Both the publicly and privately funded voucher programs have positive 
effects on reading, overall. The average impact of using a voucher in privately funded programs 
is a gain in reading of 0.14 SD. The impact of voucher use in publicly funded programs is much 
larger, averaging reading gains of 0.65 SD. This large effect of publicly funded programs is 
primarily driven by the PACES program in Bogota, Colombia (1.4 SD).14 In fact, excluding this 
Colombia based program indicates that publicly funded programs had a smaller (null) effect than 
privately funded programs. Due to the sensitivity of this result to the inclusion of PACES, we do 





                                                     




Figure 4: Overall impacts by Funding Type – TOT Reading. 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study. 
The diamonds show overall estimates for privately and publicly (having received any public 
funds) funded programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study 
(inverse of variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test 
outcomes. Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. 
Reading estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and 
Telugu. Reading estimate for Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Overall effect size for publicly 
funded programs excluding Louisiana and Bogota, Colombia is 0.01 (-0.07, 0.10). 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall  (I-squared = 99.2%, p = 0.000)
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 Figure 5 presents the results in math, by funding type. The impact in math for privately 
funded programs, on average, is null, but the impact for publicly funded programs is an increase 




























Figure 5: Overall impacts by Funding Type – TOT Math. 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study. 
The diamonds show overall estimates for privately and publicly (having received any public 
funds) funded programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study 
(inverse of variance). Overall effect size for publicly funded programs excluding Louisiana and 
Bogota, Colombia is -0.06 (-0.14, 0.02). 
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5-C. Overall impacts by years of treatment 
The last set of effects we present are the impacts on reading and math by years of 
treatment. If there is a cumulative positive effect of voucher treatment over time, we would 
expect impacts to increase15 with the number of years of voucher use. The results are presented 
for eight programs with effects after one year, seven programs with effects after two years, six 
programs with effects after three years in math (five in reading), and three programs with effects 
of four or more years of treatment. All the estimates for years of treatment presented in this study 
are cumulative effects and do not represent annual estimates of the program effects. 
Figure 6 shows the reading impacts by years of treatment. As expected, treatment effects 
increase with time of exposure. There is a null effect associated with one year of treatment, small 
positive effects for two and three years (0.07 SD and 0.06 SD, respectively), and a large positive 











                                                     





Figure 6: Overall impacts by Years of Treatment – TOT Reading. 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are effect sizes for one, two, three, and four or more years. The 
diamonds show overall yearly (dosage) estimates. The gray area around each point (effect size) 
is the study weight (inverse of variance). Toledo, OH only had math outcomes. Reading estimate 
for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading estimate for Andhra 
Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. Reading estimate for 
Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Overall effect size with Louisiana removed is 0.00 (-0.03, 
0.04) for one year and 0.09 (0.06, 0.13) for two years. Overall effect size with Louisiana and 
Bogota, Colombia removed is 0.03 (-0.01, 0.07) for three years and with Bogota, Columbia 
removed is 0.25 (0.21, 0.29) for four or more years. The overall estimate treats each effect size as 
independent and we do not focus on it due to spatial auto-correlation among different years of 
treatment within the same program. 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
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The math results in Figure 7 show null effects after the first year and after three years, a 
negative effect after two years, and positive effects after four or more years. The average 
negative effect of two years of treatment is small (-0.05 SD), and primarily driven by the 
Louisiana Scholarship Program (-0.34 SD) and the program in Andhra Pradesh, India (-0.10 SD). 
The positive math effect of four or more years of treatment is large (0.33 SD) and precisely 
estimated [95% CI: 0.28, 0.37]). This longer-term outcome is primarily driven by the PACES 

















                                                     
16 The large jump in treatment effects in Bogota, Columbia between three years of treatment and seven years of 
treatment may be partly related to a change in examination and data-collection methods. The outcomes after three 
years are based on La Prueba de Realizaciόn, a grade-specific multiple-choice achievement test, and the outcomes 




Figure 7: Overall impacts by Years of Treatment – TOT Math. 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on one year, two year, three year, and four or more year 
effect sizes for each study. The diamonds show overall estimates for yearly (dosage) effect of 
programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). Overall effect size with Louisiana removed is 0.07 (0.03, 0.10) for one year and -0.01 
(-0.05, 0.02) for two years. Overall effect size for programs with Louisiana and Bogota, 
Colombia removed is 0.04 (-0.01, 0.09) for three years and with Bogota, Columbia removed is -
0.03 (-0.10, 0.03) for four or more years. The overall estimate treats each effect size as 
independent and we do not focus on it due to spatial auto-correlation among different years of 
treatment within the same program. 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall  (I-squared = 97.1%, p = 0.000)
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Figure 8: Overall TOT impacts by Year – US. 
Note: Hedges’ g estimates are based on one year effect, two year effect, three year effect and 
four or more year effect size calculated for each study. The effect size and confidence interval 




































Figure 9: Overall TOT impacts by Year – Global. 
Note: Hedges’ g estimates are based on one year effect, two year effect, three year effect and 
four or more year effect size calculated for each study. The effect size and confidence interval 
for each year are plotted vertically.  
These results indicate generally neutral to positive effects of school vouchers that vary by 
subject (math or reading), location (U.S. vs. non-U.S.), and dosage. The impacts of private 
school vouchers tend to be larger for reading than for math. Impacts generally are larger for 
programs outside the U.S. relative to those within the U.S. Impacts tend to grow from small to 
moderately large after four or more years. Unfortunately, a meta-regression to analyze the ceteris 
paribus relationships of each of these variables to voucher impacts from only 20 studies (11 
programs) would be underpowered. 
5-D. Robustness of the results 
Sample attrition poses a challenge to our confidence in the true impacts of the 11 
programs. Hence, we categorized the program impacts as either “low” or “high” risk of attrition 





















http://handbook-5-1.cochrane.org/). We classified individual studies as “low” risk for bias if they 
either met the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) standards for acceptable and non-differential 
sample attrition levels or passed an appropriate robustness test for sample attrition bias. The 
checks for robustness to attrition used by the authors of the original studies included testing for 
baseline equivalence between treatment and control group students after program attrition had 
occurred and analyzing the sensitivity of the impact estimates to artificial truncations in the 
respondent samples for the treatment and control groups. In some cases, the authors conducted 
various bounding analyses such as inverse probability weighting or Lee bounds to check for the 
robustness of the results to differential attrition. For multiple studies that analyzed the same 
sample (such as the studies for NYC; Milwaukee, WI; and Charlotte, NC), if one of the studies 
was labelled as “low” risk, the other studies were read to check if they contradicted this 
classification. If no discrepancy was found, the overall impacts for a particular program were 
labelled “low” risk for attrition bias. With this categorization, only the program impacts for 
Delhi, India were labelled “high” risk for attrition bias, as the authors did not carry out any 
robustness checks for sensitivity of the results to sample attrition. Excluding the results for Delhi, 
India yields overall TOT global reading impacts of 0.29 (0.26, 0.32) and overall TOT math 
impacts of 0.15 (0.12, 0.18) which are essentially identical to the estimates that include the Delhi 









Figure 10: Overall Global impacts – TOT Reading (Colombia and Louisiana excluded). 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study. 
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red 
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. 
Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading 
estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. 
Estimates for Colombia and Louisiana are excluded. 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
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Figure 11: Overall Global impacts – TOT Reading (Colombia excluded). 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study. 
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red 
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. 
Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading 
estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. 
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Figure 12: Overall Global impacts – TOT Math (Colombia and Louisiana excluded).   
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study. 
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red 
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). Estimates for Colombia and Louisiana are excluded. 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.299
Overall  (I-squared = 62.6%, p = 0.006)
Washington, DC - OSP II
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Figure 13: Overall Global impacts – TOT Math (Colombia excluded).   
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study. 
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red 
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). Estimate for Colombia is excluded. 
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The effect size estimates for Louisiana17 and Bogota, Colombia regularly appear as 
outliers in our forest plots. We repeat the meta-analysis (Figures 10, 11, 12 and 13), excluding 
the results from these two potential outliers which contribute the most extreme negative and 
positive effect estimates in our study. The resulting overall estimates shrink in size but some of 
them retain statistical significance. We provide these results in the footnotes to each figure. With 
Louisiana and Bogota excluded, the math estimates have an overall null effect globally. The 
reading estimates are smaller but still positive and statistically significant even with these outlier 
findings removed. 
 We also conduct this same robustness test (removing outlier effects for Louisiana and 
Bogota) and assess whether the effect sizes for various years of treatment change. The reading 
estimates remain null for one year of treatment and increase slightly (from 0.07 SD to 0.09 SD) 
for two years of treatment. However, the estimates shrink from 0.06 SD to null for three years of 
treatment and from 0.54 SD to 0.25 SD for four or more years of treatment. In all of these cases, 
the confidence intervals still overlap, so there is no conclusive evidence that the results from the 
robustness check themselves are significantly different than the results from the main analysis.  
With the outliers omitted, the math estimates of positive effects increase substantially for one 
year of treatment, increase slightly but remain substantively similar for two and three years of 
treatment, and shrink dramatically for four or more years (from 0.33 SD to null). 
 From this robustness check, it seems that the magnitude of the overall reading impacts is 
reduced, but the overall conclusion of positive reading impacts is not affected by the Louisiana 
and Bogota outliers, as the reading impacts remain positive and significant. Math impacts are 
affected negatively by the exclusion of the outlier cases, becoming null overall. The LSP 
                                                     
17 Louisiana was the only program that used criterion references tests. The treatment effects may be sensitive to the 




evaluation was the only voucher RCT to use state criterion-referenced tests to measure program 
impact. Since the curricula used in the private schools in Louisiana are not necessarily aligned to 
the state test the way that they are in Louisiana public schools, it is possible that using the state 
test biased the Louisiana voucher impacts negatively, especially in math, which relies upon a 
specific sequencing of topics and skills.  The results for Bogota, Colombia represent a blend of 
student incentives (to continue receiving the voucher, the students had to maintain minimum 
academic standards), additional education spending (through top up by parents) and private 
school productivity (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016). The fact that the Bogota program was a 
blend of school vouchers and other reforms could explain its status as an outlier in our meta-
analysis. 
5-E. Heterogeneity of the results 
 Testing for heterogeneity of effect sizes in a meta-analytic estimate allows for 
determination if the studies reasonably share a common effect size (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). We 
are interested in testing if our meta-analytic estimates have more variation than would be 
expected simply due to sampling error. The existence of significant heterogeneity between study 
subgroups (U.S. vs. non-U.S. programs, publicly vs. privately funded programs, and various 
years of treatment) would indicate true differences between the effects of vouchers on distinct 
subgroups that are not due to sampling error.  
The forest plots provide an estimate of the percentage of variation in the meta-analytic 
effect sizes derived from within and across subgroup comparisons. The 𝐼2 statistic in the forest 




the analyzed studies. A higher value of the 𝐼2 statistic18 resulting in a significant p-value suggests 
that the variation in the results of the studies are due to underlying heterogeneity rather than due 
to chance alone (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003). The tests for heterogeneity in the 
figures show that they are statistically significant in both math and reading for the total sample of 
studies. Generally, there is statistically significant heterogeneity between subgroups (U.S. vs. 
non-U.S. programs, publicly vs. privately funded programs and between years of treatment). 
However, within the privately funded programs there is a lack of significant heterogeneity for 
math impacts. With that one exception, the heterogeneity analysis indicates that variation in 
effect sizes across subgroups reflects a true underlying variation and not statistical noise. The 
within subgroup analysis also reflects statistically significant heterogeneity in most cases—we 
do not observe significant heterogeneity in some cases probably due to small subgroup sample 
sizes. 
6. Discussion 
This meta-analysis contributes to the field of private school choice by combining and 
systematically evaluating rigorous evidence from all RCT studies of the effects of private school 
vouchers on student achievement. This review provides an up-to-date, methodologically coherent 
and comprehensive overview of all the rigorous experimental findings and yields important 
policy implications about the effectiveness of voucher programs.  
Our search process turned up 9,443 potential studies, 20 of which ultimately were 
included. These 20 studies represent 11 different voucher programs, eight in the U.S. and three in 
                                                     
18 In a fixed effects meta-analysis, the studies are assumed to have been carried out under similar conditions with 
similar study participants. Thus, one true effect size is shared by all the studies included in the meta-analysis. In 
contrast, in a random effects meta-analysis, the true effect size could vary across studies. Hence, the random effects 
meta-analysis estimates the mean of a distribution of true effects of all the studies. Thus, 𝐼2 statistic has a lower 




non-U.S. countries. A total of 260 effect sizes are included, with a two-stage consolidation of 
those estimates yielding a total of 46 average findings drawn from the last year of the studies. 
We report 10 meta-analytic TOT effect sizes for reading (seven in the U.S. and three outside of 
the U.S.). In reading, we find an overall positive effect of about 0.28 SD with null effects in the 
U.S. and large positive effects (0.51 SD) outside of the U.S., primarily driven by PACES, in 
Bogota, Colombia. A much larger gap in the quality of public and private schools in countries 
like Colombia than in the U.S. may explain this finding (Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer, 2006). In 
addition, the PACES program was distinctive in providing individual student incentives for 
academic achievement. Excluding this outlier, the overall impact on reading was still significant 
(0.13 SD). The overall impact on reading remains same (0.13 SD) when both Colombia and 
Louisiana outliers are excluded. 
For math scores, we report 11 meta-analytic TOT effect sizes (eight in the U.S. and three 
outside of the U.S.). The math effects (0.15 SD overall) are large for the non-U.S. studies (0.35 
SD) and null for the U.S. studies. Again, this is driven primarily by the PACES program – 
excluding this outlier results in a null overall impact on math test scores. Excluding both 
Colombia and Louisiana outliers yields a null overall impact on math test scores. A large-scale 
meta-analysis of all education RCTs from 1995 to 2010 has shown that the average impact of an 
intervention on test scores is 0.08 SD at the elementary level and 0.15 SD at the middle school 
level (Lipsey et al. 2012). Hence, our meta-analysis shows that voucher interventions produce 
positive test scores outcomes chiefly in reading, that are comparable in size to outcomes from 
other education interventions, but that there is heterogeneity within the set of programs. 
The overall results just described are for the final year of data in each study. It could be 




fact, our analysis of the effects by years of treatment indicates that the effects of private school 
voucher programs often start out null initially and then turn positive. Longer-term achievement 
effects are much more salient than immediate achievement effects whenever longer-term effects 
are available (Das et al., 2013; Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016). The general pattern of results 
also indicates that voucher interventions tend to increase reading scores more than math scores.  
The results of this meta-analysis indicate that voucher programs globally tend to 
moderately increase test scores, particularly in countries like Colombia with a large private-
public school quality gap. Although the scope of our search process was global, more 
international RCTs are needed to reach definitive conclusions about the impacts of voucher 
programs around the globe. Our search process yielded RCTs on private school vouchers only in 
U.S., India and Colombia. In addition, many of the programs included here are still relatively 
small-scale, and more experimental work should be done on larger programs to understand 
whether the potential benefits of private school vouchers would replicate at scale. We cannot 
learn much from even large-scale programs if they are not implemented alongside an 
experimental evaluation. Further, more experimental evaluations that consider the impacts of 
vouchers on key non-cognitive outcomes such as educational attainment and civic values (e.g. 
Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer, 2006; Wolf, 2007; Wolf et al., 2013) would be of great value to 
the field. We hope that our study motivates researchers to pursue experimental evaluations of 
voucher impacts whenever feasible. 
Additionally, it is critical to consider the cost-benefit tradeoffs associated with voucher 
programs. Numerous studies find that vouchers are cost effective, since they tend to generate 
achievement outcomes that are as good or better than traditional public schools but at a fraction 




impacts in a voucher program, if obtained at a lower cost than education in a public school 
setting, may have a net benefit for society. The average per-pupil spending in the public school 
jurisdictions covered in our meta-analysis was higher than the voucher amounts. For programs 
where the voucher covered the full amount of private school tuition, the average school funding 
in private vs. public sectors in the same geographic location19 was $255 vs. $636 for Andhra 
Pradesh, India, $483 vs. $1,963 for Delhi, India, $4,817 vs. $11,846 for Milwaukee, WI, $5,456 
vs. $10,853 for Louisiana, $7,761 vs. $21,081 for D.C. OSP I, and $12,306 vs. $20,577 for D.C. 
OSP II. The partially funded programs required parents to top up the voucher amounts. The data 
indicate that the partially funded programs in Charlotte, NC, Dayton and Toledo, OH, NYC, 
Washington, D.C. and Bogota, Colombia had much lower voucher amounts – less than half of 
the per-pupil expenditures in the neighborhood public schools. A cost-effectiveness analysis of 
the 20 studies included in this study may inform us about the savings from the experimental 
interventions of 11 voucher programs.  
When taking into account the total costs and benefits of these types of programs, it is 
important to also study the impacts on the students who remain in the traditional public school 
(TPS) system. A voucher program in place may generate competitive effects for comparison TPS 
system as the school systems would compete for academic efficiency and for drawing children 
and financial resources towards the schools. Four of the voucher programs in our meta-analysis 
of participant test-score effects also have been evaluated regarding their systemic effects on the 
test scores of students who remained in public schools. The Louisiana (Egalite, 2014) and 
Milwaukee (Carnoy, Adamson, Chudgar, Luschei, & Witte, 2007; Chakrabarti, 2008; Greene & 
                                                     
19 We calculated the numbers from the data provided in the papers, department of education websites and reports 
from sources such as EdChoice. For India, the rupees have been converted to dollars. All amounts are based off the 
last year of evaluation of a program and weighted averages are taken across cohorts in D.C. OSP II. The numbers 




Forster, 2002; Hoxby, 2003) voucher programs have been found to have a positive effect on the 
subsequent test scores of affected public schools. The Washington, DC (Greene & Winters, 
2007) and Andhra Pradesh (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015) programs have been found to 
have no significant effects on the achievement of the students who remained in public schools. 
Thus, the research to date suggests that the modest average achievement benefits from private 
school choice for participants are not coming at the expense of achievement declines for non-
choosing students. It is practically difficult to randomly assign school systems to a treatment 
group comprising of choice-based competition and a control group that is isolated from the 
choice-based competitive forces. Due to the nature of the question concerning how expanding 
private school choice and competition affects the performance of traditional public schools, the 
systemic effects of private school choice have been evaluated almost exclusively using merely 
quasi-experimental methods. Still, such studies in the U.S. consistently report effects that range 
from null to positive (Egalite & Wolf, 2016).   
This meta-analysis provides a systematic summary of the generally modest positive 
effects of private school choice programs around the globe on the test scores of participating 
students. With time and more years of outcome data from voucher interventions, a better 
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Figure A1: PRISMA Flow Diagram 
From:  Moher D, Liberati A, Tetzlaff J, Altman DG, The PRISMA Group (2009). 
Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The 





Table A1: Overview of Article Sources and Exclusions 
  Number of Articles 
Search 1 (University Library) 
 
Three library sources (EBSCO, JSTOR, ProQuest) 2,737 
Duplicates Removed -534 
Unique articles (EBSCO, JSTOR, ProQuest) 2,203 
Excluded Based on Title and/or Abstract -2,075 
Remaining Articles (EBSCO, JSTOR, ProQuest) 128 
 
 
Search 2 (Google Scholar) 
 
Number of Google Scholar Sources Initially Found 6,706 
Excluded Based on Title and Abstract -6,549 
Remaining Google Articles 157 
Duplicates Removed -9 
Remaining Articles (Google Scholar) 148 
 
 
Sum of Remaining Articles (Both Searches) 276 
Excluded Based on Full Article -260 
Studies added through networked search +4 










Table A2: Reason for Exclusion - for 260 papers were excluded at full article phase 
Not a quantitative analysis 69 
Not related to educational vouchers for K-12 students (housing vouchers, etc.) 30 
Private schooling in general (not voucher specific) 7 
Religious schooling in general (not voucher specific) 1 
Different question related to vouchers (e.g. competitive effects, cost efficiency, 
segregation/stratification, school participation, parental preferences, etc.) 63 
Earlier version of an included study 24 
Not randomly assigned 63 
Methodology fails to utilize available lottery to conduct RCT 3 
Lack of information necessary to be included* 1 
Total Excluded 260 
*Attempted to find author to obtain this information, but was unable to. 
 
 
Details on Search Strategy 
Our search process was comprised of two stages. Our initial search focused on only the 
studies published since 2005 or later, but due to a lack of RCT studies identified during this 
process, we added a second search, including all years, but narrowing the search criteria to only 
include studies that included text related to randomization. The study selection was based on 
systematic search procedures. Keywords and phrases were chosen to be as inclusive as possible 
for our preliminary search. 
The search criteria were as follows:  
Initial Search: 2005 or later  
EBSCO Search 1 
Search terms: school voucher* OR education* voucher*  




Types of sources included: Academic Journals, Journals, and Reports  
Total number of results: 765  
EBSCO Search 2  
Search terms: opportunity scholarship  
Time period:  2005 or later   
Types of sources included: Academic Journals, Journals, and Reports  
Total number of results: 48  
JSTOR Search 1  
Search terms: voucher* AND education* or school AND research AND experiment* or 
“randomized controlled trial”  
Time period: 2005 or later  
Language: English  
Included only Articles related to: Business and Economics, Economics, Education, Political 
Science, Public Policy & Administration, Social Sciences  
Total number of results: 853 search results  
JSTOR Search 2  
Search terms: “opportunity scholarship”   
Time period: 2005 or later  
Language: English  
Included only Articles related to: Business and Economics, Economics, Education, Political 
Science, Public Policy & Administration, Social Sciences.  





ProQuest Search 1  
Search terms: all(voucher) AND all(school*) AND all(research*)  
Time period: 2005 or later  
Excludes: Wire Feeds, Magazines, and Newspapers  
Total number of results: 603 results  
ProQuest Search 2  
Search terms: all(“opportunity scholarship”)  
Time period: 2005 or later  
Excludes: Wire Feeds, Magazines, and Newspapers  
Total number of results: 122 results  
 The searches of the three library databases (EBSCO, JSTOR, and ProQuest) resulted in a total of 
1,934 unique papers, after removing duplicates. 
 
Secondary Search: All RCTs (including prior to 2005) 
Since RCTs or experiments are especially prized as education evaluations, we decided to extend 
our meta-analysis to any RCTs we could find on the topic, regardless of when they were 
conducted or published. In order to find these, a secondary search was conducted. 
EBSCO Search 3 (for all RCTs) 
Search terms: school voucher* OR education* voucher* AND AB: random* 
Time period: No restriction 
Types of sources included: Academic Journals, Journals, and Reports 
Total number of results: 85 




 EBSCO Search 4 (for all RCTs) 
Search terms: opportunity scholarship AND AB: random* 
Time period: No restriction 
Types of sources included: Academic Journals, Journals, and Reports 
Total number of results: 9 
Note: AB: random* means that the abstract had to include a stem of the word random* 
 JSTOR Search 3 
Search terms: voucher* AND education* or school AND ab(random*) 
Time period: No restriction 
Language: English 
Included only Articles related to: Business and Economics, Economics, Education, Political 
Science, Public Policy & Administration, Social Sciences 
Total number of results: 116 search results 
 JSTOR Search 4 
Search terms: “opportunity scholarship” AND ab(random*) 
Time period: No restriction 
Language: English 
Included only Articles related to: Business and Economics, Economics, Education, Political 
Science, Public Policy & Administration, Social Sciences. 
Total number of results: 2 search results 
 ProQuest Search 3 
Search terms: all(voucher) AND all(school*) AND all(research*) AND ab(random*) 




Excludes: Wire Feeds, Magazines, and Newspapers 
Total number of results: 95 results 
Note: ab(random*) means that the abstract had to include a stem of the word random* 
 ProQuest Search 4 
Search terms: all(“opportunity scholarship”) AND ab(random*) 
Time period: No restriction 
Excludes: Wire Feeds, Magazines, and Newspapers 
Total number of results: 9 results 
Note: ab(random*) means that the abstract had to include a stem of the word random. 
This secondary search of the three library databases (EBSCO, JSTOR, and ProQuest) resulted in 
a total of 269 additional unique papers, after removing duplicates. 
Google Scholar and Other Website Searches  
In addition to the three main library databases, we searched a variety of other sources. 
First, using the first search criteria, we searched Google Scholar for articles from 2005 or later 
using the search terms “school voucher” OR “voucher school” to find the maximum number of 
results. The search returned approximately 4,000 results including patents and citations. Other 
places we searched, due to their interest in school vouchers, were the websites of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), University of Chile, Uppsala University in Sweden, and 
the Poverty Action Lab at MIT.  
Using the second search criteria in Google Scholar: (("opportunity scholarship" OR 
"education* voucher*" OR "school voucher*") AND random*), we found 2,570 results including 
citations. Apart from importing the references in Refworks, we also did individual Google 




Details on Selection Process and Coding 
After our title/abstract review, 148 sources remained from the Google and snowball 
search along with 128 sources from the library searches. Two members of our team reviewed 
each of these 276 sources in their entirety to determine if they met our inclusion criteria. In some 
cases, the researchers initially disagreed on the inclusion decision, in which case they met to 
discuss and come to a consensus. 260 papers were excluded at the full article phase. The reasons 
for exclusion of the 260 papers have been provided above in Appendix A, Table A2. Additional 
efforts were made to ensure our results are not affected by publication bias (described in the 
following section). 
The remaining 20 studies were coded using a predesigned format in MS-Excel. The 
coding format included information on authors, publication year, years of treatment, program 
evaluated by the study, location of the study, source of funding, duration of study, grades 
analyzed, sample sizes of treatment and control groups, total sample sizes and information on 
program and sample attrition. All information was collected separately for different years of 
treatment reported in the studies and separately by TOT/ITT and separately by math/reading 
(information for effect sizes in English and local languages were coded for international studies). 
Statistical details such as mean test scores (treatment/control), differences in means 
(treatment – control), standard deviation (treatment/control), treatment effect sizes (in standard 
deviations), standard error of Cohen’s d, treatment effect and standard error in other units (such 
as National Percentile Rank (NPR)), t-statistic, p-values, upper/lower 95% confidence intervals 
were coded into the excel sheets. Every detail entered into the excel sheet had to be finally 
agreed upon by two of the coauthors to reduce human error. Lastly the information was used to 




sheet also contained information on comments/assumptions made for each row as well as mini 
meta-analytic estimates for multiple studies that reported an effect of the same program for the 
same year. For example, a mini meta-analysis was carried out to obtain an overall ITT effect for 
reading estimates for one year of treatment from two studies related to the Charlotte, NC 
program: Greene (2000) and Cowen (2008). The mini-meta analysis relied on a fixed effects 
strategy (Borenstein Hedges, & Rothstein, 2007) due to small sample size in all cases, and a pre-
coded excel sheet was used to arrive at these mini meta-analytic estimates using the formula 
described in Appendix B. As a robustness check, STATA software was also used to check the 
accuracy of the estimates obtained using the pre-coded excel sheet in Excel. 
Robustness check for unpublished literature 
Tables in Appendix A include details of the literature identified through the computerized 
and network search described above. The final 20 studies included for meta-analysis are either a 
published study (when a study actually got published; this forms the majority of studies 
included), a working paper (when the paper did not yet get published; an example is 
Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015) and a book chapter (Wolf, Egalite, & Dixon, 2015). 
Wherever necessary, supplementary details were added through other supporting documents 
available including direct contact with the authors if required. 
To ensure our findings were not affected by publication bias, we conducted a variety of 
additional searches for unpublished documents such as working papers, conference drafts, and 
technical reports. Also, multiple versions of the same study published elsewhere in book chapters 
and different formats of publication were read for details. We manually searched known websites 
of universities and research institutes such as University of Chile, Uppsala University in Sweden, 




International Development (DFID) in UK, Center for Civil Society in New Delhi, India etc. Our 
team members also utilized Google translator in some cases where it appeared to the team 
member that a document in foreign language may tell us something about a voucher RCT. To 
look for possible ongoing evaluations of school vouchers, a hand search of journals that publish 
studies on school choice such as the Journal of School Choice were carried out.  
As a last robustness check, a separate search was carried out for master’s and doctoral 
theses in EBSCO, JSTOR, and ProQuest databases using the same search terms as described in 
above sections of Appendix A. Finally, one of the coauthors of this study is an internationally 
known expert in school choice and has a well-connected network of leading researchers in the 
area. The coauthor independently did a search in his contacts to find past or ongoing projects 
without publicly available results. No study or unpublished document found in the robustness 
checks was an additional experimental evaluation of school vouchers. Thus, no further studies 
contribute to the meta-analysis.  
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Appendix B: Formula used during meta-analysis 
 
1. Mean differences:    ?̅?𝑇 − ?̅?𝐶 










4. Lower bound ES (95%):   LB = 𝐸𝑆 − (𝑆𝐸𝑑 ∗ 1.96) 
5. Upper bound ES (95%):   UB= 𝐸𝑆 + (𝑆𝐸𝑑 ∗ 1.96) 





































    
Appendix C: Intent to treat (ITT) analysis 
Figure C1: Overall Global impacts – ITT Reading. 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The 
diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red dotted 
line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. 
Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading 
estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. 
Reading estimate for Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Louisiana voucher program did not have 
ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery. Overall effect size for non-U.S. studies with Bogota, 
Colombia removed is 0.12 (0.09, 0.16) and overall global average is 0.08 (0.05, 0.11). 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall  (I-squared = 96.9%, p = 0.000)
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Figure C1.1: Overall Global impacts – ITT Reading (Colombia and Louisiana excluded). 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study. 
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red 
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. . 
Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading 
estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. 
Reading estimate for Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Louisiana voucher program did not have 
ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery. Estimates for Colombia and Louisiana are excluded. 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall  (I-squared = 68.4%, p = 0.001)
Milwaukee, WI
Washington, DC - OSP II
Location
Subtotal  (I-squared = 50.8%, p = 0.058)
Subtotal  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.445)
Dayton, OH
















































ITT Reading — Global (Colombia and Louisiana excluded)
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Figure C2: Overall Global impacts – ITT English.   
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The 
diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red dotted 
line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. 
Bogota, Colombia did not have an English estimate as the tests were administered in Spanish. 
Louisiana voucher program did not have ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery.  
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.006







Subtotal  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.627)
Washington, DC - OSP II
Washington, DC - OSP I













































ITT English — Global
 
91 
    
Figure C3: Overall Global impacts – ITT Math.   
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The 
diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red dotted 
line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). Louisiana voucher program did not have ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery. 
Overall effect size for non-U.S. studies excluding Bogota, Colombia is -0.01 (-0.06, 0.04) and 
overall global average is 0.03 (-0.01, 0.06). 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall  (I-squared = 91.7%, p = 0.000)
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Figure C3.1: Overall Global impacts – ITT Math (Colombia and Louisiana excluded). 
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The 
diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red dotted 
line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of 
variance). Louisiana voucher program did not have ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery. 
Estimates for Colombia and Louisiana are excluded. 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.105
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Figure C4: Overall impacts by Funding Type – ITT Reading.   
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The 
diamonds show overall estimates for privately and publicly (having received any public funds) 
funded programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study 
(inverse of variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test 
outcomes. Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. 
Reading estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and 
Telugu. Reading estimate for Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Louisiana voucher program did 
not have ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery. Overall effect size for publicly funded 
programs excluding Bogota, Colombia is 0.01 (-0.06, 0.08). 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall  (I-squared = 96.9%, p = 0.000)
NYC
Dayton, OH
Subtotal  (I-squared = 98.4%, p = 0.000)
Washington, DC - OSP II
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Figure C5: Overall impacts by Funding Type – ITT Math.   
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The 
diamonds show overall estimates for privately and publicly (having received any public funds) 
funded programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study 
(inverse of variance). Louisiana voucher program did not have ITT estimates as it was a 
placement lottery. Overall effect size for publicly funded programs excluding Bogota, Colombia 
is 0.04 (-0.03, 0.11). 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall  (I-squared = 91.7%, p = 0.000)
Washington, DC - OSP I
Toledo, OH
Dayton, OH
Subtotal  (I-squared = 9.0%, p = 0.360)
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Figure C6: Overall impacts by Years of Treatment – ITT Reading.  
 Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are one year, two year, three year, and four or more year effect 
sizes for each study. The diamonds show overall yearly (dosage) effect estimates. The gray area 
around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of variance). No reading 
estimates were reported for Toledo, OH. Reading estimate for Delhi is an overall estimate for 
English and Hindi. Reading estimate for Andhra Pradesh is an overall estimate for English, 
Hindi, and Telugu. Reading estimate for Bogota is for Spanish. Louisiana uses a placement 
lottery and thus does not have ITT estimates. Overall effect sizes with Bogota, Colombia 
removed are 0.04 (-0.00, 0.08) for three years and 0.12 (0.08, 0.16) for four or more years. The 
overall estimate treats each effect size as independent and we do not focus on it due to spatial 
auto-correlation among different years of treatment within the same program. 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
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Figure C7: Overall impacts by Years of Treatment – ITT Math.   
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on one year, two year, three year, and four or more year 
effect sizes calculated for each study. The diamonds show overall estimates for yearly (dosage) 
effect of programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study 
(inverse of variance). Louisiana voucher program did not have ITT estimates as it was a 
placement lottery. Overall effect size for programs with Bogota, Colombia removed is 0.05 
(0.00, 0.09) for three years of treatment and 0.02 (-0.03, 0.07) for four or more years of 
treatment. The overall estimate treats each effect size as independent and we do not focus on it 
due to spatial auto-correlation among different years of treatment within the same program. 
 
 
Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
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Appendix D: Assumptions and Calculations for Studies, by Program 
Andhra Pradesh (AP) School Choice Experiment 
Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2015) 
• ITT effects from Table VI, Panel A. Two languages impacts were meta-analyzed into one 
overall for two years, and three impacts for three years. 
• TOT effects from Table VI, Panel B. Two languages impacts were meta-analyzed into 
one overall for two years, and three impacts for three years. 
• 2 year program attrition: 39%: 39% of those offered did not use the voucher (p.10). 
• 4 year program attrition: 49.2%: 39% of those offered did not use the voucher (p.10), but 
at the end of four years only 1,005 out of the 1,980 original treatment group were still 
using it. (1,980-1,005)/1980 = 49.2%. 
• Sample attrition rates differ by year and test but are based on Table A.2 and Table VI. 
For example, the year 2 English sample attrition is 14.9%: (5,316 – 4,525/5,316) where 
5,316 is the sum of the 1,980 + 3,336 in Table A.2 and 4,525 is the sample size in Table 
VI. 
• Control crossover rates not provided. 
• Voucher take-up rates were initially 61% (p. 1026), and 51% at the end of the project (p. 
1038). 
Charlotte Children’s Scholarship Fund 
Greene (2000) 
• Program attrition calculated as the percent of students who were offered a voucher but 




    
• Sample attrition: Overall sample attrition 60% (p. 3). 
• TOT estimates are IV results from Table 3. T-statistic was calculated using a p-value of 
0.05 and degrees of freedom of 350 (N=357 – 7 variables including constant). 
• Treatment/control split was based on the ratio of Choice students to Public students in 
Table 2 (Choice = 145, Public is 197), applied to the total N of 357. 






Usage rate for was 48.4% (1-program attrition rate of 51.6%). 
• Control crossover rate not provided. 
• Voucher take up rate was based on statistics from p. 56 (388/(388+413)) where 388 was 
the number of students who were offered a voucher that attended private school, and 413 
was the number of students offered a voucher who did not use it to attend a private 
school. 
Cowen (2008) 
• Program attrition: 25.5% (54/212 of those offered voucher declined it), Table 1 (p. 307). 
• Sample attrition: 70% based on 30% of participants with outcome testing (Table 1, p. 
307). 
• ITT sample sizes from Table 1. 
• ITT effects from Table 2. 
• TOT in this case is the Complier Average Casual Effect (CACE), the mean treatment 
outcome across the subpopulation of compliers. 
• TOT treatment group sample size (N = 212, number of users, p. 307). 
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• TOT control group sample size (From Table 1: N = “Total” minus “Choice” = 347 – 
158). 
• Control crossover rate not provided. 
• Voucher take up rate was based on statistics in Table 1. 
Children's Scholarship Fund (Toledo, OH) 
Bettinger & Slonim (2006) 
• Math effects only. ITT effect size from Table 3. 
• Used some information from Bettinger & Slonim (2003) as needed. 
• Sample size reported in Table 3 (N=349) was based on stacking two sets of math test 
scores, but this overstates the actual number of students. The footnote indicated 163 
students who took both parts of the test, and 23 who took one part of the test, so we used 
a total sample size of 163 + 23 = 186. 
• Control group is calculated as 58% of the 186 total sample, where 58% is the number of 
lottery losers (1,416 from p. 30), divided by the difference between the number of 
applicants (2,424) from p. 7 of Bettinger & Slonim (2003) and 39 “mystery winner” 
students who were excluded from the analysis. 58% = 1,416/(2,424-39). 
• Program attrition: N/A. Table 1 on p. 30 indicates that the total number of winners was 
2,385 (1,126 + 1,259). The number of losers was 1,416 (331 + 1085), but no indication of 
how many lottery winners actually used the vouchers. 
• Sample attrition: 186 tested out of 2,385, indicates sample attrition of 92% (Table 1). 








    
where usage rate is 43% (p. 12). 
• Voucher take-up rates and control crossover rates from p. 12. 
District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) 
• This is the only program having two different evaluations for two distinct samples. 
Wolf, Kisida, Gutmann, Puma, Eissa, & Rizzo (2013) 
• ITT reading effects from Table 3-2 and Figure 3-1. 
• ITT math effects from Tables 3-2 and 4-1 and Figure 3-2. 
• Program attrition: Based on p. 67-67 (year 1), p. A-34 (year 2), p. A-32 (year 3), and p. 
A-41 (year 4). 
• TOT effects  after year one and two were calculated from the ITT estimates using the 





where usage rates for year one and two rare based on p. 67-68.  
• TOT effects after year three and four were based on percent of “never users.” 
• Control crossover rates from p. 225. 
• Voucher take-up rate from Table 1 (using just cohorts 1 and 2, which represent the 
analytic sample). 
Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman (2017) 
• Program attrition rate from Table 1 (p. 4). 
• Sample attrition rates from p. 8. 
• Control crossover rates from p. 5 and voucher-take up rate from p. 4. 
Ensure Access to Better Learning Experiences (ENABLE) 
Wolf, Egalite & Dixon (2015) 
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• Year 1 ITT: treatment-control means, difference, effect size, and p-value taken from 
Tables 1, 2, and 3.  
• Year 2 ITT: treatment-control means, difference, effect size, and p-value taken from 
Table 25.2. All other statistics acquired from data output obtained directly from the 
authors. 






 where the usage rate is 0.8678. 
• Control crossover rate from p. 12-13 and voucher take up rate from p. 13. 
Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) 
Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters (2015) 
• No ITT effects because it was a placement lottery. 
• Sample attrition was 17% for lottery losers (p. 13), and Table 10 indicates the probability 
of observing a score is about 8 percentage points higher for lottery winners than lottery 
losers, so we assume 9% sample attrition rate for lottery winners. Overall sample attrition 
is calculated as the number of attriters divided by the assumed beginning N (1,456) where 
the assumed beginning N = (treatment N/(1-attrition rate of treatment group) + (control 
N/(1-attrition rate of control group)). Overall sample attrition, therefore, is (1,456-
1,248)/1,456 = 14.3%. 
• Treatment and control splits is based the following: Control group sample size is equal to 
the total sample size from Table 4 (1,247 in Math or 1,248 in Reading) times the loser 
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rate from Table 10 (903/1412 or about 64%). Then the treatment group size is the Total N 
– Control N. 
• Control crossover rate and voucher take up rate from Table 10. 
Mills & Wolf (2017) 
• Control crossover rate is based on control “non-compliers” in Table 8. 
• Voucher take up rates are the “complier” rates for the treatment group from Table 8 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) 
Rouse (1998) 
• Treatment and control group sample sizes are based on Table 1, p. 555. Assumption is 
that reading analytic samples are identical to math analytic samples. 
• TOT effect not calculated as the necessary information to compute TOT effects for each 
year is not available.  
• Control crossover rates not available. 
• Voucher take up rates are based on the “ever in fall” rates in Table II. 
Greene, Peterson, & Du (1999) 
• Sample attrition was calculated as the 1 – proportion of each group with test outcomes 
available. For example, 40% of the treatment group had test data available by the third 
and fourth year, so sample attrition was 60%. 48% of the control group had test data 
available by the third and fourth year, so sample attrition was 52%. 
• Table 6 was used to calculate treatment/control splits for the ITT estimates. For example, 
for Reading ITT, Control N= 48/(48+63) or 43.2% of the total sample.  




    
• Control crossover and voucher take-up rates not available. 
Parents Advancing Choice in Education (Dayton, OH) 
Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) 
• ITT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table 
4B.3 in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average. 
• TOT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table 4.3 
in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average. 
• ITT treatment and Control group sample sizes after years 1 and 2 based on response rate 
in each year times number of vouchers offered. For example: first year treatment group 
sample size is the total number of offers times the response rate (515 x 56%) from p. 195 
of Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson (2002). 
• Response rates between treatment and control assumed to be the same according to 
Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003), p. 197. 
• Voucher take up rate from Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003). 
• Control crossover rate from Table 6. (p. 2014) in Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson 
(2002). 
Programa de Ampliacion de Cobertura de la Educacion Secundaria (PACES) 
Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer (2002) 
• ITT reading effect from Table 5. 
• Control group sample size from Table 2, total ITT sample size from Table 5. 
• TOT sample sizes from Table 7 (Control = 562, N of “Loser Means’; Total = 1,147) 
• Sample attrition (year 3) is based on 283 students who took the test (Table 2) out of the 
total 1,147 (Table 3). 
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• Program attrition estimated to be 43% from p. 1543, which stated: "Not all winners were 
using their PACES vouchers in the survey year. This is because 15 percent of winners 
were not in school at all, and another 16 percent were in public schools, and therefore 
ineligible for scholarships. Some lottery winners also lost their voucher after repeating a 
grade (7 percent), while 5 percent switched to nonparticipating private schools or failed 
to complete the paperwork for a transfer. Others attended schools that stopped accepting 
vouchers or lost their vouchers for unreported reasons.” The sum of 15%, 16%, 7%, and 
5% is 43%. 
• TOT effects were bloom adjusted using the voucher take up rate of 57%: 
𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 =
𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡





𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑢𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
• Voucher take-up rate from p. 1543 (see program attrition calculation above). 
• Control crossover rate is somewhat different from other studies, because what is reported 
is the percent of control group that received scholarships from other sources (p. 1536). 
Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer (2006) 
• ITT effects for year 7 (ICFES exam scores) are the Tobit 10% results on p. 853. 
• Total sample size (3,541) from footnote in Table 3. Treatment group was 58.5% of total 
sample size (Table 1, p. 850) 
• Program attrition: 50% within three years (p. 854). Voucher take-up rate based on this as 
well. 
• Sample attrition Table 1 as: 
 
105 
    
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =












 where the usage rate is 1- program attrition = 1 - .5 = .5 
School Choice Scholarships Foundation Program (NYC) 
Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, & Rubin (2003) 
• Sample attrition: Utilized Table 1 for total number at randomization (676+676 = 1352), 
and 1,050 as the observed sample, to calculate attrition rate of 22%: (1,352-1,050)/1,352 
• Program attrition: Midpoint of 20% and 27%, the percentage of children who won 
scholarships and did not use them (p. 301). 
• ITT effects: overall estimate based on a meta-analytic average of the “Low School” and 
“High School” impacts presented in Table 4. “Overall” impacts (combination of different 
grades at application) were used. 
• There was a lack of detail on sample sizes, so treatment and control group sample sizes 
were based on a 50/50 split of the total number of single-child families included in the 
analysis (p. 301). 
• Voucher take-up rates and control crossover rates from p. 301. 
Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) 
• ITT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table 
4B.1 in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average. 
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• TOT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table 4.2 
in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average. 
• ITT treatment and Control group sample sizes after years 1 and 2 based on response rate 
in each year times number of vouchers offered. For example: first year treatment group 
sample size is the total number of offers times the response rate (1,300 x 82% = 1,066) 
from p. 195 of Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson (2002). first year control group 
sample size is total N from Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) of 1,434 minus 
the 1,066 treatment units. 
• Response rates between treatment and control assumed to be the same according to 
Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003), p. 197, with the exception of in year 2. In 
year 2, the response rate was 7 percentage points higher in the treatment group than in the 
control group. Treatment and control split in year 2 was generated so that this differential 
was approximately 7 percentage points (912/1300 = 70.2% is the treatment group 
response rate and 284/449 = 63.3% is the control group response rate). 
• Control crossover rate from Table 6, p. 2014 oh Howell et al. (2002). No data reported 
for third year control crossover rate. 
• Voucher take-up rate from p. 110 of Peterson et al. (2003). 
Krueger & Zhu (2004) 
• Assumed to be same data as Bitler et al. (2015) so if statistics were not available in 
Krueger & Zhu (2004), we referenced Bitler et al. (2015). 




    
• For year three sample sizes, 2,770 is assumed to be the original all inclusive sample, 
because 1,801 was reportedly left after roughly 35% attrition. Half each of 2,770 is 
assumed to be treatment and control (1,385 each). Treatment and Control attrition rates 
(p. 638) were then used to calculate the number of treatment and control units in the 
analytic sample. For example 35.4% of the control group attrite, so the remaining is 895, 
and the remaining 906 in the total sample size are assumed to be treatment units. 
• Year 1 and 2 treatment and control splits were assumed to be in the same ratio in year 
three.  
• Sample attrition rates for each year were then calculated based on the observed sample 
size in a given year and the original sample size (2,770). 
• Program attrition rates in each year are assumed to be the same as Bitler et al. (2015), 
from Table A2, Panel B. 
• TOT effects from Table 6 2SLS results.  
• TOT samples sizes: assumed to be the same as ITT, because not enough information. 
• Control crossover rate from p. 695 (percent of students in control group who attended 
private school in at least one year). 
• Voucher-take up rate from Table 1. 
Jin, Barnard, & Rubin (2010) 
• No ITT effects, because this is just using a different TOT-methodology with the same 
Barnard et al. (2003) and Krueger & Zhu (2004) sample. 
• TOT effects from Table 7. Same assumptions made as Barnard et al. (2003). 




    
Bitler, Domina, Penner, & Hoynes (2015) 
• Sample sizes all assumed to be the same as Krueger & Zhu (2004). 
• Sample attrition from Panel A of Table A1 (Bitler et al., 2015). For example, year 1 math 
attrition was calculated as the difference between the number of students randomized and 
the number of students with valid test scores (2,666 – 1,977), divided by the number of 
students randomized (2,666). 
• Program attrition: From Panel B of Table A2 (Bitler et al., 2015). For example, in year 1, 
1,022 of the 1,292 students randomized were attending a private school, indicating a first 
year usage rate of 79.1% and program attrition in the first year of 20.9%. 
• ITT effects from Table 3, last column. 






where usage rates were based on Table A2, Panel B. For example, in year 1, 1,022 of the 1,292 
students randomized were attending a private school, indicating a first year usage rate of 79.1%. 
• Control crossover rate calculated from Table A2, p. 446. 
• Voucher take-up rate from Table A2, p. 446 (assuming that if in private, they are using 
voucher). However, there appears to be an error in Table A2, because the sum of the 
private and public students among the treatment group does not add to the 1292 (e.g. 352 
+ 1022 does not equal 1292).  Table A1 shows the correct total treatment number (1374) 
so we use this as the denominator to calculate the take up rates. 
Washington Scholarship Fund (WSF) 
Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) 
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• ITT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table 
4B.2 in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average. 
• TOT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table 4.4 
in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average. 
• ITT treatment and control group sizes after years 1 and 2 based on response rate in each 
year times number of vouchers offered. For example: first year treatment group sample 
size is the total number of offers times the response rate (809 x 63% = 510) from p. 195 
of Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson (2002) 
• Response rates between treatment and control assumed to be the same according to 
Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003), p. 197. 
• The standard error on the three year reading impact for Other Ethnic Groups was not 
reported in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003), but due to uniformity of standard 
error patterns across years within each subject, we calculated an average. For example, 
the standard errors for DC reading ITT impacts for African-American students were 1.5, 
1.4, and 1.5 standard deviations for years 1, 2, and 3). The three year reading ITT 
standard error is the average of the one and two year standard errors (8.0 and 9.1). 
• Control crossover rate from Table 6, p. 204 of Howell et al. (2002). No data reported for 
third year control crossover rate. 










Appendix E:  
Table E1: Effect Sizes (Hedge’s g) and Standard Errors, by Study 
      ITT Reading ITT English ITT Math TOT Reading TOT English TOT Math 

























2 0.009 0.022 0.185 0.031 -0.053 0.030 0.101 0.025 0.364 0.036 -0.104 0.036 
4 0.131 0.020 0.116 0.032 -0.031 0.031 0.271 0.024 0.229 0.038 -0.061 0.037 
Charlotte Children’s 
Scholarship Fund 
Greene (2000); Cowen 
(2008) 1 0.168 0.077 0.168 0.077 0.131 0.077 0.217 0.076 0.217 0.076 0.157 0.076 
Children's Scholarship 
Fund (Toledo, OH) 
Bettinger & Slonim 
(2006) 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.005 0.149 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.011 0.149 




Gutmann, Puma, Eissa, 
& Rizzo (2013) 1 0.030 0.051 0.030 0.051 0.080 0.050 0.039 0.051 0.039 0.051 0.105 0.050 
Wolf et al. (2013) 2 0.090 0.052 0.090 0.052 0.010 0.052 0.113 0.052 0.113 0.052 0.013 0.052 
  Wolf et al. (2013) 3 0.130 0.054 0.130 0.054 0.030 0.053 0.150 0.054 0.150 0.054 0.030 0.053 
  Wolf et al. (2013) 4 0.110 0.057 0.110 0.057 0.020 0.057 0.130 0.057 0.130 0.057 0.030 0.057 
  
Dynarski, Rui, 
Webber, Gutmann, & 
Bachman (2017) 1 -0.090 0.062 -0.090 0.062 -0.120 0.062 -0.120 0.062 -0.120 0.062 -0.170 0.062 
Ensure Access to Better 
Learning Experiences 
(ENABLE) 
Wolf, Egalite, & Dixon 
(2015) 1 0.005 0.039 0.010 0.056 0.110 0.056 0.010 0.039 0.020 0.056 0.130 0.056 
 
2 0.095 0.044 0.150 0.062 0.070 0.061 0.159 0.044 0.250 0.062 0.120 0.061 
Louisiana Scholarship 
Program (LSP)  
Abdulkadiroglu, 
Pathak & Walters 
(2015); Mills & Wolf 
(2017) 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.150 0.039 -0.150 0.039 -0.538 0.040 
 
Mills & Wolf (2017) 2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.181 0.052 -0.181 0.052 -0.337 0.053 











Table E1 Cont’d: Effect Sizes (Hedge’s g) and Standard Errors, by Study 
      ITT Reading ITT English ITT Math TOT Reading TOT English TOT Math 






















Choice Program  (MPCP) 
Rouse (1998); Greene, 
Peterson & Du (1999) 
1 0.070 0.045 0.070 0.045 0.094 0.045 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 0.054 0.049 0.054 0.049 0.081 0.049 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3 0.069 0.057 0.069 0.057 0.123 0.057 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4 -0.003 0.069 -0.003 0.069 0.263 0.070 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Parents Advancing Choice 
in Education (Dayton, OH) 
Peterson, Howell, Wolf 
& Campbell (2003) 
1 0.137 0.110 0.137 0.110 0.008 0.110 0.008 0.110 0.008 0.110 0.009 0.110 
2 0.171 0.112 0.171 0.112 0.117 0.112 0.173 0.112 0.173 0.112 0.118 0.112 
Programa de Ampliacion 
de Cobertura de la 
Educacion Secundaria 
(PACES) 
Angrist,  Bettinger, 
Bloom, King & 
Kremer (2002) 
3 0.202 0.120 N/A N/A 0.153 0.120 0.166 0.042 N/A N/A 0.125 0.059 
 
Angrist, Bettinger, & 










Table E1 Cont’d: Effect Sizes (Hedge’s g) and Standard Errors, by Study 
   ITT Reading ITT English ITT Math TOT Reading TOT English TOT Math 
Program Evaluated Studies included 
Years of 
Treatment 






Wolf & Campbell 
(2003); Barnard, 
Frangakis, Hill & 
Rubin (2003); Jin, 
Barnard & Rubin 
(2010)*;  Krueger 
& Zhu (2004); 
Bitler, Domina, 
Penner & Hoynes 
(2015) 1 -0.008 0.025 -0.008 0.025 0.044 0.025 0.011 0.023 0.011 0.023 0.069 0.023 
  
Peterson et al. 
(2003); Krueger & 
Zhu (2004); Bitler 
et al. (2015) 2 0.027 0.030 0.027 0.030 -0.017 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.030 -0.037 0.030 
  
Peterson et al. 
(2003); Krueger & 
Zhu (2004); Bitler 





Wolf & Campbell 
(2003) 
1 -0.154 0.066 -0.154 0.066 0.144 0.066 -0.156 0.066 -0.156 0.066 0.143 0.066 
2 0.173 0.076 0.173 0.076 0.226 0.076 0.172 0.076 0.172 0.076 0.225 0.076 
3 -0.060 0.078 -0.060 0.078 0.016 0.078 -0.064 0.078 -0.064 0.078 0.035 0.078 
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Private school vouchers allow parents to choose any school for their children using 
government resources (Wolf, 2008). Parental choice and satisfaction make families active 
consumers of education where they can demand quality education in a school market. In the 
U.S., both government- and privately-sponsored voucher programs exist. School choice has also 
become a topic of high relevance since Donald Trump favored school choice during his recent 
successful presidential run and nominated Betsy DeVos—a voucher proponent—as his Secretary 
of Education. Chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that experimental studies on school voucher 
programs have generally found null to moderately positive achievement effects within the United 
States. Evaluations of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) and a recent second evaluation 
of the District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Program (DC-OSP II) are the only 
exceptions; three evaluations have found negative effects of these two school voucher programs 
on student achievement in the initial years (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015; Dynarski 
et al., 2017; Mills & Wolf, 2017).  
Chapter 3 studies the 11 school voucher programs around the globe (also studied in 
chapter 2 of this dissertation) from a cost-effectiveness perspective. This study adds to the 
literature on cost effectiveness by combining experimental estimates of the participant effects of 
private school vouchers with the estimated cost savings associated with these programs. We 
compare the efficiency of vouchers in terms of reading and math gains, for programs within and 
outside the U.S., and for publicly- versus privately-funded programs. We argue that null to 





Two definitions are central to our study. “Effectiveness” is the extent to which a program 
accomplishes its intended goals. “Cost-effectiveness” is “the efficacy of a program in achieving 
given intervention outcomes in relation to the program costs.” (Rossi, Lipsey & Freeman, 2004, 
p. 425)  A program can be cost-effective because it generates better outcomes at a similar cost or 
because it produces similar outcomes at a lower cost. In the real world of scare resources, either 
result relatively benefits society.  
The economic theory of vouchers is to increase educational effectiveness through choice 
and competition. Chapter 2 of this dissertation showed that the academic achievement effects of 
vouchers, though they tend to increase with years of treatment, are generally modest in size. 
Outside the U.S., in developing countries, the achievement effects of school vouchers are 
generally larger. This differential could be due to a larger gap between public and private school 
quality in developing countries compared to the U.S. Some studies on vouchers have found 
larger positive effects on graduation rates (Cowen et al., 2013; Wolf et al., 2013; Chingos & 
Peterson, 2015) and college enrollment (Cowen et al., 2013; Chingos & Peterson, 2015) while 
having null to moderately positive achievement effects on participants. This pattern has led some 
education researchers to study non-test score outcomes, which may be affected differently than 
cognitive (e.g. test score) outcomes in an education intervention. 
 Few education interventions produce large positive effects on test scores, according to 
experimental evidence. Lipsey et al. (2012) conducted a large-scale meta-analysis of all 
education randomized controlled trials (RCTs) since 1995, concluding that the average impact of 
an intervention on test scores for a broad-based standardized test was 0.08 standard deviations 
(SD) at the elementary level and 0.15 SD at the middle school level. Thus, the meta-analysis in 




effects that are typical of other education interventions. Nevertheless, promising educational 
interventions must not only be effective but also efficiently use public resources. Hence, we 
study the cost-effectiveness of the experimental evidence on school vouchers.   
This study suffers from several concerns. We consider two basic issues concerning the 
effectiveness of vouchers at raising student test scores: 1) how to interpret null-effects of voucher 
interventions and 2) achievement effects that change in magnitude and statistical significance 
over time. Concerning the first issue, Muralidharan (2015) lists five different interpretations of 
null-effects. A private school voucher intervention may yield null-effects due to: a) lack of 
program fidelity, b) substitution effects as a result of pulling away of schooling inputs in 
response to the voucher, c) positive effects for the participants equaled by positive competitive 
effects on non-participants, d) lack of administrative reforms that hinder the effectiveness of the 
voucher intervention, or e) a true null-effect on all students. Howell et al. (2002) found positive 
achievement gains for the African-American subgroup of participants in their evaluation of the 
voucher program in Dayton, OH. The same evaluation, however, yielded an overall null 
achievement impact on all participants. In case of an overall null impact, a targeted voucher 
program may meet its objectives by raising student achievement for the disadvantaged families. 
Thus, overall null impacts in a voucher program warrant further analysis. 
Second, not all voucher programs show a linear relationship between the effect size and 
years of treatment. While few voucher programs have been evaluated for more than a couple 
years, the existing evidence in chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that the relation between 
effect size and years of treatment may be non-linear. This pattern creates a dilemma for drawing 
relevant policy conclusions for the true effect of a voucher intervention, especially if there is 




treatment. Thus, conclusions drawn from the early years of an evaluation may be substantively 
different from conclusions drawn from later years of an evaluation, which are arguably more 
policy relevant, but more time- and resource-intensive to obtain.  
This issue can be understood mathematically by differentiating between the partial and 
total derivative of the outcome of interest with respect to the observables. In any voucher RCT, it 
is expected that by randomly assigning the observable explanatory variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 the production 
parameter 𝛽 can be efficiently obtained. However, 𝛽 is a partial derivative of the outcome of 
interest with respect to the explanatory variable 
𝜕𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑋𝑖𝑡
. The partial derivative assumes that the 
observable explanatory variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 remains constant. However, with increases in the length of 
treatment, the school and family-level characteristics may endogenously confound 𝑋𝑖𝑡, resulting 
in inaccurate estimates of 𝛽. Instead of the partial derivative, the total derivative 
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑡
 𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑡
 may more 
appropriately account for any re-optimization by the school or family agents in response to an 
exogenous change in the explanatory variables. Family satisfaction is key to a market oriented 
reform like school vouchers and it is expected that changing schools would require some time for 
adjusting the household level inputs for the family. Similarly, the schools are also likely to re-
optimize their inputs due to competition, entry and exit of students.  The latest year of a voucher 
intervention may be more policy relevant, especially if a voucher intervention is to be scaled up 
based on results from a limited intervention. In some cases vouchers may actually increase the 
amount of personal resources that families devote to education. This is clearly the case in the 
voucher program of Bogota, Colombia. It allowed families to top up and had incentives for 
students to get continued access to their voucher if they passed the exams. Thus, an earlier year 




yield the policy parameter effect which accounts for this re-optimization by agents and is more 
policy relevant (Das et al., 2013; Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016).  
To draw more policy relevant conclusions concerning achievement effects from a 
voucher intervention, six issues must be raised in future studies: 1) long-term voucher 
interventions must establish the relation between effect size and years of treatment, 2) the 
interventions should address the five points raised above concerning null-effects, 3) the 
production function vs. policy parameters dilemma should be emphasized, 4) the last year’s 
cognitive effects should be the parameter to compare with non-cognitive outcomes of voucher 
interventions, 5) the details of the validation, reliability and construction process of the 
achievement test used in the interpretation should be provided in the papers, and 6) researchers 
should also study the outcomes from a cost-effectiveness perspective. 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) and Wolf and McShane (2013) argue in favor of 
considering the cost-effectiveness of school vouchers as their findings indicate that null-effects 
in school voucher settings are achieved at a fraction of the cost of per pupil public school 
expenditures. A thorough analysis of the cost-effectiveness of school vouchers across the globe, 
conducted here, provides the foundation for a greater scholarly consensus regarding the ability of 
school vouchers to improve outcomes for students.  
We focus our cost-effectiveness study on RCTs because these are the “gold standard” of 
program evaluation in terms of assessing causal relationships (Mosteller & Boruch, 2002; Rossi, 
Lipsey & Freeman, 2005). In RCTs, the assignment of a voucher is random, and therefore the 
issue of selection bias is resolved, as treatment and control group units should be identical in 
expectation. While quasi-experimental design (QED) methods (quasi-experimental designs allow 




random assignment of program participants to treatment and control groups) are often used to 
approximate the causal effect of a program, evidence from a within-study comparison (Anderson 
& Wolf, 2017) indicates that QEDs do not necessarily approximate causal estimates from an 
RCT, and that even the direction of the selection bias is not consistently predictable. For 
example, while it is often thought that more motivated or more able families self-sort into private 
schools and/or voucher programs, this is not always the case (Anderson & Wolf, 2017). 
In addition to the participant effects of vouchers, the competitive effects of vouchers (the 
effect of choice-based competition on the performance of affected public schools) are also 
relevant for studying the cost-effectiveness of vouchers. Positive competitive effects of voucher 
programs would strengthen the case for the cost-effectiveness of vouchers while negative 
competitive effects would make an overall conclusion more difficult. Chakrabarti (2008) showed 
that when money follows the student, there are increasing incentives for the improvement in the 
traditional public school system. Reviews on competitive effect of vouchers generally indicate 
positive or neutral to positive impacts of vouchers on the performance of affected public schools 
(Egalite & Wolf, 2016; Forster, 2016). Given the generally positive competitive effects, the 
current analysis on the cost-effectiveness of vouchers provides a lower bound on the societal 
benefit of vouchers. 
The cost-effectiveness analysis proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss earlier 
studies on school vouchers that have studied the outcomes from a productivity perspective. 
Section 3 describes the funding structure of the programs included in the cost-effectiveness 
analysis. In section 4, we describe the research methodology and assumptions made. Section 5 




policy implications of the cost-effectiveness analysis. We also discuss cautions when drawing 
policy implications from the study. 
2. Literature review 
Earlier studies on the fiscal effects of publicly-funded school vouchers have found 
financial benefits for the voucher funding body (i.e. the government). This conclusion is because 
the typical per-pupil voucher cost is less than the per-pupil cost had the same student attended a 
traditional public school. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) is the longest 
running voucher program in the United States. Costrell (2010) estimated the net fiscal impacts of 
MPCP as approximately $52 million per year. With MPS denoting Milwaukee Public Schools, 
Costrell (2010, p. 4) relied upon the following:  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = (𝑀𝑃𝑆 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙×𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑃𝑆 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
                               −(𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟×𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑃 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
The MPCP program expanded over time. Thus, by comparing the newer estimates of the net 
fiscal impact of MPCP with estimates in his earlier evaluation of the MPCP, Costrell found that 
the net fiscal impacts of the MPCP were positive and growing over time with program 
expansion. 
 The District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) is the only federally 
funded private school voucher program in the U.S. In a benefit/cost analysis of the DC OSP, 
Wolf and McShane (2013) took into account the increase in graduation rate induced by the 
program and estimated the economic returns to education attainment. Their estimates suggest 
that DC OSP’s impacts on educational attainment generated a return on investment (ROI) of 
approximately 162 percent. In other words for the low-income students in DC, for every dollar 




 In a review of the fiscal benefits of 10 school voucher programs, Spalding (2014) 
estimated total savings of $1.7 billion as the lower bound since the inception of the MPCP in 
1990-91 through 2010-2011. The calculations also showed an increase of over 230 times in the 
enrollment in school voucher programs in the analyzed timeframe. The increase in demand for 
school vouchers and the associated cost savings should draw the interest of policymakers for 
more experimental testing of voucher programs in the U.S. The contribution of our study relative 
to Spalding (2014) is the cost-effectiveness analysis of 11 voucher program around the globe that 
have been experimentally evaluated for achievement effects. 
 Generally, the students leaving the traditional public schools for a voucher-accepting 
school generate fiscal benefits for the public school, as the leaving students cost more to educate 
than the revenue lost from the state (Scafidi 2012; Trivitt & DeAngelis 2016). This is so as the 
cost of educating a child in the school constitutes both variable (such as costs associated with 
current instructional expenses, current student support/pupil support, instructional support, and 
food service) and fixed costs (such as facilities costs). When a child leaves a school, only the 
variable portion of the costs associated with educating the child is lost but there is no effect on 
the fixed portion of the cost in the short term. As a result, when a student leaves a public school 
via a private school choice program, the remaining students in that school actually have 
increased financial resources, on a per-pupil basis. Hence, an average public school district 
would generally receive fiscal benefits due to school choice interventions. 
 Tax-credit scholarship programs, which operate like voucher programs but are funded 
through donations to non-profits, also produce fiscal benefits, but these benefits may differ from 
the savings associated with vouchers for a variety of reasons. Publicly funded voucher programs 




programs allow taxpayers to receive partial or full tax credits for donating to nonprofits (Lueken, 
2016). Some voucher programs involve fixed tuition amounts and regulations that affect 
participation by families and schools that prefer tuition top up. As tax-credit scholarship 
programs seemingly give more freedom to the taxpayers, they might produce different impacts 
than school vouchers due to choice differentiation, in a market where school choice is in high 
demand. In addition, tax-credit scholarship programs have proven to be more politically 
palatable, as they do not require participation by all taxpayers, as full voucher programs do. On 
the other hand, tax-credit scholarship programs, if implemented, may have a lower take-up rate 
by donors, since individuals must choose to donate to nonprofits, as opposed to a voucher 
program, for example, in which taxpayers are required to contribute and all school-age children 
are able to participate at no additional private cost. Lueken (2016) estimated overall savings 
between $1,650 and $3,001 per student, on average, for ten tax-credit scholarship programs in 
the U.S. The cumulative savings per student to the taxpayers for different tax-credit scholarship 
programs ranged between $298 and $8,450. 
Fiscal benefits are not restricted to private school choice. Public charter schools also 
produce fiscal benefits. Wolf et al. (2014) used two measures for the productivity of public 
charter schools. They estimated the gains in the student test scores on the 2010-11 National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) per a $1,000 investment in education of a student 
in charter school in comparison to the traditional public school. In their second measure, they 
calculated a return on investment (ROI) by converting the learning gains in the charter and 
traditional public school sectors into an estimate of economic returns over a lifetime for the 
students. Thereafter, they compared the gains to the revenue amounts that had been invested in 




that charter schools are more productive than TPS, either because they produce higher student 
gains at a lower cost or because they produce similar or only slightly lower student gains at a 
significantly lower cost.” (Wolf et al., 2014, p. 9).  
 Positive fiscal impacts of private school vouchers may also be expected in international 
contexts where the private schools charge less per-pupil tuition in comparison to the average per-
pupil government expenditure in the public school system. Muralidharan and Sundararaman 
(2015) reported the funded voucher amount to be around 40% of the per-student costs in the 
public schools. Due to the larger quality gap between public and private schools in the 
developing world, the cost effectiveness of private school vouchers may be higher there in 
comparison to voucher interventions in the U.S. 
3. Funding structure of the programs included in the analysis 
The RCTs of private school vouchers included in our analysis were located in three 
countries: the United States of America (U.S.), Colombia and India. Eight out of these eleven 
voucher programs analyzed were administered within the U.S. The U.S. studies covered 
programs in Charlotte, NC; Dayton, OH; Milwaukee, WI; New York City; Toledo, OH; 
Washington, DC (two separate programs) and Louisiana. The participants in the RCTs were 
children who were randomized through a lottery to receive (or not) a voucher to attend a private 
school. The grades analyzed ranged from K to 12, although most RCTs included a shorter grade 
range in their analysis. Most of the private schools that participate in voucher programs in the 
U.S. and other countries are relatively low-cost schools with per-student costs below the average 
amount spent in area public schools (Sude, DeAngelis & Wolf, 2018). The duration of studies 
analyzed ranged from one to seven years. The voucher interventions were targeted towards 




voucher-accepting private schools were already serving disadvantaged students. Often they had a 
religious orientation, especially Catholic. With the exception of Louisiana, the U.S. programs 
were limited to particular cities. 
Table 1 shows the summary of the funding structure for the publicly or privately funded 
school voucher or K-12 “scholarship” programs. The costs in Table 1 have been adjusted for 
inflation and cost-of-living/purchasing power to 2013 U.S. dollars (as 2013 was the first year of 
inception of the LSP program) and account for the variable proportion of the costs in traditional 
public schools. We discuss details in the next section. The publicly funded programs were in 
Bogota, Colombia; Washington, DC; Louisiana; and Milwaukee, WI; U.S.A. Generally, the 
publicly funded programs covered full tuition costs and the privately funded programs covered 
varying portions of the full tuition costs, with some combination of the parents or the schools 
making up the difference. In addition, we adjust for regional cost-of-living within the U.S. using 
a comparable wage approach (Taylor & Fowler, 2006). Our calculations show that the per-pupil 
cost differences between the voucher amount and public school variable cost for the publicly 
funded programs in the U.S. ranged from around -$1,322 in DC OSP II to -$2,842 in Louisiana; 
the unadjusted amounts of the voucher were approximately $5,000 (median award amount) for 
Louisiana and $8,000 for grades K-8 and up to $12,000 for grades 9-12 for DC OSP II (Dynarski 
et al., 2017; Mills & Wolf, 2016). For the privately funded programs in the U.S., the proportion 
of support for the tuition cost varied vastly. While we are unable to determine the exact 
proportion and amount of per-pupil top-up (families contributing funds to make up the difference 
between the private school tuition and the voucher amount), the per-pupil cost difference 
between the voucher amounts (ignoring top-up) and the traditional public school variable cost 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Funding for the voucher programs in Colombia and India was extremely low. The two 
privately-funded voucher programs in India were fully funded and the voucher program in 
Colombia allowed top-up and was partly funded by the World Bank. In nominal USD, the 
original voucher amounts ranged from about $117 in India (Wolf, Egalite & Dixon, 2015) to 
$190 in Colombia (Angrist et al., 2002). Both the privately- and publicly-funded voucher 
programs across the globe covered less than half of the per-pupil expenses in nearby public 
schools. The international voucher programs served students living in abject poverty (Angrist et 
al., 2002; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015; Wolf, Egalite & Dixon, 2015). The private 
schools accepting voucher students have modest infrastructure, instructional facilities and special 
programs for differentiating instruction to students in comparison to the nearby public schools 
(Dixon, 2013; Wolf et al., 2013).   
4. Research methodology and assumptions 
The research design of the studies that inform the cost-effectiveness analysis was random 
assignment of children to treatment and control groups.20  Most studies had a one-stage 
randomization through administration of a lottery while one study in Andhra Pradesh, India 
(Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015) was based on a two-stage randomization (randomly 
assigned students within randomly assigned villages). For this cost-effectiveness analysis, we 
relied on estimates of the participant effects of school vouchers from the meta-analysis in chapter 
2 of this dissertation. To graphically analyze the productivity of voucher programs, we compare 
these experimental estimates of program benefits, in Hedge’s 𝑔 effect sizes (Hedges, 1981), 
                                                     
20 Chapter 2 of this dissertation excluded TOT impacts for Milwaukee as an experimental estimate was not 
available. However, ITT impacts for Milwaukee are based on experimental estimates. For allowing comparison of 
cost-effectiveness across all voucher interventions, the non-experimental TOT estimates for Milwaukee have been 




graphing each effect size within a circle sized according to the treatment sample size. The size of 
the treatment sample is the average of treatment samples for math and reading scores for a 
particular year of treatment (the treatment sizes do not differ vastly for math and reading scores). 
In particular, we use Consumer Price Index (CPI) data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics21 for 
the studies within the U.S., CPI data from India’s Open Government Data (OGD) Platform22 for 
the studies in India, and CPI data from Colombia’s Banco de la República23 for the study in 
Colombia. In addition, all U.S. costs are adjusted for regional differences in cost-of-living using 
a comparable wage approach (Taylor & Fowler, 2006), and costs outside of the U.S. are adjusted 
to the U.S. cost-of-living using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) data from the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).24 These adjustments allow for more careful 
cost comparisons, adjusted for both inflation over time, and the relative value of (purchasing 
power) of money in different localities. This approach allows us to analyze the relative 
productivity of the voucher in comparison to public school expenditures in the same locality 
(district or state). 
We focus on the treatment on the treated (TOT), but we also analyze the ITT estimates.25 
The TOT informs about the impact of the voucher on voucher winners who actually used it, and 
the Louisiana Scholarship Program was a placement lottery that only yielded TOT impacts. The 
cost measures for the voucher programs are accumulated from a variety of sources including 
program websites, state-level websites, country-level websites, and research evaluations or other 
documents. In general, to be conservative, we use the maximum voucher amount available as an 
                                                     
21 Source: https://www.bls.gov/cpi/ 
22 Source: https://data.gov.in/catalog/state-level-consumer-price-index-ruralurban 
23 Source: http://www.banrep.gov.co/en/prices/consumer-price-index 
24 Source: https://data.oecd.org/conversion/purchasing-power-parities-ppp.htm 




upper limit on the cost of the voucher, when available. Exceptions are the voucher amounts for 
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) (Rouse, 1998; Greene, Peterson, & Du, 1999;), 
the LSP (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Waters, 2015; Mills & Wolf, 2017), the Programa de 
Ampliación de Cobertura de la Educación Secundaria (PACES) program in Bogota, Colombia 
(Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer, 2002; Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer, 2006) and the 
Andhra Pradesh (AP) School Choice Experiment (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015) where 
the upper limit was not publicly available. In the first three cases, we use average voucher 
amounts instead. In the fourth case (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015) we calculate the 
average voucher amount as 40 percent of the average public school expenditure per child (p. 
1031, 1058). We obtain the per-pupil expenditure in public schools for Delhi, India from an 
Economic Survey of Delhi, 2016-2017.26 The per-pupil expenditures for public schools in 
Bogota, Colombia is obtained from Angrist et al. (2002, p. 1537). 
For the U.S. studies, we subtract from the voucher costs the variable per pupil costs 
associated with public school education in the same locality. Only variable expenditures are 
subtracted, as the local public school system should theoretically be able to reduce costs by this 
amount, while being unable to affect fixed costs in the short term. The cost measures for the 
traditional public school system come from the per-pupil expenditures in a given locality in a 
given year, adjusted to September 2013 dollars. These expenditures are primarily obtained from 
the Census Bureau databases,27 supplemented with state-level databases from Ohio (Ohio 
                                                     
26 Source: http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/15375/publisher/government-of-nct-of-delhi/ 




Department of Education)28 and the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of 
Data State Fiscal Reports,29 as needed. 
We use conservative guidance from Spalding (2014) to determine which public school 
costs are considered variable. Specifically, we include (on a per-pupil basis) only current 
instructional expenses, current student support/pupil support, instructional support, and food 
service. Other fiscal effect studies have included enterprise operations (school bookstore, 
interscholastic activities, etc.) as variable costs as well (Scafidi, 2012), but Spalding assumes that 
as the costs associated with certain enterprise operations rise or fall, so would the associated 
revenues. The removal of these would have no net fiscal difference, and we exclude these from 
our lower bound estimates of the variables cost in the local TPS system. Therefore, we are 
assuming only a lower bound on the potential savings from the TPS system. In one study 
location and year combination (MPCP, 1990-1991), the corresponding traditional public school 
expenditures were not available, so we assumed that these costs were the same as the 1991-1992 
Milwaukee TPS costs, adjusted to 2013 dollars. 
The public school costs outside of the U.S. are not reported in the same level of detail,30 
so we are unable to differentiate between the variable and fixed components of these costs. 
Therefore, when calculating the net “savings” from voucher programs outside the U.S., we make 
assumptions about the proportion of total TPS costs that are variable, beginning with an 
assumption based on this proportion calculated from the U.S. studies. For example, we calculate, 
the percent of TPS expenditures that is considered variable for the last evaluation year for each 
                                                     
28 Source: http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Finance-and-Funding/Finance-Related-Data/Expenditure-and-
Revenue/Expenditure-Revenue-Data 






U.S. voucher program.31 Across all U.S. programs, this percentage ranged from 64% to 79%, and 
on average was 69%. This average is the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are 
considered variable in the U.S. localities with voucher evaluations included here. We use this 
number to estimate variable public school costs for the non-US studies. This decision is based on 
the assumption that non-U.S. governments allocate the same proportion of their per-student 
public expenditures to variable costs as in the U.S. voucher settings. This might be a strong 
assumption, so we report a breakeven point at which there would be no potential savings to the 
non-U.S. governments. The breakeven point is the percentage equivalent to the voucher amount 
divided by the total per-student public school expenditures in non-U.S. contexts. The breakeven 
points for Delhi, Andhra Pradesh and Bogota occur at 25, 40 and 54 percent, respectively. In 
other words, in Delhi, India, if 25% of the traditional public school costs are variable (and 
therefore represent savings from a voucher program), the program would break even, as the 
average per-pupil variable cost savings would equal the average voucher amount. 
The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) created a Comparable Wage Index 
(CWI) as a measure of “systematic, regional variations in the salaries of college graduates who 
are not educators.”  The CWI is used to make financial comparisons in terms of cost of living, or 
wages demanded across geographic regions within the U.S. (Bush School of Government and 
Public Service, 2016). For the U.S. studies, we utilize the CWI to adjust for regional differences 
related to cost of living. Due to the lack of a similar index for the two regions in India (urban 
Delhi and rural Andhra Pradesh), we are not able to adjust for cost of living differences across 
those areas. For comparing the cost differences across countries we utilize the purchasing power 
                                                     
31 For LSP and DC OSP II, we do not have public school expenditures for 2014-2015 (not published yet by NCES) 




parity (PPP) conversion factor32 from the World Bank. This tool allows us to adjust for the 
difference in costs that are affected by the exchange rates of currencies across the countries. 
Public school expenditures are generally reported as elementary and secondary 
expenditures combined. Since secondary education tends to be more expensive, we may be 
overstating the comparable TPS cost for the typical student in these voucher studies, who tends 
to be younger than the average K-12 student. Only one U.S. study, the DC OSP evaluation, 
included students through grade 12, and the second PACES study (Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer, 
2006) included students in grades 6 to 11.  
If a voucher program accepts students who were not already attending public schools 
(i.e., already attending private schools), then there is no corresponding savings for the public 
school system. However, few voucher/scholarship programs in the U.S. serve students already 
enrolled in private school, as most are limited to public school students or rising kindergarteners 
(EdChoice, 2017). In some developing countries, the public schools are often of low quality and 
teacher absenteeism is high (Chaudhury et al., 2006). It is possible that vouchers in developing 
countries may induce kids who are not attending a public school due to no learning to attend a 
private school. Three publicly funded U.S. programs in Table 1 have already been evaluated 
regarding their cost-effectiveness (Costrell, 2010; Wolf & McShane, 2013; Trivitt & DeAngelis, 
2016). All three concluded that the voucher programs were more cost-effective than their TPS.     
  The total savings for a voucher program for the last year of treatment in each program 
can be calculated33 from Table 1 as: 
 
  𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟−𝑇𝑃𝑆)×𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑇𝑂𝑇 
                                                     
32 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPP 





The cumulative savings associated with a voucher program can be calculated by multiplying the 
above equation by the number of years of treatment for these students in Table 1. This formula 
would generate a lower bound on the cumulative savings as the treatment sample for the last year 
is generally the lowest for any year of evaluation due to attrition. The savings can then be 
summed up across programs to generate net social savings due to these voucher programs. These 
calculations should not be viewed as net fiscal impacts or benefit/cost analysis of these voucher 
programs. Instead, they are a lower bound of the savings from these programs, as they represent 
only the savings for students who were randomly assigned and evaluated within an RCT, and 
only for certain years of the program. The overall savings from these programs accrue in part to 
the government and in part to society, although the savings that we estimate are limited in that 
we are unable to account for top-up in the privately-funded programs. In the privately funded 
programs, while savings accrue to the government as students leave public schools, private funds 
do represent a cost to society at large, and we are also ignoring additional private or social costs 
related to top-up amounts. We could think of the privately funded program as providing seed 
money with the later intention that funds would be public. 
5. Results 
We present the results graphically with the per-pupil cost difference between the voucher 
amount and the TPS variable cost on the horizontal-axis of our figures. A negative cost 
difference means that the voucher amount is less than the local TPS variable costs saved. In other 
words, negative cost differences indicate net savings from the voucher. On the vertical axis, we 
plot the effect size weighted by the size of the treatment group obtained from the meta-analysis 




sizes are in bold circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of 
the circle) with a line. The center of the circle above (below) the horizontal-axis represents a 
positive (negative) effect size which means that treatment (voucher) students had higher (lower) 
reading or math test scores, relative to their TPS peers in the same RCT study. 
First, we present the overall results for reading and math (TOT) for the last year of 
evaluation of the programs. Then we show the results by the type of funding received by the 
program (public vs. private), and finally we graph the results by years of the treatment. 
5-A. Overall impacts 
The overall results for the last year evaluation of the programs for reading in Figure 1 and 
for math in Figure 2 show that, generally, the productivity of vouchers is greater than that of 
traditional public schools. In fact, in all cases, the cost savings are positive (all centers of circles 
lie in the left two quadrants). The generally null effects come at a lower per-student cost in 
comparison to per-student variable cost in public schools. In only two programs (LSP and the 
second DC OSP evaluation), and only in math, were the effects of vouchers negative, and even 
in these cases, the voucher programs were operating at savings relative to the TPS system. Thus, 
while vouchers tend to be at least as effective as public schools, their cost-effectiveness tends to 
be consistently higher. Generally, the U.S. programs seem to save more money than the non-U.S. 
programs, however this is misleading given the stark differences in the level of spending 









Figure 1: Overall impacts – TOT Reading.  
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size, which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading 
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for 
Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading estimate for Andhra 
Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. Reading estimate for 
Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The 
variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of 
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Figure 2: Overall impacts – TOT Math. 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size, which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT 
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are 
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered 
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5-B. Overall impacts by funding type 
In Figures 3 through 6 we plot results by the type of funding received by the voucher 
program. The funding source is defined as public if a voucher program received any portion of 
the voucher amount from the government. Our results are limited in that they do not account for 
voucher top-up, which is quite common in the case of small, privately funded vouchers, and thus 
we are not able to determine which type of funding is more cost-effective among the publicly 
and privately funded programs. Generally, the privately funded vouchers in the U.S. cover only 
part of the private school tuition amount. The results show that even publicly-funded voucher 














Figure 3: Overall impacts – TOT Reading (Privately Funded). 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading 
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for 
Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading estimate for Andhra 
Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. TOT impacts for 
Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based 
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Figure 4: Overall impacts – TOT Reading (Publicly Funded). 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading 
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for 
Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The 
variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of 
total TPS expenditures that are considered variable in the U.S. 
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Figure 5: Overall impacts – TOT Math (Privately Funded). 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT 
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are 
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered 
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Figure 6: Overall impacts – TOT Math (Publicly Funded). 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes in comparison than the local 
TPSs. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. 
programs are calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that 
are considered variable in the U.S. 
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5-C. Overall impacts by years of treatment 
In Figures 7 through 14 we plot the previous results by the duration of treatment (one, 
two, three and four or more years). Both the math and reading results show that treatment 
duration is positively related to voucher cost-effectiveness, as evidenced by the circles lying to 
the left of the origin and generally having null to positive achievement impacts. While we cannot 

















Figure 7: Impacts for Year 1 – TOT Reading. 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading 
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for 
Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are 
non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based on 69% as the 
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Figure 8: Impacts for Year 2 – TOT Reading. 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading 
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for 
Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading estimate for Andhra 
Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. TOT impacts for 
Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based 
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Figure 9: Impacts for Year 3 – TOT Reading. 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading 
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for 
Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The 
variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of 
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Figure 10: Impacts for Year 4 or more – TOT Reading. 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading 
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for 
Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The 
variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of 
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Figure 11: Impacts for Year 1 – TOT Math. 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT 
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are 
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered 
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Figure 12: Impacts for Year 2 – TOT Math. 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT 
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are 
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered 
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Figure 13: Impacts for Year 3 – TOT Math. 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT 
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are 
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered 
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Figure 14: Impacts for Year 4 or more – TOT Math. 
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year 
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the 
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold 
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a 
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect 
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT 
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are 
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered 
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 There are two main takeaways from the preceding figures. First, school vouchers are 
consistently more cost-effective than the public schools, even if most of the achievement effects 
are null. Second, the dilemma of the production function vs. policy parameter effect does not 
produce substantively different conclusions about voucher cost-effectiveness, as for all years of 
treatment, the voucher programs produced savings. While voucher effectiveness based on test 
scores may vary between worse and better (the effect size on test scores can change between 
positive and negative and between statistically significant to null effects) from the earliest year of 
an evaluation to the latest year, voucher cost-effectiveness consistently remains positive (in DC 
OSP II and LSP negative impacts were obtained at lower costs). Hence, regardless of whether 
one uses estimates from the early years of treatment or later years, the conclusion is still that 
voucher programs save money. 
 The total savings to the government from these voucher programs is high. Summing over 
the costs obtained from the voucher program yields savings worth $54,786,267 for the U.S. 
programs, $3,610,992 for the Colombia program, and $1,718,796 for the India programs. Overall 
the voucher interventions saved the governments $60,116,057 globally.  This number does not 
adjust for student top-ups, per-student costs in elementary and secondary grades and cost of 
living differences across Delhi and Andhra Pradesh, India. This number is only for the students 
that were part of the RCTs and only for the number of years that an evaluation was conducted; 
hence it is a lower bound on the overall savings from the program. A program may have students 
that were not randomized and still participated. Furthermore, programs may not have been 
evaluated for all years of operation (e.g., the DC OSP). Nevertheless, aligning our analysis with 
previous voucher productivity studies of MPCP (Costrell, 2010), DC OSP (Wolf & McShane, 




government money. Further investment in voucher programs may be a cost-effective policy tool 
as these programs are generally at least as effective as the public schools in raising student 
outcomes on math and reading. 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This cost-effectiveness analysis contributes to the field of school choice by combining 
rigorous evidence from RCT studies on school vouchers with actual public school expenditures. 
While voucher programs are growing across the globe, a cost-effectiveness analysis of the effect 
of vouchers internationally was lacking. There is variation across programs in both cost-
effectiveness and impacts. No clear relationship has emerged between the cost and estimated 
impacts of a program from our analysis. As hypothesized, interpreting null student test-score 
impacts from a cost-effectiveness perspective reveals that private school vouchers generally 
produce student test scores similar to those in the local public school system, but at a lower cost. 
Our findings generally accord with Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) and Wolf and 
McShane (2013). 
The evidence suggests that all programs pass the cost-effectiveness test for reading test 
score impacts, while only two evaluations had a more ambiguous overall effect (slightly negative 
test scores alongside lower costs in the LSP and DC OSP-II). A meta-analysis of the 
experimental studies on private school vouchers in chapter 2 of this dissertation has shown 
generally higher impact of voucher programs on participants’ reading scores in comparison to 
math scores. In the future, it would be interesting to see how the impacts and cost-effectiveness 
of LSP and DC OSP II change with later years of evaluation of the program. Although we 
distinguished between publicly- and privately-funded voucher programs, our study is limited 




mechanisms, as they differ in terms of who pays, and generally only privately-funded programs 
allow top-up. This area requires further exploration.  
In terms of policy recommendations, the government could save money by investing in 
private school vouchers without generally losing student effectiveness. For an education 
intervention to be promising, it must not only improve student outcomes, but also be cost-
effective. On the first measure, voucher programs, based on experimental evidence, are at least 
as effective as public schools, with the exception of two U.S. programs in Louisiana and 
Washington, D.C. On the second measure, they are substantially more cost-effective than public 
schools. Before scaling up a voucher program, policymakers should consider funding more 
experimental evaluations of school vouchers. Test scores and cost-effectiveness cover only part 
of the effects of voucher programs. For scaling up voucher programs, re-optimization of 
household and school level inputs deserve more exploration. It would also be important to assess 
how instructional time is spent in public and private schools in voucher settings. Future studies 
should also use productivity measures based on unit of instructional time spent to address the 
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While the public school principal is bound most by red tape, the private school principal 
is bound most by his or her conscience. 
—John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, 1988, p. 1076 
School choice has emerged as a key intervention in school reform globally. President 
Donald Trump promised massive expansion of private school choice through a reallocation of 
$20 billion in federal funding to school choice initiatives. Evidence suggests that private schools 
slightly outperform public schools on improving student achievement within the US and 
internationally (Forster, 2016; Greene, 2005; Tooley, 2005; Tooley et al., 2011). Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation showed that children using voucher programs to attend private schools do 
slightly better in achievement outcomes than comparison kids in public schools. Of the sixteen 
experimental studies of private school choice in the United States, only three studies have shown 
consistent negative findings for test scores in math, reading, or both in the early years of 
evaluation (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015; Dynarski et al., 2017; Mills & Wolf, 
2016). 
Most school choice studies focus on student achievement (West & Woessmann, 2010; 
Witte, 2001; Witte et al., 2014; Wolf et al., 2013). Other studies on private and charter schools 
examine impacts on the long-term outcomes such as student attainment (Booker et al., 2008; 
Cowen et al., 2013; Wolf et al., 2013; Zimmer, 2009) and criminal activity (Deming, 2011; 
DeAngelis & Wolf, 2016; Dobbie & Fryer, 2015). While this evidence is limited, existing 
research suggests that access to school choice reduces criminal activity and teen pregnancy while 
increasing the likelihood of graduating from high school. Additionally, access to private school 
choice may increase performance in public schools through competitive effects (Egalite, 2013; 





increase civic skills such as voting, volunteering, charitable activity, and tolerance of others 
(Bettinger & Slonim, 2006; Campbell, 2002; Fleming, 2014; Fleming, Mitchell, & McNally, 
2014). 
Though many studies have examined whether private schools outperform public schools, 
few address possible mediating factors. For example, Wolf and Hoople (2006) closely examine 
the Washington Scholarship Fund, finding that the successful private schools allocated fewer 
resources to facilities and programs. They also find suggestive evidence that more committed 
teachers and more challenging homework made a difference. Our study fits into the literature by 
examining a potential explanation for why school choice seemingly produces (modestly) positive 
outcomes for students.  
We examine the differences in the autonomy of school leaders, since such autonomy may 
enable leaders to respond to the changing needs of students and staff within their schools. 
Empowering principals to act on their superior knowledge of and interest in school level 
outcomes may facilitate the creation of successful education for children (Ouchi, 2009). For 
example, Grissom, Loeb and Master (2013) find that principals spending time on curricula can 
positively influence student achievement. Conversely, principals allocating more time on 
activities such as classroom walkthroughs may have a negative impact on student growth. Ouchi 
(2009) and Hess (2013) point out that student learning cannot be improved unless school leaders 
have control over important school-level activities such as curriculum, personnel, and the budget. 
In schooling, it is axiomatic that leaders that are free to influence important decisions can 
ameliorate inefficiencies (Tekleselassie & Villarreal III, 2011). In contrast, schools with 
constrained leadership have less capacity to act in response to school level knowledge. It is 





such as rewarding their friends. Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin (2013) pointed out that highly 
effective principals increase student learning by two to seven months within a single school year. 
Chubb and Moe (1988, p. 1065) found that the public and private schools were “distinctively 
different in environment and organization.” They theorized that greater autonomy would exist in 
private schools with respect to structure, goals and school operations; though they did not test 
this specific hypothesis. Private school principals had more teaching experience than public 
school principals. 
We provide an empirical test of the hypothesis that the private schooling sector allows for 
more leadership autonomy than traditional public schools, using nationally representative survey 
data of principals in the United States for the 2011-12 school year from the School and Staffing 
Survey. We compare the reported differences between public and private school principals’ 
influence on decision-making activities within their schools.34 
2. Theory 
Families attending private schools face fewer transaction costs associated with school 
exit because public schools are typically residentially assigned. This difference makes private 
school operators more prone to the threat of closure (Friedman, 1955; West, 1981). Shorter term 
enrollment, and thus monetary loss, can, over the medium and longer term, damage brand name, 
threaten teachers’ jobs, and discourage future clients. Since families are more apt to leave private 
schools if they are dissatisfied, school leaders must have the power to change schooling to 
maintain customer satisfaction (West, 1997). If a private school principal is able to make the 
decisions necessary to respond to the signals transmitted by his or her clients, the families would 
                                                     






find a better match between their needs and schools’ quality. Since public schools often have a 
monopoly on public funding, and their customers are normally assigned residentially, their 
leaders may face less pressure to respond to dissatisfaction (Hoxby, 2007; Peterson, 1998; 
Peterson & Hassel, 1998).  In other words, the transaction costs for a customer leaving a public 
school are much higher, typically requiring Tiebout choice (Tiebout, 1956) or paying for a 
private school out of pocket (Friedman & Friedman, 1990; Merrifield, 2008). 
 Public school families are less able to just pick up and leave a school. Thus, high levels 
of principal autonomy can be undesirable in that sector (Neal, 2002). If a malicious, or simply 
ineffective, principal leads a school, we may not want them making school-level decisions that 
could negatively affect students (Murphy, 2017). If the ineffective principal is free to make bad 
decisions, many students may be harmed without an exit option, especially if they come from 
disadvantaged families unable to seek a wide range of options or push for modifications within 
the system (Lerner, 1934; Ong-Dean, 2009). Thus, the public sector may limit the principals’ 
power to make decisions. As a result, central office officials may be more likely to control 
important school-level decisions. 
Public school principals operate under increased political constraints as they are 
accountable to their school boards. Due to fewer political and bureaucratic constraints, the 
private school principal is likely to have more influence in decision-making and enjoy more 
autonomy in selection of students and daily administration than his or her public school 
counterparts (Firestone & Shipps, 2005; Shipps & White, 2009; White, 2006). Since private 
school principals do not require public funding, they are less likely to feel political pressures than 





Additionally, private school principals may face a stronger dismissal threat than their 
public school counterparts.  If private school boards have fewer costs associated with dismissing 
their principals, they will be more likely to be able to hold them accountable for their actions.  
Possible dismissal either through boards or other superiors or via school closure due to family 
exits could make private school principals more motivated to make effective decisions. On the 
other hand, if a school principal is protected through unionization or civil service rules, they will 
be less likely to face accountability, and perhaps less apt to perform effectively (Chubb & Moe, 
1986). Since it is more difficult to fire a principal in the public sector, we expect that district 
bureaucrats will reduce their autonomy in order to limit negative outcomes for students (Hess, 
2013). Furthermore, public school principals theoretically have an incentive to maximize 
budgets. This condition suggests central offices will not grant them much autonomy over finance 
decisions (Niskanen, 1971; for schooling, see Levenson, 2012). 
3. Data 
The data for the public and private school principals comes from the School and Staffing 
Survey (SASS) 2011-2012 questionnaire.  SASS was developed by the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) and it has been administered seven times from 1987-88 to 2011-
2012. Table 1 lists the question categories and what they measure.35 The public school principal 
data file contained 7,510 records while the private school principal data file contained 1,720 
records. There were some additional questions for public school principals, but in this study, we 
compare only the common questions related to decision making. As the sample is nationally 
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representative, systematic differences across public and private schools after controlling for 
relevant characteristics may indicate benefits of school leadership in one sector over the other. 
Our dependent variables come from questions on decision-making in SASS 2011-2012. 
These variables measure the influence principals perceive to have on setting performance 
standards, establishing curriculum, determining content for professional development, evaluating 
teachers, hiring teachers, setting discipline policy, and deciding how the budget will be spent. 
This section asks the principals to rate their ability to influence seven school related activities on 
a four-item Likert scale (no influence, minor influence, moderate influence and major influence) 
and it includes a not applicable option for each activity (Table 1). We choose these variables as 
they are proxies for autonomy and earlier work has shown that bureaucratization in public 
schools acts as a hindrance for a school principal’s ability to influence school-level activities 
(Chubb, & Moe, 1988; Ouchi, 2009; Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 2009; Nadelstern, 2013). Hence, we 
expect to find increased decision making ability of the private school principal to influence the 
above mentioned school-level activities in comparison to the public school principal. 
Table 1: School-Related Activities over Which the Principal Has Influence 
Category School-related activities 
A Setting performance standards for students of this school 
B Establishing curriculum at this school 
C Determining the content of in-service professional development programs for 
teachers of this school 
D Evaluating teachers of this school 
E Hiring new full-time teachers of this school 
F Setting discipline policy at this school 
G Deciding how your school budget will be spent 
 
 We utilize questions from the survey gauging principals’ demographics and academic 
and professional background for summary statistics. Tables 2A and 2B show the population 
weighted summary statistics expressed as percentages for the principals in public and private 





education levels in comparison to the public school principals. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Hill et al. (2016).  The proportion of private school principals reporting greater than 
10 years of experience as a principal or school head is almost double that of public school 
principals. The proportion of private school principals involved in teaching in addition to their 
task as a principal or school head is also about twice that for public school principals.  
A higher proportion of public school principals report having previous experience as a 
department head, assistant principal or program director and participation in a school training or 
development program in comparison to their private counterparts. The proportion of public 
school principals holding a school administration license is about twice as large as the proportion 
of private school principals. Almost all public school principals earned an MA or higher degree 
while only 76% of the private school principals report doing so. The racial composition of 
principals is largely white36 in both the sectors (86% in public schools and 90% in private 
schools). Lastly, private schools have a larger share of females in their leadership in comparison 
to the public schools. 
  
                                                     





Table 2A: Summary Statistics for Principal Characteristics 
Measure Public Private 
Years principal or school head at this or any school prior to this year   
no experience 8.32 8.78 
low experience 1-3 24.55 18.82 
medium experience 4-10 43.79 30.97 
high experience 10+ 23.34 41.43 
Years principal or school head at this school prior to this year   
no experience 16.46 14.52 
low experience 1-3 38.83 27.62 
medium experience 4-10 36.07 32.92 
high experience 10+ 8.64 24.94 
Years of elementary or secondary teaching before becoming principal or 
school head   
no experience 1.70 18.51 
low experience 1-3 2.79 7.99 
medium experience 4-10 47.34 32.79 
high experience 10+ 48.16 40.71 
Years of elementary or secondary teaching since becoming principal or 
school head   
no experience 90.41 49.69 
low experience 1-3 5.42 21.87 
medium experience 4-10 3.30 15.87 
high experience 10+ 0.87 12.56 
Currently teaching at school 37.37 71.89 
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each italicized 
category.








Table 2B: Summary Statistics for Principal Characteristics 
Measure Public Private 
Prior to becoming a principal or school head   
Worked as department head 40.4 35.3 
Worked as an assistant principal or program director 73.9 43.8 
Participated in school training or development program 55.3 31.4 
Previous management experience outside education 40.3 46.4 
Currently holding license in school administration 95.9 43.4 
Having a bachelor’s degree 99.9 88.5 
Bachelor degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education 81.9 67. 8 
Having a master’s degree 97.6 76.3 
Master’s degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education 97.4 85.4 
Earned a MA and higher degree 97.8 68.9 
Participated in any professional development activity related to principal or school head in last 12 months 99.3 89.6 
Race (white) 86.4 90.2 
Gender (male) 48.4 44.6 
N 7,510 1,720 







We also present summary statistics on the percent of private and public school principals 
to state that they have a major influence on the seven outcome categories in Table 3. More than 
two-thirds of private school principals state having a major influence on establishing curriculum 
in their schools whereas less than half of public school principals state the same. A slightly 
higher proportion of private school principals than public school principals state having a major 
influence on setting performance standards, professional development and discipline policy in 
their schools. On the other hand, a greater proportion of public school principals than private 
school principals state having a major influence on teacher evaluation, hiring teachers and 
spending budget in their schools. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Principals’ Self-Reported Major Influence on Outcome 
Variables 
Measure Public Private 
Performance Standards 73.3 80.4 
Establishing Curriculum 42.6 69.1 
Professional Development 69.5 74.2 
Teacher Evaluation 95.3 82.1 
Hiring Teachers 84.3 83.7 
Discipline Policy 79.4 81.5 
Budget Spending 63.8 62.1 
N 7,510 1,720 
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category. 
4. Methods 
Since the survey responses related to decision-making are ordinal and have four 
categories (from “No Influence” to “Major Influence”), the analytic technique we employ is an 
ordered logistic regression (Borooah, 2001; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) of the form: 






The dependent variable of interest DM, is the reported decision-making ability of a given 
principal, i, for the following school-level activities: setting student performance standards, 
establishing curriculum, determining teacher professional development content, evaluating 
teachers, hiring new full-time teachers, setting discipline policy and deciding how the budget 
will be spent. The decentralized nature of private schools is likely to induce better decision 
making ability for the private school principal in comparison to the public school principal to 
decide what is best for their schools. The dependent variable DM is likely to differ across public 
and private schools due to the former’s increased centralization and bureaucratization (Chubb, & 
Moe, 1988; Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 2009; Nadelstern, 2013; Ouchi, 2009). This variable takes 
the value 1 for the least influence and the value 4 for the most influence.37 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 is a dummy 
variable of value 1 if the principal is in a private school and 0 if the principal is in a public 
school. The coefficient of interest, 𝛼1, measures the mean difference of the decision-making 
influence reported by private school principals relative to public school principals. The constant, 
𝛼0, measures the average principal decision-making influence reported by public school 
principals. 
Since we want to examine the differences between principals based solely on the type of 
institution they are in, this initial model does not control for any principal or school-level 
differences. In order to have a conservative estimate of the association between institution-type 
and decision-making freedom, we analyze the following model that also includes school and 
principal characteristics as controls: 
𝐷𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 +  𝛼2𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇i                                Equation (2) 
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PC is a vector of controls which includes the following principal characteristics: race, 
gender, education level, years of experience as a principal or school head, years of experience as 
a teacher in elementary or secondary school, any experience as a department head, any 
experience as an assistant principal, participation in professional development or training 
programs, management experience outside of education, and whether the principle holds a 
license in school administration. Vector X also includes these school-level characteristics: school 
size, school level, number of full-time teachers, student/teacher ratio, percent of minority 
teachers, and percent of minority students. This second model includes school and principal level 
controls in order to examine if the effects are significant after accounting for differences in the 
types of schools and principals hired across the two institutions. 
The restricted use data provided by the NCES are imputed and adjusted for non-
response.38 Based on the stratified probability proportionate to size sampling strategy used by 
NCES in the SASS, we use the balance repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap methodology39 so 
that the results reflect the true population values and not just the sampled units. This 
methodology does not change our final estimates, but rather corrects the formula for the 
calculation of the standard errors. 
 
                                                     
38 There are two types of non-response in the SASS survey. The unit-level non-response rates represent a fully or 
partially incomplete response for the key questionnaire items on the survey. If the key questionnaire items are not 
filled out, the entire survey is discarded. Additionally at least 10 percent of the remaining items should be completed 
to meet the threshold for inclusion. The weighted unit-level non-response rate is approximately 73 percent for the 
public school principal and it is approximately 65 percent for the private school principal. The item-level non-
response rates represent missing items in a questionnaire that has passed the threshold to be considered complete. 
Approximately 96 percent items on the survey for the public school principal and 94 percent items on the survey for 
the private school principal had a response rate of 85 percent or more. Thus, the item-level non-response rate that 
may affect the analysis in our study, is not high. 







We now present the results for our models with and without controls in Table 4. The first 
row presents results without any controls, the second includes principal-level controls, and the 
third includes all school and principal-level controls. The results are robust across models, 
though the model without controls only finds statistical significance for the first four categories.   
The model with all controls indicates that private school principals are more likely to 
report having a major influence on 6 out of 7 types of school decisions. When controlling for 
school and principal-level differences across sectors, we find evidence that private school 
principals exercise significantly more influence over decision-making activities. In particular, 
private school principals have a higher likelihood of reporting major influence over performance 
standards, curriculum, professional development, hiring teachers, discipline policy, and budget 
decisions. However, private school principals have a 3.9 percentage point lower likelihood of 
reporting to have a major influence on the evaluation of teachers; we will discuss this further 
below. Since private school principals have a 4.9 percentage point higher likelihood of having a 
major influence over the hiring of teachers, they may not need to provide as much direct 
feedback. In addition, since private school principals have a 14.4 percentage point higher 
likelihood of having a major influence on the content of their teacher professional development 
programs, they may provide feedback through that channel instead. Notably, private school 
principals have a 20-percentage point higher likelihood of reporting that they have a major 
influence on establishing their school’s curriculum. Furthermore, private school principals have a 
14 percentage point higher likelihood of reporting that they have a major influence on their 
students’ performance standards.  Having a major influence on their students’ performance 





achievement. Based on our results, we expect that the reduced regulatory burden found in private 
schools (Chubb & Moe, 1988) grants the principals the ability to exercise more influence related 
to school activities in comparison to public school principals. To explore our analysis further, we 
examine the coefficients on the control variables for our preferred model, found in Table 5.








Table 4: Results Based on Model Used 
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of private on the “major influence” category, estimated after running ordered logit 
models. Demographic variables, academic training, professional development and educational attainment levels are included as 
controls. Estimates use balanced repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap population weights. Standard errors in parentheses.   
















No Controls 0.072*** 0.247*** 0.126*** -0.064*** 0.019 0.018 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) 
        
Principal Controls 0.146*** 0.259*** 0.141*** -0.034*** 0.050*** 0.060*** 0.049** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) 
        
Principal and School Controls 0.140*** 0.200*** 0.144*** -0.039*** 0.049*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) 
        
Observations 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 
























Private School Principal 0.140*** 0.200*** 0.144*** -0.039*** 0.049*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) 
School Size 0.009* -0.011* 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
School Level 0.018* 0.073*** 0.017 -0.003 -0.001 -0.017** -0.044*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
Number of Full Time Teachers  -0.000 -0.001** -0.001* -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Student/Teacher Ratio -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Percent of minority teachers  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percent of minority Students  -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Low principal Experience -0.060** -0.053** 0.037 -0.001 0.015 -0.085*** -0.095*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.029) (0.016) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023) 
Low Teaching Experience -0.042 -0.064 0.069 -0.034** -0.050* -0.049* 0.028 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.076) (0.016) (0.029) (0.029) (0.043) 
Department Head 0.034*** 0.052*** 0.039*** 0.003 0.034*** 0.024** 0.041*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) 
Assistant Principal/Program Director -0.027* -0.046*** 0.001 -0.004 0.007 -0.029* 0.032** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
School Training/ Development 0.044*** 0.015 0.018* 0.007 -0.006 0.015 0.016 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
License in School Administration 0.045** 0.032 0.022 0.031*** 0.004 0.037* 0.019 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.009) (0.013) (0.020) (0.031) 
Management Experience  0.005 0.012 -0.023* 0.002 0.001 0.017 -0.006 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) 
Master’s Degree or Higher 0.062** -0.004 -0.024 0.007 0.035* 0.051* 0.075** 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.047) (0.011) (0.019) (0.027) (0.033) 







Table 5 (Cont’d): Likelihood of Reporting Major Influence (All Controls) 
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects for the “major influence” category, estimated after running ordered logit models. 
Estimates use balanced repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap population weights.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
















Professional Development 0.146*** 0.148*** 0.034 0.019 0.059 0.054 0.076 
(0.046) (0.057) (0.126) (0.020) (0.056) (0.036) (0.062) 
White -0.006 -0.041* 0.010 0.002 0.035** 0.051*** 0.020 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) 
Female 0.022 0.022 0.052*** 0.020*** 0.015 0.015 0.034** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) 







 Most of our school-level controls are unrelated to the seven outcome measures of 
interest; however, some statistical significance emerges. Principals within larger schools are 
more likely to report having a major influence on performance standards, but less likely to report 
so for establishing curriculum. Principals in secondary schools are more likely to report having a 
major influence in performance standards and curriculum, but less likely to report having 
influence over discipline and budget decisions. Being in a school with a more diverse set of 
teachers is associated with a higher likelihood of reporting a major influence on performance 
standards and curriculum. 
 The coefficient on the principal’s previous experience as a department head is significant 
and positive in all cases except for the case of teacher evaluation, where it is not statistically 
different from zero. Hence, previous leadership experience has a systematic positive relationship 
with the principal’s ability to influence school level activities. Lower levels of previous principal 
experience and previous teaching experience are associated with a lower likelihood of reporting 
to have an influence on most categories. 
The coefficient on female is positive throughout and statistically significant for three of 
the seven activities. Females seem to have systematic advantages over males in their perception 
of influence over school-related activities, even after controlling for background and types of 
school. Since about three-fourths of all elementary and secondary-level teachers are female, 
female principals may be more able to have a strong connection with their employees (Goldring 
et al., 2013).  Female principals are also more apt to have a background in curriculum than their 
male counterparts, and to stay longer in the principal post rather than seeing it as a stepping stone 
to the superintendency (Maranto et al., 2016). Minority principals have a lower likelihood of 





higher likelihood of reporting that they have an influence over student performance standards 
and curriculum. This finding may reflect the tendency of such principals to be overrepresented in 
more bureaucratized, unionized urban school districts (Moe, 2011; Payne, 2008). 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
Private and public school principals differ significantly in their influence on school-level 
activities. Private school principals may have an advantage over their public school counterparts 
in affecting student success by having significantly more influence on almost all the school 
related activities. Principal characteristics, like previous experience as a department head and 
having a masters or higher degree, play a positive role in their ability to exercise higher influence 
on school activities. Nevertheless, the private school sector may be able to learn from the public 
school sector in evaluating teachers. Female principals appear to have a systematic advantage 
over their male counterparts in reporting more school-level influence. 
 Regarding policy implications, private school principals report having more autonomy 
than public school principals on every aspect of decision-making ability except the evaluation of 
teachers. This finding could reflect the emphasis that the Obama administration’s Race to the 
Top program placed on teacher evaluations in public schools, though there are indications that 
these provisions in fact had little impact on personnel decisions (Maranto, McShane, & 
Rhinesmith, 2016). 
This result could also mean that private school principals have less need for direct teacher 
observation and evaluation since they have more autonomy in hiring decisions and more 
involvement in the schools generally, as Chubb and Moe (1988) find. If principal autonomy is 
associated with enhanced educational experiences for children, and the private sector allows for 





these policy decisions would benefit substantially from additional research linking principal 
autonomy to student-level outcomes. 
Ouchi (2009) has emphasized the importance of principal autonomy, arguing that 
principals know more and have greater interest in what happens at the school-level than do their 
central office superiors (see also Nadelstern, 2013). Perhaps the relatively short tenure but 
greater credentialing of public school principals, as well as larger school size may suggest that 
they are climbers; that is, they see the principal position as a stepping-stone to the 
superintendency and focus on pleasing superiors rather than serving kids (Downs, 1967; Maranto 
et al., 2016). Cheng (2015) finds that schools where principals have more autonomy over 
personnel have greater mission coherence, though his sample only includes public schools. 
Principals with more autonomy in schools with greater mission coherence may be able to focus 
on student success differently than principals in schools with no mission coherence. 
 There are, however, limitations of this analysis. Since we have relied on self-reported 
measures in school surveys, the results are prone to social desirability bias as well as reference 
group bias (Dobbie & Fryer, 2015; West et al., 2016). Although SASS is a nationally 
representative sample and stable results over time can have good external validity, future studies 
should utilize other measures like value-added measures related to school’s graduation rates and 
teacher turnover to study principal’s leadership qualities. 
 Prior research theorized that placing decision making power at the school level may work 
better (Chubb & Moe, 1988; Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 2009). Principals are those administrators 
most aware of the daily issues at the school level: more autonomy may help them address the 
issues faster. Due to the heavy bureaucratization and centralized functioning of the public school 
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Chapter 5  
Who stays, who leaves? Determinants of principal attrition across school sectors. 
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Principal attrition poses a challenge to the field of educational leadership. School 
principals play an important role in a schools’ performance and, presumably, they are most 
informed about the issues that affect a school’s environment (Hess, 2013; Ouchi, 2009). 
Principal turnover likely generates short-term shocks into the school system, which in turn may 
affect school environment and student learning (Branch, Hanushek, & Rivkin, 2013; Burkhauser 
et al., 2012; Mascall & Leithwood, 2010; Miller, 2013). High turnover may make it difficult for 
schools to effectively implement policies (Miller, 2013), improve school environment and lay 
out a plan (Day, Gu, & Sammons, 2016; Hitt & Tucker, 2016; Robinson, Lloyd, & Rowe, 2008) 
and it may also affect hiring and retaining effective teachers (Baker & Cooper, 2005; Burkhauser 
et al., 2012; Ronfeldt, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2013). The School Leaders Network (2014) estimates 
that it costs $75,000 for a district to hire and nurture a principal. Expenses on principals’ 
nurturing extend beyond salary, and include costs related to participation in professional 
development activities. The cost of turnover is likely to be higher for districts as the loss incurred 
is on a school’s human resources and student learning. A reduction in turnover of effective 
principals is likely to benefit high poverty districts, where the turnover rates are high. 
Alternately, in some cases where student learning is on the decline and teachers are dissatisfied 
with the school environment, the turnover of ineffective principals may yield benefits. 
Nevertheless, principal turnover appears to be very important for educational leadership. 
Earlier studies found heterogeneity in the types of principals who exit their schools, such 
as the satisfied and the disaffected principals. For example, the majority of the satisfied 
principals are pulled out of their job as they move on to better jobs with increased salary and 




positions (Boyce & Bowers, 2016; Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Farley-Ripple, Solano, 
& McDuffie, 2012). Principal satisfaction may be related to principals’ intention to stay in the 
profession as disaffected principals are more likely to return to teaching (Boyce & Bowers, 
2016). Finally, their actual decisions to stay in the profession may vary based on their experience 
as school leaders. 
Estimates using state-level data find average principal turnover for public schools as 30 
percent for Texas between 1995 and 2001 (Branch, Hanushek, & Rivkin, 2009) and 21 percent 
for Illinois between 2001 and 2008 (DeAngelis & White, 2011). Using Texas state data between 
1995 and 2008, Fuller and Young (2009) find that almost half of newly hired principals leave 
within three years and more than two-thirds leave within five years. The nationally representative 
2012-13 Principal Follow-up Survey (PFS) shows that 78 percent of school principals (public 
and private) continued to be in the same school, while 12 percent left the principalship and 6 
percent moved to a different school in the following year (Goldring, Taie, & Owens, 2014). 
Similar statistics for the 2008-09 Principal Follow-up Survey (PFS) that also included Bureau of 
Indian Education schools are 80 percent, 12 percent and 6 percent (Battle, 2010). Studying 
principal turnover is important as in the 2012-2013 PFS among the principals who left the 
principalship, more than 60 percent of public school principals and 70 percent of private school 
principals did not leave due to retirement.  
Although some research has explored the determinants of principal turnover in traditional 
public schools40 using nationally representative samples (Boyce, & Bowers, 2016; Mitani, 2017; 
Sun & Ni, 2016; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010), a comparative analysis of the attrition 
patterns of public and private school principals using nationally representative samples does not 
                                                     




exist (Rangel, 2018). A comparative analysis of attrition patterns of school principals may be 
informative of the underlying school-level mechanisms that differentiate public schools from 
private schools, which in turn may offer explanations for intersectoral differences in student 
learning.  
Private school choice has gained attention with Betsy Devos as the Secretary of 
Education. The effectiveness of private schools in general and private school choice in particular 
is debated (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Coleman, Hoffer, & Kilgore, 1982; Doolittle & Connors, 2001; 
Lubienski & Lubienski, 2014; Ravitch, 2013). Chapter 2 of this dissertation showed that 
experimental evidence indicates moderate positive effects of private school vouchers over time 
on student achievement in the U.S., especially for students who remain in the program for more 
than two years. However, much less is known about the mechanism through which private 
schools may produce different outcomes than public schools. Differences in principals across 
sectors may explain some of the observed differences between public and private schools. 
Research shows that public school principal stability is positively associated with work-related 
autonomy (Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010). Some 
studies argue that there is increased principal autonomy in the private school sector (Chubb & 
Moe, 1988; chapter 4 of this dissertation). Yet, prior work has not explored whether more 
autonomy for private school principals explains achievement or attainment differences across 
school sectors. 
This study utilizes nationally representative datasets to study the determinants of attrition 
for public and private school principals. For this study attrition is defined as a principal leaving 
the profession.41 The hypothesis tested in the study is H0: Private school principals are more 
                                                     
41 The questions asked to principals at baseline year of survey (to be discussed in section 3 of this study) ask about 




likely to remain in the profession. Private school principals may be more likely to remain in the 
profession as they enjoy increased autonomy over managing a school (Chubb & Moe, 1988; 
chapter 4 of this dissertation) and self-selection of private school principals based on school 
mission and community orientation (Brinig & Garnett, 2014; Bryk, Lee, & Holland, 1993). On 
the other hand, the existence of tenure related job security, higher average salaries for principals 
in public schools than private schools, availability of professional development opportunities 
(that may strengthen their resume and facilitate principals’ promotion to superintendent), may 
make public school principals more likely to stay in the profession than private school principals, 
posing a challenge to the hypothesis. The availability of more resources in the public school 
districts may incentivize public school principals to stay in the profession. Thus, the stay of 
private school principals in the profession may be socially conditioned whereas the stay of public 
school principals in the profession may be vocationally conditioned. Presumably, socially 
conditioned motivations are ideological in nature and the principals may be actively making 
informed selections for long-term consequences, whereas vocationally conditioned motivations 
are based on an expectation of availability of better professional opportunities that may not 
actually be available. Thus, socially conditioned motivations may translate into smaller 
differences in stated versus revealed preferences than vocationally conditioned responses. Hence, 
the study anticipates a larger gap between stated and revealed preferences of principals in public 
school than of principals in private schools. Due to distinct environment and organization, daily 
internal administrative and paperwork related requirements concerning principalship may be less 
                                                     
implications of studying attrition from principal profession versus studying attrition from schools would be more 
conservative in relation to effects on student outcomes at the school-level. However, in the current study, it is less 
concerning as the rates of attrition between schools are similar across sectors. Merely seven and two percent of 
principals within the public and private school sectors moved from their original school to another school in the 
following year. Seventy-seven percent and 80 percent of principals in the public and private sector schools stayed in 
the same school in the following year. Hence, attrition from the principal profession is not vastly different in 




demanding in private schools than public schools (Chubb & Moe, 1988). The study expects to 
find internal administrative pressures as a destabilizing force for public school principals. 
There could be heterogeneity in principal turnover even within the public and private 
sectors. Principal turnover in public charter schools, due to their mission orientation and relative 
decentralized models in comparison to traditional public schools, may resemble differences in 
turnover between public and private schools. It is also possible that principal turnover rates may 
differ within the private sector. For example, a majority of private schools have a religious 
mission orientation whereas the non-sectarian private schools have a money or status driven 
orientation. These differences may be associated with principal satisfaction and their desire to 
stay in/exit from the profession. In a Catholic school network, a priest or nun leading a school 
may be transferred by the Archdioceses to a school (or a role other than principal) where they are 
needed more, particularly if they have trained a successor. In this way Catholic private schools, 
at least those connected to an archdiocese rather than independent, might resemble well run 
school districts. Thus, the study briefly tests the within school sector hypotheses: a) public 
charter school principals are more likely to remain in the profession that traditional public school 
principals and b) religious school principals are more likely to remain in the profession that non-
sectarian school principals. 
Using data from the School and Staffing Survey 2011-2012 and the Principal Follow-up 
Survey 2012, the study analyzes principal attrition between public and private schools. 
Principals’ stated preferences in 2011-2012 are compared to their revealed status a year later. 
The study is relevant to the fields of educational leadership, school choice and education policy. 




contributes to our understanding of the journey of those who choose to become a principal by 
determining who chooses to stay and who decides to leave. 
2. Literature review 
Research on principal turnover has gained prominence in the area of educational 
leadership, primarily due to the high rates of turnover and the impact generated by turnover on 
schooling and principal labor markets. Rangel (2018) conducts a systematic review of 36 
empirical studies on principal turnover. Studies measure turnover in many ways, ranging from 
amount of time principals stay or have tenure in a given school (Baker, Punswick, & Belt, 2010; 
Fuller & Young, 2009) to leaving a school (Li, 2015; Loeb, Kalogrides, & Horng, 2010). Other 
studies on principal turnover analyze career changes (Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Li, 
2015), effectiveness of the principal in improving student achievement (Branch, Hanushek, & 
Rivkin, 2009) and job satisfaction (Boyce & Bowers, 2016). Turnover can be based on a 
principal’s stated decision (Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010) to leave a school/principalship or 
their revealed status later on (Goldring, Taie, & Owens, 2014; Li, 2015). 
The definition of turnover depends on the policy question being answered. For example, 
if a principal leaves a school but remains within a school district, the policy implications of 
turnover would be different from a principal leaving the district. Similarly, the policy 
implications for retirement related turnover would be different from job dissatisfaction related 
turnover. Policymakers may also be interested in turnover that affects principals after their initial 
hiring year (Burkhauser et al., 2012). 
Due to a lack of experimental studies and variation in the definition of principal turnover 
across studies, it is difficult to comment on the causal determinants of principal turnover. Rangel 




and the determinants can be classified as relatively weak and relatively strong. A caveat with this 
classification as weak and strong is the low number of studies on principal turnover and 
differences in contexts, definitions and methodologies employed across studies. Relatively weak 
and relatively strong determinants of principal turnover are discussed below for potential 
inclusion in the analytical models employed in this study. For example, relatively weak 
determinants of turnover include principal characteristics such as gender (Fuller, Young, & Orr, 
2007, Ni, Sun, & Rorrer, 2015; Sun & Ni, 2016), race (Baker, Punswick, & Belt, 2010; Fuller, 
Young, & Orr, 2007), age (Fuller & Young, 2009; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010), principal 
experience (DeAngelis & White, 2011; Podgursky et al., 2016; Tran & Buckman, 2017) and 
principal education (Baker, Punswick, & Bel, 2010; Gates et al., 2006; Tekleselassie & 
Villarreal, 2010). 
Analysis of a nationally representative sample shows a higher likelihood of minority 
principals intending to leave the principalship in comparison to their white counterparts (Carroll 
et al., 2018; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010). Some African American principals might use 
principalship as a stepping stone to get better jobs elsewhere. They may see other employment 
markets as racist and hence may be more likely to go into public education (Carroll et al., 2018; 
Maranto et al., 2017). Evidence also suggests a non-linear relationship between principal age and 
turnover (Rangel, 2018). Younger and older principals are more likely to move or leave in 
comparison to middle-aged principals. The opportunity cost of changing profession may be 
lower for young principals than middle age principals. Old age principals may leave the 
profession due to accrual of adequate social security and retirement related benefits. 
Work related conditions such as principal satisfaction (Boyce & Bowers, 2016; 




Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010), relationships with superiors, peers and subordinates (Farley-
Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012) and the changing nature of principalship (Oberman, 1996) are 
weakly related to turnover. Participation in professional development activities has become an 
important component of the principal profession. Such changes in the nature of principalship 
have been building for a long time (Rousmaniere, 2013). One experimental study found that 
participation in professional development leads to a decline in principal turnover (Jacob et al., 
2015). As participation in professional development seems to be the norm for educational 
leadership, the quality and type of professional development may be more relevant for principal 
satisfaction than mere availability of professional development activities. 
School characteristics such as school level (Baker, Punswick, & Bel, 2010; Fuller, 
Young, & Orr, 2007; Ni, Sun, & Rorrer, 2015), percent of students at the school qualifying for 
special education services (Solano et al., 2010; Ni, Sun, & Rorrer, 2015) and urbanicity (Gates et 
al., 2006; DeAngelis & White, 2011; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010) are relatively weak 
determinants while the school size (Baker, Punswick, & Bel, 2010; Podgursky et al., 2016), 
school’s performance (Cullen & Mazzeo, 2007; Béteille, Kalogrides, & Loeb, 2012; Podgursky 
et al., 2016; Tran & Buckman, 2017), conditions (Béteille, Kalogrides, & Loeb, 2012; Sun & Ni, 
2016; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010), and some student demographics such as race/ethnicity 
and level of poverty (Gates et al., 2006; Loeb, Kalogrides, & Hong, 2010; Podgursky et al., 
2016) are relatively strong determinants of turnover. Teacher characteristics such as certification 
(DeAngelis & White, 2011; Sun & Ni, 2016) are weakly related to principal turnover. Large 
districts are their own job market. Hence, within district turnover may not be a first order issue in 
principal turnover for larger districts, unless it leads to geographical stratification of lower 




to principal stability. Perhaps large school size permits more division of labor. The findings may 
also hold for principals in charter school networks as opposed to individual schools (Foreman & 
Maranto, 2017). 
The policies related to flexibility from the district central office over human resources, 
such as hiring and firing of teachers (Oberman, 1996; Sun & Ni, 2016), and state’s accountability 
policy (DeAngelis & White, 2011; Li, 2015; Mitani, 2017) are relatively strong determinants of 
principal turnover. The relation between principal salary and turnover is the most researched and 
has generally showed that increased salary adds to principal stability (Baker, Punswick, & Bel, 
2010; Cullen & Mazzeo, 2007; Ni, Sun, & Rorrer, 2015; Solano et al., 2010; Tekleselassie & 
Villarreal, 2010). Oberman (1996) found principal attrition positively related to early retirement 
options in Chicago Public Schools. Finally, district expenditures are weakly related to principal 
turnover (Solano et al., 2010). Boyce and Bowers (2016) show that among principals satisfied 
with jobs, salary is not related to turnover. Hence, beyond a mere increment in salary, factors 
such as school quality, school climate, working conditions and professional development of 
principals should be analyzed for policy relevant conclusions. 
Overall effect sizes across studies show that school performance, accountability policy 
and professional development are consistently strong determinants of principal turnover (Rangel, 
2018). Differences in school performance are related to principal turnover with as low as 3% to 
as high as 350% change in the likelihood of turnover. Two studies found significant differences 
in principal turnover in traditional public and charter schools (Ni, Sun, & Rorrer, 2015; Sun & 
Ni, 2016); however, no study has yet examined the differences between public and private 
schools in a nationally representative sample. Findings from two studies caution us to account 




2009) and satisfaction based on work-related conditions (Boyce & Bowers, 2016) when 
comparing principals who either stay or leave. 
3. Data 
The data come from the Public School Principal Status and Private School Principal 
Status Data Files of the 2012–13 Principal Follow-up Survey (PFS). The survey is developed by 
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and it assesses principal attrition and 
mobility after a survey conducted in 2011-2012. The survey is informative of 1,720 records 
(Catholic, other religious and non-sectarian schools) for private school principals and 7,510 
records (traditional public schools (TPS) and public charter schools) for public school principals. 
Principal switching between either school type does not seem to be a first order issue in principal 
turnover as approximately 1 percent of principals switched from public to private schools and 
approximately 5 percent moved vice versa. Two definitions of principal turnover are central to 
this study. A principal is a: a) stayer if they stayed as a principal and b) leaver if they left 
principalship altogether. 
 Tables 1A and 1B present information on principals’ experience, training and 
professional development. A greater proportion of private than public school principals report 
ten or more years of experience as a principal at their current school or any school. Just nine 
percent of public school principals report being principal at their current school beyond ten or 
more years, while 23 percent report so for any school. Comparable statistics for private school 
principals are 25 and 41 percent. The findings may be associated with a socially versus 
vocationally conditioned response of leaders between private and public school sectors, wherein 
public school leaders may lose the vocational incentive to continue in the same school and 




weakly related to turnover (DeAngelis & White, 2011; Podgursky et al., 2016; Tran & Buckman, 
2017) especially after 10 years in the profession. Public schools are more hierarchical (Gerth & 
Mills, 1946) than private schools. There are very few superintendents of private school systems 
but many more superintendents of public school systems.  For most private school 
administrators, school principal is the highest ranking they might attain, but that is not true for 
most public school principals. Public school administrators may view the principalship as just 
another temporary step towards the ultimate prize: superintendent. 
 Among principals having four or more years of teaching experience, a higher percentage 
of public school principals have teaching experience before becoming a principal but the relation 
is the opposite for principals having teaching experience since their principalship. This finding 
could be due to the distinct nature of private schooling where a higher proportion of principals 
(72 percent) currently teach at school in comparison to principals at public schools (37 percent). 
A higher percentage of public school principals have higher education, a license/certificate in 
school administration and previous experience and training in school administration in 
comparison to their public school counterparts (Hill et al., 2016). A higher proportion of public 
school principals participated in professional development activities in the past 12 months. This 
finding could be due to the availability of extra resources and administrative requirements for 
professional development laid down by public authorities. 
 As professional development is a strong determinant of principal stability (Jacob et al., 
2015; Rangel, 2018), increased opportunities for professional development in the public schools 
may add to higher satisfaction for a principal and consequently they may be more likely to stay 
in comparison to their private counterparts. If professional development is a source of 




are private school principals. A majority of the public school principals currently hold a 
license/certificate in school administration. As licensure/certification may be relevant to the 
principal profession in public schools, it may incentivize principals to stay in the profession 
(DeAngelis & White, 2011; Sun & Ni, 2016). Finally, most principals in either school sector 









Table 1A: Summary statistics for principal experience and training 
Measure Public Private 
Years principal or school head at this or any school prior to this year   
no experience 8.3 8. 8 
low experience 1-3 24.6 18.8 
medium experience 4-10 43.8 30.9 
high experience 10+ 23.3 41.4 
Years principal or school head at this school prior to this year   
no experience 16.5 14.5 
low experience 1-3 38.8 27.6 
medium experience 4-10 36.1 32.9 
high experience 10+ 8.6 24.9 
Years of elementary or secondary teaching before becoming principal or school head   
no experience 1.7 18.5 
low experience 1-3 2.8 7.9 
medium experience 4-10 47.3 32.8 
high experience 10+ 48.2 40.7 
Years of elementary or secondary teaching since becoming principal or school head   
no experience 90.4 49.7 
low experience 1-3 5.4 21.9 
medium experience 4-10 3.3 15.9 
high experience 10+ 0.8 12.6 
Years of total elementary or secondary teaching    
no experience 1.4 11.1 
low experience 1-3 2.5 7.1 
medium experience 4-10 45.5 25.4 
high experience 10+ 50.6 56.4 
Currently teaching at school 37.4 71.9 












Table 1B: Summary statistics for principal experience and training 
Measure Public Private 
Prior to becoming a principal or school head   
Worked as department head 40.4 35.3 
Worked as an assistant principal or program director 73.9 43.8 
Participated in school training or development program 55.3 31.4 
Previous management experience outside education 40.3 46.4 
Currently holding license/certificate in school administration 95.9 43.4 
Having a bachelor’s degree 99.9 88.5 
Bachelor degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education 81.9 67.8 
Having a master’s degree 97.6 76.3 
Master’s degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education 97.4 85.4 
Earned a MA and higher degree 97.8 68.9 
Participated in any professional development activity related to principal or school head in last 12 months 99.3 89.6 
Race (white) 86.4 90.2 
Gender (male) 48.4 44.6 
N 7,510 1,720 





Table 2 shows that, in general, a greater proportion of private school principals report a 
specialized status for their schools. This difference could be due to an often alluded to consumer 
oriented nature of private schools. Specialized schools may attract leaders wanting to work in 
specialized environments. Conversely, specialized schools may pose challenges to leaders, and 
require leadership qualities that are different than the ones required for regular schools. 
Table 2: Summary statistics for school’s specialization 
Measure Public Private 
Program type of school   
Regular 88.4 81.1 
Montessori  5.2 
Special program emphasis 3.1 1.8 
Special Education 1.3 6.6 
Career/Technical/Vocational Education 1.1  
Alternative 6.3 4.8 
Early Childhood Program/Daycare Center  0.5 
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category. 
 
Table 3 presents the average statistics for principals’ working conditions. The average 
statistics do not show a meaningful difference in the principals’ working conditions related to 
hours spent on school related activities and number of days per year required to work under their 
current contract. Thus, internal administrative pressures may be generally similar for the 
principal profession, regardless of sector. The average salary for a public school principal is one 
and a half times that of a private school principal. Also, on average, the public school principal is 
slightly younger than his/her private school counterpart. If salary is a source of satisfaction for 
the principalship (Baker, Punswick, & Bel, 2010; Cullen & Mazzeo, 2007; Ni, Sun, & Rorrer, 
2015; Solano et al., 2010; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010), the public school principal is more 




private schools (Brinig & Garnett, 2014; Bryk, Lee, & Holland, 1993; Chubb & Moe, 1988) may 
incentivize private school leaders to stay for reasons unrelated to salary.  
Table 3: Summary statistics (mean) for principals’ working conditions 
Measure Public Private 
Hours spent on all school-related activities during a typical full week 58.1 53.2 
Hours spent interacting with students during a typical full week 22.5 21.2 
Number of days per year required to work under current contract 230.8 230.9 
Current annual salary (without tax and deductions) 90,510 57,560 
Age  48.0 51.7 
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category. 
Salaries are rounded to nearest dollars. 
 
The SASS data allow for looking at principal turnover from principals’ stated preferences 
in 2011-2012 and revealed status at follow-up in 2012-2013 (table 4A). For the SASS 2011-2012 
baseline year, the principals were asked to select from among eight categories as the projected 
duration for them to remain as principal, such as: as long as able to, until eligibility for 
retirement from current/previous job, until eligible for social security benefits or occurrence of a 
special life event, until more desirable job opportunity comes along, plan to leave as soon as 
they can or undecided. For this study, the categories are recoded as a stayer for as long as able 
to, leaver for intending to leave for any reason and the last category remains undecided. As the 
questions at the baseline year do not ask the principals if they want to stay in the same school, 
the stayer category represents principals’ intention to stay in the profession. 
Principals’ revealed status at the follow-up year in 2012-2013 PFS was based on a four 
category status for schools in which the 2011-2012 SASS survey was carried out. The four 
categories were: stayer (principals who stayed in the same schools), mover (principals who were 
principals in a different school), leaver (principals who left the profession) and other (principals 
for whom it was not possible to determine a mover or leaver status). For this study, the PFS 




principal profession and the other category is recoded as missing. Thus, comparisons can be 
made among the intended stayers at the base year and actual stayers at the follow-up year. Table 
4B shows that among the stated baseline category of leaver, most principals (more among the 
public schools) continued to be stayers at the follow-up year. 
Table 4A: Summary statistics for principals’ turnover from SASS and PFS 
Measure Public Private 
Length planned to remain principal (stated at base year)   
Intended Stayer 42.7 56 
Intended Leaver 32.2 15.7 
Undecided 25.1 28.3 
Four category principal status (revealed at follow-up)   
Actual Stayer 84.4 82 
Actual Leaver 11.5 11.6 
Other 4.2 6.4 
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category. 
 
Table 4B: Summary statistics for principals’ stated vs. revealed preferences 
 Actual Stayer 
Length planned to remain principal All schools Public Private 
Intended Stayer 91.5 91.4 91.9 
Intended Leaver 85.7 86.5 79.4 
Undecided 83.9 84.3 82.6 
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category. 
 
Over half of private school principals and less than half of public school principals stated 
they expected to remain principals the following year unconditionally. The revealed status at the 
follow-up year shows that more than two-thirds of principals continued to be stayers. The 
percent of actual stayers at the follow-up year doubled in comparison to the percent of intended 
stayers at the base year (84% versus 42%) for public schools. A smaller gap (82% versus 56%) is 
observed for intended stayers and actual stayers for private schools. There is a disconnect 
between principals’ stated preferences at the base year and their revealed status at follow-up. It 




opportunity cost of selecting alternatives. The larger gap between principals’ stated versus 
revealed preferences for public schools in comparison to private schools may be related to the 
former’s vocationally conditioned response versus the latter’s socially conditioned response. 
Chubb and Moe (1988) and chapter 4 of this dissertation argue that there is increased 
principal autonomy in the private schools. Principal autonomy is weakly associated with 
turnover in public schools (Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Tekleselassie & Villareal, 
2010). Work related barriers; especially barriers related to poor human resources that affect 
student learning, are likely to be a source of dissatisfaction for principals (Oberman, 1996; Sun 
& Ni, 2016). Table 5 shows a greater proportion of public school principals report barriers 
related to human resources and bureaucracy. Private school principals report more stress and a 
higher resistance from parents in the firing and replacement of teachers. This pattern could be 
due to a higher degree of parental involvement in private schools (Hiatt-Michael, 2017) and 
presumably high opportunity cost of replacing teachers that may be self-selecting into the private 
school sector. 
Table 5: Summary statistics for principals’ working barriers 
Measure Public Private 
Barriers to dismissal of poor-performing teachers   
Personnel policies 52.6 19.1 
Termination decisions not upheld 20.3 7.9 
Length of time required for termination process 61.8 14.2 
Effort required for documentation 65.7 27.7 
Tight deadlines for completing documentation 32.2 8.7 
Tenure 69.4 13.0 
Teacher associations or unions 60.2 5.9 
Dismissal is too stressful and/or uncomfortable 11.5 13.2 
Difficulty in obtaining suitable replacements 11.4 23.4 
Resistance from parents 3.6 11.3 





Principal turnover is likely to be affected by school climate. Table 6 shows that principals 
report less crime in private schools (Andrade, 2013; Brinig & Garnett, 2012; Waasdorp et al., 
forthcoming, 2017; Zhang, Musu-Gillette, & Oudekerk, 2016). This difference could be due to 
possible student selection, smaller school size, mission orientation and the higher degree of 
parental involvement in private schools. 
Table 6: Summary statistics for frequency of school problems (never occurring) 
Measure Public Private 
Physical conflicts among students 4.7 27.3 
Robbery or theft 16.2 52.5 
Vandalism 20.4 54.4 
Student use of alcohol 69.4 85.3 
Student use of illegal drugs 63.4 86.1 
Student possession of weapons 58.2 93.5 
Physical abuse of teachers 79.6 93.7 
Student racial tensions 54.7 78.8 
Student bullying 3.7 19.0 
Student verbal abuse of teachers 31.2 71.0 
Widespread disorder in classrooms 72.2 85.3 
Student acts of disrespect for teachers 12.4 36.0 
Gang activities 80.4 97.7 
 Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category. 
 
Lower salaries and lower availability of professional development opportunities may put 
the private school principal at a comparative disadvantage. Conversely, increased autonomy, 
lower barriers related to human resources that affect student learning and a perceived safer 
school environment may put the private school principal at a comparative advantage. A 
comparative disadvantage/advantage would mean the private school principal is less/more likely 
to be a stayer in comparison to the public school principal. It remains to be seen if self-perceived 
comparative advantages/disadvantages by school principals in either sector actually translate to 




4. Research design 
The study utilizes multinomial logistics regressions to analyze the determinants for the 
dependent variable 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟: a) for the 2011-2012 baseline year as the length planned to 
remain principal expressed: stayer, leaver or undecided and b) for the 2012-2013 follow-up year 
as a stayer or leaver. The baseline category stayer/leaver is comparable to the stayer/leaver 
category at the follow-up year. The undecided category at baseline year is not comparable with 
any category at the follow-up year. Hence, results for the undecided category are not reported. 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖            Equation (1) 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖        Equation (2) 
Equation (1) is run separately for the public and private school samples to examine the 
within sector determinants of turnover. Additionally equation (2) includes a school type dummy 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 to study if the turnover rates are consistently higher in the private sector than in the 
public sector. For within public school (public charter and traditional public schools) and private 
school (religious, Catholic and non-sectarian) sector analyses, the dummy Private is replaced by 
dummies Public charter, Private religious and Private Catholic in equation (2). 
In equation (1), coefficient 𝛽1 measures the likelihood of principal turnover for a unit 
increase in the control vector X. 𝜇 contains the unobserved error term. In equation (2), 
𝛽1 measures the likelihood of difference in principal turnover between private and public schools 
after controlling for vector X. 𝜇 contains the unobserved error term. The determinants of 
principal staying in or leaving the profession are contained in the control vector X. X comprises 
several measures that include principal-level characteristics such as principals’ total experience, 
race, gender, salary and age and school-level characteristics such as school size, school level, 




in table 7. When multiple survey items were listed under a broad theme of questions in the SASS 
survey, the items were combined into factors using a factor analysis. Average marginal effects 
for equations (1) and (2) are reported in the regression coefficients. All regressions are weighted 
using the survey weights provided in the principal status data files (the weights are the same for 
baseline year and the follow-up survey). As principal labor markets are likely to differ by state, 
state dummies are included in all models. 
Table 7: Measures used as controls in multinomial regression models 
Measure Variables 
Total experience 
Total experience (dummies as per table 1) as a principal, teacher, and 
previous experience as a department head, assistant principal or program 
director, participated in school training program, holding a 
license/certificate and management experience 
Race and gender Race and gender 
Other variables 
Salary in log, age (dummies created for young age ≤40, 41≤medium 
age≤60 and old age≥61) 
School controls 
School size, school level (dummies for elementary, secondary and 
combined), total school enrollment, number of full-time teachers, student-
teacher ratio, percent of minority teachers, percent of minority students, 
urbanicity (dummies for city, suburban, town and rural) and percentage of 
enrolled students approved for the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) 
at school, dummies for states. 
School 
specialization 
Dummy variable for specialized schools (for equation 2, the dummy is 
recoded for only comparable categories in table 3) 
School problems 
Factor variable of school problems (loads onto two factors with Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.8526). Frequency of physical conflict among students, physical 
abuse of teachers, student bullying, student verbal abuse of teachers, 
widespread disorder in classroom and student acts of disrespect for 
teachers load on to factor 1 whereas frequency of robbery or theft, 
vandalism, student use of alcohol, illegal drugs, possession of weapons, 
racial tensions and gang activities load on to factor 2. 
Principal 
autonomy 
Factor variable of principal's decision making (loads onto two factors with 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.6095). Determining content of in-service 
professional development programs for teachers, evaluating and hiring 
teachers, setting discipline policy and deciding how to spend school budget 
load on to factor 1 whereas setting performance standards for students and 
establishing curriculum at school load on to factor 2. 
Work conditions 
(bureaucratic) 
Weekly hours spent on all school-related activities, avg. percent time spent 










Factor of variables related to barriers faced by principals in incompetent 
teacher dismissal (loads onto two factors with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7352). 
Personnel policies, termination decisions not upheld, length of time required 
for termination process, effort required for documentation, tight deadlines for 
completing documentation, tenure and teacher associations or unions load on 
to factor 1 whereas dismissal is too stressful and/or uncomfortable, difficulty 
in obtaining suitable replacements and resistance from parents load on to 
factor 2. 
5. Results 
For the 2011-2012 baseline year, the dependent variable has three categories: stayer, 
leaver and undecided. The results for stayers generally mirror leavers. For findings where results 
for stayers and leavers mirror each other, the discussion focuses only on stayers. For the 2012-
2013 follow-up year, the dependent variable is dichotomous: stayers and leavers. Hence, the 
discussion focuses only on stayers.  
5.1 Determinants of principals’ stay in the profession and attrition based on principals’ stated 
preferences 
Results for different models are shown in table 8A. At the 2011-2012 baseline year, the 
significantly positive determinants of a private school principal to intend to remain as principal 
are principal autonomy, low principal experience (reference category experience>10 years), no 
teaching experience (reference category experience>10 years) and previous management 
experience outside education. Results for autonomy being perceived as a stabilizer by principals 
accord with Chubb and Moe (1988) and chapter 4 of this dissertation. It could be that private 
school principals with no teaching experience may be using the principalship as a route to 
teaching. Conversely, the significantly negative determinants for private school principals’ 
intention to stay as principal are average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks, 




department head, being white, principal salary, principals’ young age≤40 (reference category 
age>60) and elementary school level (reference category combined school level). Furthermore, 
school’s location in a city (reference category rural) and increase in the frequency of school 
problems is associated with private school principals’ intention to leave. As urbanicity is a weak 
determinant of principal turnover (Gates et al., 2006; DeAngelis & White, 2011; Tekleselassie & 
Villarreal, 2010), the results may be policy relevant if they remain statistically significant at the 
follow-up year. 
 The results for the average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks suggest 
that private sector institutions face administrative pressures similar to public institutions. It is 
surprising to note that a percent increase in principal salary is associated with a 10 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of a private principal to state their intention to leave the 
principalship. The negative coefficient on salary suggests that private schools attract principals 
for reasons other than salary. The change in sign of principal experience from positive to 
negative with an increase in experience (low: 1-3 years to medium: 4-10 years) indicates lesser 
opportunities for professional development or incentives for private school principals.  
The significantly positive determinants of a public school principal to intend to remain as 
principal are principal autonomy, working in a specialized school, no and low (1-3 years) 
principal experience (reference category experience>10 years), no and medium (4-10 years) 
teaching experience (reference category experience>10 years), participation in a school training 
or development program and currently holding a license/certificate in school administration. 
Seemingly public school principals have slightly lower autonomy (Chubb & Moe, 1988; chapter 
4 of this dissertation) than their private counterparts, hence, they perceive increased autonomy 




significantly negative determinants of public school principals’ intention to stay as principal are 
barriers to dismissal of poor-performing teachers (Oberman, 1996; Sun & Ni, 2016), average 
percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks and principals’ medium (41≤medium≤60) 
age (reference category age>60). It seems that the bureaucratic environment of principals’ office 
concerning paperwork, human resource and job related constraints adds to public school 
principals’ negative perception to remain as principals. Furthermore, the frequency of school 
problems, principals’ white race, principal salary, previous management experience outside 
education and percent of minority students at the school are associated with public school 
principals’ intention to leave. Results for principal race stand in contrast to earlier research 
(Rangel, 2018). 
When we compare the results for public and private schools, principal autonomy is a 
positive determinant for principals’ intention to stay as principal for both public and private 
school principals. However, principals in either sector value different factor loadings of principal 
autonomy. The private principals value autonomy concerning the setting of performance 
standards for students and establishing curriculum whereas the public principals value autonomy 
related to determining the content of professional development programs for teachers, evaluating 
and hiring teachers, setting the discipline policy and deciding how to spent the school budget. In 
both school sectors, the average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks is a 
significantly negative determinant of principals’ intention to stay as a principal. Low (1-3 years) 
principal experience (reference category experience>10 years) and no teaching experience 
(reference category experience>10 years) are significantly positive determinants of public and 
private school principals to state the desire to remain as principal. The combined model in 




average, the private school principal is 12 percentage points more likely to state the intention to 










Table 8A: Results for principals’ stated status at baseline year 
  Intended Stayer Intended Leaver 
  Private Public Pri / Pub  Private Public Pri / Pub  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private   0.118***   -0.075* 
   (0.039)   (0.041) 
Days/year required to work -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Teacher dismissal barrier 1 -0.024 -0.032*** -0.031*** 0.007 0.038*** 0.037*** 
 (0.032) (0.010) (0.009) (0.027) (0.009) (0.008) 
Teacher dismissal barrier 2 -0.010 0.006 0.002 -0.011 0.005 0.006 
 (0.023) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) 
Weekly hrs. spent on all school -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001* -0.001 
related activities (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Avg. percent time spent on  -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 
internal administrative tasks (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Principal autonomy 1 0.130*** 0.016 0.020** -0.070*** 0.011 0.007 
 (0.028) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) 
Principal autonomy 2 0.064 0.033*** 0.035*** -0.065*** -0.024*** -0.025*** 
 (0.040) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.008) (0.007) 
School problems 1 -0.001 -0.012 -0.012 0.035* 0.025*** 0.026*** 
 (0.025) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) 
School problems 2 -0.037 -0.017 -0.019* -0.011 0.015 0.014 
 (0.046) (0.011) (0.011) (0.035) (0.011) (0.010) 
Specialized school -0.102 0.061* 0.053 -0.124 -0.007 -0.010 
 (0.111) (0.036) (0.034) (0.086) (0.034) (0.032) 
Principal experience (no) 0.072 0.132*** 0.123*** -0.133* -0.123*** -0.118*** 
 (0.090) (0.036) (0.034) (0.069) (0.037) (0.035) 
Principal experience (low: 1-3 years) 0.219*** 0.068** 0.068*** -0.133* -0.067** -0.062** 
 (0.078) (0.028) (0.026) (0.076) (0.027) (0.026) 
Principal experience (medium: 4-10 years) -0.167*** 0.007 -0.006 0.120*** -0.020 -0.009 









Table 8A (Cont’d): Results for principals’ stated status at baseline year 
  Intended Stayer Intended Leaver 
  Private Public Pri / Pub  Private Public Pri / Pub  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total teaching experience (no) 1.009*** 0.139** 0.121* -1.996*** -0.012 -0.034 
 (0.199) (0.068) (0.064) (0.269) (0.066) (0.062) 
Total teaching experience (low: 1-3 years) 0.128 -0.057 -0.038 0.118 -0.006 0.005 
 (0.102) (0.049) (0.047) (0.073) (0.048) (0.046) 
Total teaching experience (medium: 4-10 years) -0.038 0.056*** 0.049*** -0.045 -0.020 -0.021 
 (0.058) (0.019) (0.018) (0.040) (0.017) (0.017) 
Worked as department head -0.096* 0.020 0.013 0.108*** -0.017 -0.011 
 (0.049) (0.017) (0.017) (0.036) (0.016) (0.016) 
Worked as an assistant principal  0.026 0.003 0.001 -0.039 0.032 0.027 
or program director (0.048) (0.021) (0.020) (0.038) (0.020) (0.019) 
Participated in school training  -0.045 0.068*** 0.060*** -0.021 -0.020 -0.019 
or development program (0.048) (0.017) (0.017) (0.041) (0.016) (0.016) 
Currently holding license/certificate  0.060 0.118** 0.087** 0.006 -0.031 -0.026 
in school administration (0.054) (0.046) (0.036) (0.044) (0.046) (0.037) 
Previous management experience  0.104** 0.018 0.025 -0.062 -0.035** -0.036** 
outside education (0.048) (0.017) (0.016) (0.039) (0.016) (0.015) 
Race (white) -0.157* -0.027 -0.023 0.046 0.050* 0.047* 
 (0.093) (0.029) (0.028) (0.071) (0.028) (0.027) 
Gender (male) 0.011 -0.014 -0.011 -0.052 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.053) (0.018) (0.017) (0.042) (0.016) (0.016) 
Principal salary (log) -0.123** -0.092 -0.094** 0.102*** 0.097* 0.102** 
 (0.052) (0.057) (0.042) (0.040) (0.056) (0.043) 
Principal age (young≤40) -0.248*** -0.031 -0.033 0.049 0.050 0.042 
 (0.087) (0.038) (0.035) (0.059) (0.038) (0.035) 
Principal age (41≤medium≤60) -0.039 -0.056* -0.050* 0.015 0.104*** 0.088*** 
 (0.054) (0.030) (0.028) (0.043) (0.030) (0.028) 
School size -0.021 0.002 0.007 -0.021 0.004 -0.000 









Table 8A (Cont’d): Results for principals’ stated status at baseline year 
  Intended Stayer Intended Leaver 
  Private Public Pri / Pub  Private Public Pri / Pub  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
School level (elementary) -0.309*** 0.020 -0.010 0.133** -0.030 -0.018 
 (0.072) (0.030) (0.028) (0.058) (0.028) (0.026) 
School level (secondary) -0.126 0.023 0.000 0.057 -0.022 -0.013 
 (0.078) (0.029) (0.027) (0.061) (0.027) (0.026) 
Total school enrollment 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of full time teachers  -0.000 0.002 0.002* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Student/teacher ratio -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
Percent of minority teachers  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Percent of minority students  -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
City 0.036 0.016 0.019 -0.124* -0.035 -0.036 
 (0.091) (0.028) (0.026) (0.070) (0.026) (0.025) 
Suburban -0.004 0.018 0.014 -0.053 -0.033 -0.030 
 (0.093) (0.025) (0.024) (0.067) (0.023) (0.022) 
Town -0.050 -0.002 -0.007 -0.036 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.088) (0.024) (0.023) (0.063) (0.023) (0.022) 
Percentage of enrolled students approved for the -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
National School Lunch Program (NSLP) at school (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 420 6,970 7,380 420 6,970 7,380 





5.2 Determinants of principals’ stay in the profession and attrition based on principals’ revealed 
preferences 
For the revealed status at follow-up year in table 8B, principals’ young and medium age 
(reference category age>60) are the only significantly positive determinants of a private school 
principal to stay as a principal. Average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks, 
frequency of school problems and low principal experience (reference category experience>10 
years) are negative determinants of a private school principal to stay as a principal. Principals 
aged 40 or lower are associated with a 22 percentage point increased likelihood for the private 
school principal to remain as a principal at the follow-up year when compared to principals aged 
60 or more. The coefficient for medium age principal diminishes in magnitude as compared to 
the coefficient for young age principal indicating that with an increase in age, the private school 
principal may be less likely to stay in the profession.  
Comparing the private principals’ responses at the baseline and the follow-up year shows 
a contradiction between their stated versus revealed preferences. The sign on the coefficient of 
low principal experience (reference category experience>10 years) and principal age change at 
the baseline versus follow-up year. The only consistent determinant for baseline and follow-up 
years is average percent time spent on internal administrative tasks. Principal autonomy, low 
principal experience (reference category experience>10 years), participation in school training or 
professional development, currently holding license/certificate in school administration and 
principals’ young and medium age (reference category age>60) are strong positive determinants 
while average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks is a negative determinant of 
a public school principal to stay as a principal. Comparing results for public principals at 




tasks, principal autonomy, low principal experience (reference category experience>10 years) 
and principals’ young age (reference category age>60) remain consistent determinants of the 









Table 8B: Results for principals’ revealed status (Actual stayer) at follow-up year 
  Private Public Private / Public  
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Private   0.029 
   (0.028) 
Days/year required to work 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Teacher dismissal barrier 1 0.017 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.007) (0.007) 
Teacher dismissal barrier 2 0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) 
Weekly hrs. spent on all school 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
related activities (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Avg. percent time spent on internal administrative tasks -0.002* -0.001* -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Principal autonomy 1 0.016 0.005 0.006 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.006) 
Principal autonomy 2 -0.008 0.009* 0.010* 
 (0.033) (0.005) (0.005) 
School problems 1 -0.034* 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.006) 
School problems 2 -0.054** -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.024) (0.007) (0.007) 
Specialized school 0.038 -0.019 -0.024 
 (0.079) (0.027) (0.025) 
Principal experience (no) -0.096 0.039 0.022 
 (0.072) (0.029) (0.027) 
Principal experience (low: 1-3 years) -0.120** 0.054*** 0.041** 
 (0.061) (0.019) (0.019) 
Principal experience (medium: 4-10 years) -0.072 0.022 0.016 









Table 8B (Cont’d): Results for principals’ revealed status (Actual stayer) at follow-up year 
  Private Public Private / Public  
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Total teaching experience (no) 0.026 0.039 0.041 
 (0.111) (0.050) (0.046) 
Total teaching experience (low: 1-3 years) -0.026 -0.030 -0.023 
 (0.091) (0.038) (0.037) 
Total teaching experience (medium: 4-10 years) -0.013 0.019 0.018 
 (0.052) (0.012) (0.012) 
Worked as department head -0.057 0.015 0.010 
 (0.043) (0.012) (0.012) 
Worked as an assistant principal or program director -0.036 0.003 0.001 
 (0.045) (0.013) (0.013) 
Participated in school training or development program 0.032 0.019* 0.017 
 (0.040) (0.012) (0.011) 
Currently holding license/certificate in school administration 0.018 0.063** 0.042 
 (0.043) (0.032) (0.026) 
Previous management experience outside education 0.049 0.001 0.005 
 (0.039) (0.012) (0.012) 
Race (white) 0.026 -0.015 -0.013 
 (0.098) (0.019) (0.018) 
Gender (male) -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.046) (0.012) (0.012) 
Principal salary (log) -0.005 -0.016 -0.014 
 (0.043) (0.039) (0.026) 
Principal age (young≤40) 0.223*** 0.120*** 0.122*** 
 (0.081) (0.023) (0.022) 
Principal age (41≤medium≤60) 0.141*** 0.111*** 0.107*** 
 (0.039) (0.016) (0.015) 
School size -0.029 -0.003 -0.002 









Table 8B (Cont’d): Results for principals’ revealed status (Actual stayer) at follow-up year 
  Private Public Private / Public  
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
School level (elementary) -0.023 0.014 0.011 
 (0.063) (0.023) (0.021) 
School level (secondary) 0.079 -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.053) (0.020) (0.019) 
Total school enrollment 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of full time teachers  0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Student/teacher ratio 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) 
Percent of minority teachers  0.002 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percent of minority students  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
City -0.106 0.012 0.005 
 (0.067) (0.018) (0.017) 
Suburban -0.082 0.017 0.014 
 (0.064) (0.015) (0.015) 
Town -0.068 0.019 0.015 
 (0.067) (0.017) (0.016) 
Percentage of enrolled students approved  0.001 0.000 0.000 
for the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) at school (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 400 6,730 7,120 




Young and medium age of principals are significantly positive determinants whereas 
average percent time spent on internal administrative tasks is a significantly negative determinant 
for both public and private school principals to stay as principal at the follow-up year. Low 
principal experience is a negative determinant for the private school principal but a positive 
determinant for the public school principal to remain a stayer at the follow-up year. The overall 
model with the dummy Private in column 3 has a positive coefficient but is not statistically 
significant. Although the private school principals were more likely to express their intention to 
stay as principal at the baseline year in comparison to public school principals, their stated 
intentions do not translate to the follow-up year in a statistically significant way. The results hint 
towards context dependent complexity in the nature of attrition and principal satisfaction (Boyce 
& Bowers, 2016; Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Farley-Ripple, Solano, & McDuffie, 
2012). In general, there is a disconnect between principals’ stated versus revealed preferences. 
Results indicate that public school principals might be climbers (Downs, 1967) who may stay in 
the profession for a few years and then get promoted into higher administration. Some principals 
may stay in the profession to gain teaching experience and later on go to teaching (Boyce & 
Bowers, 2016). 
Comparing principals’ responses at the baseline and the follow-up year shows that the 
average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks, low principal experience 
(reference category experience>10 years) and principals’ medium age (reference category 
age>60) are the only significantly consistent determinants of private principals leaving the 
profession. Whereas average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks, principal 
autonomy, low principal experience (reference category experience>10 years) and principals’ 




public principals leaving the profession. In the overall model, the dummy Private loses statistical 
significance at follow-up as compared to the baseline year. 
5.3 Within school sector comparisons 
 Tables 9A and 9B show results for within school sector comparisons between public 
charter and traditional public school (TPS) (dummy Public charter), religious and non-sectarian 
(dummy Private religious) and Catholic and other private schools (dummy Private Catholic). 
For within public school sector comparisons, the stated preferences at the baseline year show that 
public charter school principals are significantly more likely to intend to remain principals and 
much less likely to leave the profession in comparison to TPS principals. However, their 
revealed preferences at the follow-up year show a loss of statistical significance for the Public 
charter dummy. Results for within private sector comparisons yield statistically null coefficients 
on the dummy Private religious and Private Catholic. Principals’ stated preferences at the 
baseline year suggest that religious school principals are more likely to leave the profession in 
comparison to non-sectarian school principals, however the revealed status at the follow-up year 
indicates the contrary. Catholic school principals are less likely to intend to stay and also less 
likely to intend to leave the profession at the baseline year in comparison to other private school 
principals. At the follow-up year Catholic school principals are less likely to stay and more likely 
to leave the profession. The results reflect the high rate of closing of Catholic schools across the 
country (Brinig & Garnett, 2014). Thus, Catholic school principals would be more likely to 
expect to leave the profession and also be more likely actually to leave it, as for some of them 






Table 9 A: Results for principals’ stated status (Intended stayer) at baseline year 
  Intended Stayer Intended Leaver 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public charter 0.075*   -0.081*   
 (0.040)   (0.042)   
Private religious  -0.040   0.053  
  (0.093)   (0.080)  
Private Catholic   -0.072   -0.021 
   (0.061)   (0.048) 
Observations 6,970 420 420 6,970 420 420 
All models include controls for covariates in table 7 and also for state dummies.  
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 9 B: Results for principals’ revealed status (Actual stayer) at follow-up year 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Public charter 0.001   
 (0.028)   
Private religious  0.024  
  (0.086)  
Private Catholic   -0.023 
   (0.049) 
Observations 6,730 400 400 
All models include controls for covariates in table 7 and also for state dummies.  
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
At the overall level, the dummy variables indicate that within school sector differences 
are similar to between school sector differences at the follow-up year. However, at the baseline 
year only the within public school sector differences are similar to differences between the public 
and private school sectors. The overall results do not dismiss the possible heterogeneity that 
could exist within school sectors. Future research should consider the role of sector variables 
interacted with control variables in drawing policy relevant conclusions for across school sector 
differences. 
6. Conclusions 
This study contributes to fields of educational leadership, school choice and education 




and private schools in a nationally representative sample. There is a mismatch between 
principals’ stated preferences and revealed status for both public and private school principals. 
About one-third of control variables lose statistical significance at the follow-up year in 
comparison to the baseline year. Principals’ stated intentions to leave the principalship or not are 
more predictable, based on descriptive characteristics, than their subsequent revealed behaviors. 
Thus, there is a need to understand the mechanism that contributes to the disconnect between 
principals’ stated preferences versus their revealed status. The findings call for more research on 
principal satisfaction as a key determinant of principal turnover (Boyce & Bowers, 2016; Farley-
Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Farley-Ripple, Solano, & McDuffie, 2012). 
The study finds moderate evidence that private school principals are more likely to 
remain in the profession in comparison to public school principals and charter school principals 
are more likely to remain in the profession in comparison to TPS principals. Charter school 
principals are often the founder of their school so they may feel a personal attachment to it. The 
findings for a greater likelihood of religious school principals to remain in the profession in 
comparison to non-sectarian school principals are seen at the follow-up year but they contradict 
the results for principals’ stated preferences. The larger gap between public school principals’ 
stated preferences versus actual status suggest that private school principals provide a socially 
conditioned response whereas their public school counterparts provide a vocationally 
conditioned response. As a greater proportion of principals in private schools currently teach at 
their school, they are more likely to switch to teaching at their schools in the future (Chubb & 
Moe, 1988). A move from principalship to teacher is relatively easier for the private school 




specialization (Gerth & Mills, 1946) that limit such a transition and greater social distance 
between principals and teachers in public schools (Ingersoll, 2003). 
Participation in professional development activities, currently holding a license/certificate 
in school administration and principal autonomy are found to be significant determinants only 
for a public school principal to remain in the profession. Similarities in results at the follow-up 
year indicate that principals in both school sectors perceive the average percent of time they 
spend on internal administrative tasks as negative for their stay in the profession. Thus, internal 
administrative pressures are innate to the principal profession. Both young and medium age 
principals are more stable in the profession in comparison to old age principals. The results 
contrast with those of Rangel (2018) where the relation between age and turnover hints that 
younger and older principals are more prone to turnover in comparison to middle aged 
principals. Low principalship experience adds to the likelihood of public school principals to 
remain in the profession whereas it weakens the likelihood of private school principals to remain 
in the profession. This pattern could be due to presumably better opportunities for professional 
growth and job related stability for leaders in public schools. 
The current study has some limitations. For example, it did not differentiate between 
various types of attrition. Inclusion of variables related to school performance, accountability, 
parental involvement, teacher turnover and the role of sector variables interacted with control 
variables may offer opportunities for better understanding the relative importance of underlying 
mechanisms that affect turnover in each school sector. Researchers may investigate if principal 
training programs could address their common concerns related to average percent of time spent 
on internal administrative tasks. Replication of a similar analysis using different datasets may 
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
This dissertation presented evidence from four studies of differences between the public 
and private school sectors. Two studies combined causal evidence from studies on school 
vouchers globally to test the competing claims concerning the efficiency of public versus private 
schools at generating test scores. The overall evidence on student achievement in math and 
reading scores from all available experimental studies on school vouchers was analyzed. The 
findings were also explored from a cost-effectiveness perspective. Beyond voucher interventions, 
nationally representative datasets for school principal surveys were analyzed. Two studies 
separately examined principal autonomy and principal attrition between the public and private 
school sectors. This concluding chapter of the dissertation summarizes the findings from 
chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. The study limitations and policy implications are discussed. 
Summary of findings 
Evidence is presented from experimental studies on private school vouchers and 
educational leadership. Four key issues analyzed in the dissertation relate to: a) achievement 
effects of vouchers, b) cost-effectiveness of vouchers, c) comparative autonomy and d) 
comparative attrition of school leaders in private versus public schools. 
Chapter 2 is a global meta-analysis that combined evidence on student math and reading 
test scores from 20 randomized control trial (RCTs) on school vouchers. Sixteen studies took 
place in the U.S. whereas two studies each took place in India and Colombia. The 20 studies 
represent 11 distinct voucher programs. For each study, the level of randomization was at the 




limits and/or program location. The meta-analytic effects represent the achievement effects of 
low-cost private school vouchers on low-income, primarily urban minority children.  
The findings from the meta-analysis show a statistically null impact of the use of school 
vouchers on student achievement in math and reading inside the U.S. Overall impacts inside the 
U.S. for reading are 0.03 standard deviation (SD) whereas for math it is 0.01 SD. However, 
outside the U.S., the impacts are significantly positive: the reading impact is 0.51 SD and the 
math impact is 0.35 SD. The large impacts outside the U.S. are driven by the voucher program in 
Colombia that represents a combination of student incentives, additional education spending and 
private school productivity (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016). When the findings are analyzed by 
years of treatment, initially a decline in test scores impacts is seen but, by year 3 and beyond, the 
test scores catch up and improve, more so for reading scores. 
Chapter 3 analyzed the voucher studies from the perspective of cost-effectiveness. The 
programs were categorized as either publicly or privately funded, with the former defined as a 
program that received any public funds. Furthermore, some programs required participating 
private schools to accept the cost of the voucher as the full amount for educating students in their 
schools. Such programs were labelled ‘fully funded.’ Other programs covered only partial tuition 
costs and allowed the parents to top-up with extra amounts to cover the remaining cost of 
educating their children. 
The results of the cost-effectiveness analysis do not establish whether publicly versus 
privately funded programs are more efficient, as it is difficult to directly compare the cost-
effectiveness of these two types of funding mechanisms, as they differ in terms of who pays, and 
generally only privately-funded programs allow top-up. However, in accord with prior findings 




found that generally, private school vouchers save money, even in cases where the voucher 
impacts are statistically null for student achievement in math and reading. The lower bound net 
savings for US programs was approximately $55 million. The lower bound net savings for the 
program in Colombia was $4 million and for the programs in India was $2 million. Globally the 
voucher interventions resulted in a lower bound net savings of approximately $60 million. 
Assuming the results for a modest private school advantage in student achievement with 
time hold across contexts, we want to know why they do so. Chapter 4 analyzed differences in 
private and public sector principals’ responses to having control over seven school level 
activities. In six out of seven activities such as hiring and firing teachers and having autonomy 
over spending the budget, the private school principals reported having significantly more 
autonomy than their public counterparts. The results comport with Chubb and Moe (1988) who 
theorized there was increased autonomy for leaders in the private school sector in comparison to 
leaders in the public school sector. 
Chapter 5 investigated whether private school principals are more likely to stay in the 
profession than public school principals. Principals’ stated preferences at the baseline year 
showed that principals in private schools are 12 percentage points more likely to intend to remain 
in the profession in comparison to principals in public schools. A year later, the differences in 
principals’ revealed status loses statistical significance. The determinants of principal attrition at 
the baseline year stand in contrast to determinants of attrition at the follow-up year.  
Study limitations 
The first two studies presented in this dissertation suffer from some limitations. For 
example, the meta-analysis examined 11 voucher programs, three of which are outside the U.S., 




especially outside the U.S., in developing countries having a larger gap between public and 
private institutions. A second issue is that most voucher programs have not been evaluated for 
three years or more, thus, severely restricting the ability of researchers to test dosage effects of 
voucher use. Thirdly, limited data does not establish differences between publicly and privately 
funded programs. More granular data related to funding is necessary for a more precise 
benefit/cost analysis of vouchers. Fourthly, most voucher programs included in the meta-analysis 
are small scale interventions. Programs with more participants may allow a better understanding 
of issues that relate to the scaling up of vouchers. Lastly, the data do not allow us to examine 
how voucher impacts differ between lower, middle and high grade levels.  
Some limitations also concern the last two studies in this dissertation. Private institutions 
tend to have less public accountability than public institutions. Hence, increased autonomy for 
private school principals needs to be connected to educational outcomes for establishing its role 
in producing educational benefits. Furthermore, the dissertation did not test if principal 
autonomy is a moderator of student achievement, attainment or civic outcomes. Whether 
increased autonomy for school principals is an educational good or if principals’ self-perceived 
increased autonomy actually translates into revealed practices of education innovation needs to 
be studied. Similarly, the dissertation did not test if principals’ longer stay in the profession is 
good or bad. The results show no statistically significant difference between principals’ revealed 
attrition status in the public and private sectors. Lastly, the findings from leadership studies are 
not causal. More studies are needed in different contexts to establish differences in leadership 




Important lessons for policy 
The general pattern of the results indicates that vouchers tend to increase reading scores 
more than math scores. The initial decline in test scores could be due to the school switch which 
most voucher participants experience at the start of their participation in the program. Students 
may require time to adjust to their new private schools. Conversely, the private schools that 
participate in voucher programs may require time to adjust to an influx of disadvantaged students 
(Wolf, 2018). Thus, longer term achievement effects are more relevant for drawing policy 
conclusions (Das et al., 2013; Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016).  
Generally, school vouchers are cost-effective as they tend to generate student 
achievement outcomes either as good as or somewhat better than traditional public schools, at a 
fraction of the cost (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015; Wolf & McShane, 2013). Thus null 
achievement impacts in voucher programs, if obtained at lower per-student expense than public 
schools, may have a net benefit. For policy, results establish that vouchers are generally cost-
effective and produce moderate effects over time.  
Results also establish a private school leadership advantage in autonomy over school-
level activities such as establishing curriculum and setting the discipline policy of the school. At 
the baseline year, private school principals are much more likely to perceive that they will stay in 
the principalship than are public school principals. The study on principal attrition yields a 
private sector advantage for principals’ perceptions but not for their revealed status. Overall, the 
leadership research shows a private school advantage for school principals’ autonomy and 
modest advantage for principals to remain in the profession. Results indicate that the response of 
private school principals to questions about their continuance in the job is socially conditioned 




 This dissertation presents research showing a clear and consistent but moderate benefit of 
school vouchers on student test scores that is also cost-effective. Second, research shows a more 
free private school principal, who is not bound by as much red tape of bureaucracy. The impacts 
may vary across contexts so more research is needed. Nevertheless, private schools offer a hope 
for educational improvement. Use of empirical data in educational research is both wonderful 
and helpful for a graduate student. However, Hess (2017) informs is in his book Letters to a 
Young Education Reformer that even educated and well-trained researchers may look and 
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